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SUMMARY 
This thesis explores the development of Bertrand Russell‘s theory of definite 
descriptions. It aims at demonstrating the connection between Russell‘s views on the 
subject of denoting and his attempt, in the period 1903-05, to develop a solution to ‗the 
Contradiction‘ (i.e. the Russell Paradox). The thesis argues that the discovery of the 
theory of descriptions, and the way in which it works, are best understood against the 
backdrop of Russell‘s work on the paradoxes. A new understanding of Russell‘s 
seminal paper ‗On Denoting‘ is presented, including a novel interpretation of the 
notorious ‗Gray‘s Elegy Argument‘, in which Russell argues against his earlier theory 
of denoting.  
 
That Russell‘s work on denoting is connected to his work on the paradoxes is 
reasonably well-known: the nature of the connection has not, however, been adequately 
brought out in the literature. This is addressed through demonstrating the relationship 
between Russell‘s work on denoting and his development of the ‗substitutional theory‘ 
of classes and relations. This theory eliminates classes and propositional functions in 
favour of matrices and substitutions. The role of the theory of descriptions in the 
development of the substitutional theory is commonly supposed to be merely that the 
theory of descriptions facilitates the ontological elimination of classes. But this 
elimination was equally possible on Russell‘s earlier theory of denoting (which he had 
rejected in the Gray‘s Elegy Argument). In the thesis it is suggested that the theory of 
descriptions brings with it a new conception of analysis, and that it is through the 
introduction of this new form of analysis—rather than through the elimination of 
classes—that the theory of descriptions facilitates the substitutional approach. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis concerns the origins of Bertrand Russell‘s ‗theory of descriptions‘. Its main 
aim is to demonstrate the connection between Russell‘s views on denoting and his 
attempt, in the period 1903-05, to develop a solution to ‗the Contradiction‘ (i.e. the 
Russell paradox). In this way the thesis will, I hope, make a significant contribution to 
the understanding of the theory of descriptions and of the classic paper ‗On Denoting‘ 
(OD) in which it was first presented. 
 
Two connections are established in the thesis. The first is between Russell‘s earlier 
and later theories of denoting: between the ‗theory of denoting concepts‘ from 1903‘s 
The Principles of Mathematics (PoM), and the theory of descriptions from OD. The 
second is between the theory of denoting (generally conceived) and the attempt to solve 
the paradoxes. I will speak to each of these connections, and then provide an overview 
of each of the five chapters that follow. 
 
1. Denoting 
In the broadest sense, denoting is a certain kind of phenomenon: that phenomenon 
whereby description is possible
1
; that phenomenon whereby a sentence may express a 
proposition which is about an entity in virtue of that entity‘s satisfying a certain 
property. Thus ‗denoting phrases‘ are phrases formed by the combination of a 
determiner expression (‗some‘, ‗all‘, ‗any‘, ‗the‘, etc.) with a noun phrase; and the 
occurrence of a denoting phrase in a sentence signals that the proposition it expresses is, 
in some sense, about some selection of entities having the property given by noun 
phrase. It is in this sense that OD is a paper about denoting, and in this sense that the 
theory of descriptions is a theory of denoting. 
 
The notion of denoting is introduced in PoM as a fundamental logical relation, one 
of the constants to be appealed to in Russell‘s attempt to demonstrate the logicist thesis 
that the truths of mathematics can be deduced from pure logic. This technical sense of 
denoting is to be distinguished from the broad sense identified above. In the technical 
sense denoting is a relation which holds between a ‗denoting concept‘ and an entity just 
                                                 
1
 Cf. PoM: §56, 53. 
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in case, when the denoting concept occurs in a proposition, the proposition is about the 
entity. This is the basic thought behind PoM‘s theory of denoting concepts. 
 
The theory of descriptions and the theory of denoting concepts are both theories of 
denoting. I will use the expression ‗theory of denoting‘ in this broad sense; thus if I, for 
example, speak of the connection between the theory of denoting and the paradoxes, I 
should be understood as making a claim concerning the relation of the paradoxes to the 
general theory of the phenomenon of denoting. If I intend a particular theory of denoting 
I will refer to it by name. 
 
The notion of denoting is intimately linked to the notion of generality. A theory of 
denoting will constitute an account of generality, or at least of propositions involving 
generality. Recognising this is crucial to understanding the relationship between OD 
and Russell‘s earlier work. In PoM all denoting phrases—definite descriptions 
included—are taken to indicate denoting concepts and so to involve generality. In this 
they are to be contrasted with singular terms. Now on a fairly commonplace reading of 
OD, the purpose of the paper is to question the status of definite descriptions as singular 
terms.
2
 The referential use of definite descriptions is, after all, very common; and this 
observation has formed the basis of most major objections to Russell‘s theory.3 But if 
Russell‘s view prior to OD was that the analysis of sentences containing definite 
descriptions involved the notion of generality, it begins to seem less likely that the 
arguments in OD explicitly concern singular terms. This suspicion can only be 
reinforced by the discovery—now widely accepted—that the ‗Gray‘s Elegy Argument 
(GEA)
4
, OD‘s main objection to rival views, primarily targets Russell‘s earlier 
position.
5
 I take it, therefore, that in order to approach a full understanding OD, one 
must appreciate both the theory of denoting concepts and the argument which led 
Russell to abandon it. 
 
                                                 
2
 E.g. Salmon 2005. 
3
 Most obviously Strawson 1950 and Donnellan 1966.  
4
 OD: 48-51. 
5
 That this is the case is obvious from the manuscript ‗On Fundamentals‘ (OF), written in 1905 prior to 
OD. 
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2. Denoting and the Paradoxes 
In My Philosophical Development (MPD), Russell described the period during which he 
arrived at the theory of descriptions as follows: 
 
When The Principles of Mathematics was finished, I settled down to a resolute 
attempt to find a solution of the paradoxes. [. . .] Throughout 1903 and 1904, my 
work was almost wholly devoted to this matter, but without any vestige of 
success. My first success was the theory of descriptions, in the spring of 1905 
(MPD: 79) 
 
Whilst much has been written about the theory of descriptions, comparatively little has 
been written about its origins. Recent interest in the GEA has done much to redress the 
balance, and attention has refocused on Russell‘s earlier account of denoting. However 
this does not explain why he should have taken the theory of descriptions to be his ‗first 
success‘ in the attempt to find a solution of the paradoxes. Why, if his work was ‗almost 
wholly devoted‘ to the attempt to find a solution of the paradoxes, was Russell 
investigating the nature of denoting and of descriptions? On this very central question, 
the literature is, on the whole, silent.
6
 
 
But perhaps this silence is to be explained by the simple fact that there is no 
immediate connection between the paradoxes and denoting at all. Immediately after the 
passage quoted above, Russell says that the theory of descriptions ‗was, apparently, not 
connected with the contradictions, but in time an unsuspected connection emerged‘ 
(MPD: 79). Perhaps it was just good old luck that brought two apparently unconnected 
areas of Russell‘s work together. 
 
But this suggestion does not bear close scrutiny. Why was Russell working on 
denoting at all, if it bore no relation to his overall project of solving the paradoxes? His 
work on denoting was clearly no passing fancy, as the posthumously published papers 
from the period 1903-05 attest.
7
 Moreover, the paradoxes, in their most well-known 
formulations, involve classes and predicates: is it, then, just a coincidence that in PoM 
the discussions of denoting, classes, and predicates are so closely linked?
8
 
                                                 
6
 By no means completely silent. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Consuegra (1989; 1992); Wahl (1993); Landini 
(1998a; 1998b); and Levine (2005). 
7
 Cf. OMDP, DVD, PAD, OMD, OF; see also EIP. 
8
 I discuss this connection in Chapter One. 
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I think it is plain that the paradoxes and the theory of denoting are connected. The 
question is not so much if they are connected, but how. The answer concerns Russell‘s 
‗substitutional theory of classes and relations‘ (STCR). Russell had tried to construct a 
substitutional theory in 1904, but had, he claimed, ‗failed for want of the theory of 
denoting‘ (Grattan-Guinness 1977: 79-80). Once the theory of descriptions was up and 
running, however, he ‗found at last that substitution would work, and all went 
swimmingly‘ (Grattan-Guinness 1977: 80). The key to understanding the relation 
between the theory of denoting and the paradoxes is, I think, to understand why it is that 
the substitutional theory would only work with the new theory of denoting, and not with 
the old. If we could account for this we would, it seems to me, have identified what, for 
Russell, was most important about the theory of descriptions. 
 
3. Overview of the Following Chapters 
Chapter One: Denoting in the Principles of Mathematics 
Russell‘s general metaphysical and logical framework is set out. It is argued that the 
theory of denoting concepts is introduced as a basic component of Russell‘s logical 
apparatus—as part of an account of generality—rather than in response to an 
epistemological problem concerning infinite classes (as has been suggested in the 
literature). The ‗logical genesis view‘ of the theory of denoting concepts is introduced 
and defended; in so doing, the close connection between denoting concepts, predicates, 
and classes is emphasised. Russell‘s interest in denoting is located in a firmly logico-
mathematical setting. 
 
Chapter Two: Denoting and the Paradoxes 
It is argued that Russell‘s presentation of the ‗mixed‘ paradox of classes (involving 
classes-as-many and classes-as-one) involves a complex interplay of the notions of 
intension and extension. (This interplay is related back to the theory of denoting in 
Chapter Five.) The standards that Russell demanded of a satisfactory solution to the 
paradoxes are examined. In illustrating Russell‘s concerns in this area, a widespread 
understanding of his commitment to the doctrine of the unrestricted variable is 
challenged. The ‗theory of meaning and denotation‘ is introduced and shown to differ 
very little from the theory of denoting concepts. The role of the theory of meaning and 
denotation in the search for a solution of the paradoxes is then discussed. 
5 
 
 
Chapter Three: „On Denoting‟ and the Theory of Descriptions 
The theory of descriptions is introduced, and its central principle taken to be that 
denoting phrases are incomplete symbols. It is argued that the notion of an incomplete 
symbol, at least as Russell employs it, is intimately bound to the notion of ‗structurally-
radical interpretive analysis‘. The neglect of this connection has, it is argued, induced a 
tendency to mischaracterise the nature of Russell‘s theory. Emphasising the connection 
serves to distance the theory as Russell presents and uses it, from the version advocated 
by contemporary philosophers of language. It is suggested that Russell‘s version of the 
theory—by treating predicate expressions as what I shall call ‗quasi-incomplete 
symbols‘—is suitable for his purposes apropos the paradoxes in a way that the more 
contemporary version is not (this is discussed again in Chapter Five). The theory of 
descriptions‘ solution of OD‘s three ‗logical puzzles‘ is then demonstrated; and the 
‗Central Question of OD‘ is identified as being: How is it that sentences containing 
denoting phrases come to be about whatever it is that they are about? 
 
Chapter Four: The Gray‟s Elegy Argument 
A detailed original interpretation of the ‗Gray‘s Elegy Argument‘ (GEA) is provided. It 
is argued that the argument targets both Russell‘s earlier theory of denoting and Frege‘s 
theory of Sinn. These two theories share a common assumption. This assumption is not, 
however, the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms (as argued by Nathan 
Salmon (2005)); rather, both theories appeal to the relation between meaning and 
denotation in their respective answers to the Central Question of OD. Each paragraph of 
the GEA is then discussed, and the argumentative moves uncovered. The argument is 
taken to concern the ability of the theory of meaning and denotation to adequately 
answer the Central Question of OD. It is suggested that the GEA is sufficient to warrant 
the rejection of Russell‘s earlier view, but that Frege‘s theory can, if one is so inclined, 
be rescued. 
 
Chapter Five: Toward a Solution to the Paradoxes 
The thematic connections between the theory of denoting, the GEA, and the paradoxes 
are established. Certain structural similarities between Russell‘s thinking about classes 
and denoting are indicated, and some connections are drawn between the interplay of 
the notions of extension and intension in relation to the theory of classes and the theory 
6 
 
of denoting. The role of the theory of descriptions in relation to the ‗substitutional 
theory‘ is then discussed. Here it may be seen why it is important to distinguish between 
the theory of descriptions as presented by Russell, and the modified theory endorsed by 
contemporary philosophers of language. For it is the element of structurally-radical 
interpretive analysis—i.e. that which contemporary philosophers of language fail to 
carry over from Russell—that is the key to understanding Russell‘s use of the theory of 
descriptions (rather than the theory of meaning and denotation) in his substitutional 
response to the paradoxes. 
 
 
 
7 
 
1. Denoting in The Principles of Mathematics 
 
1. Introduction 
Prior to the discovery of the theory of descriptions, Russell endorsed a theory of 
denoting he had first set out in his 1903 work The Principles of Mathematics (PoM). 
The discovery of the theory of descriptions was intimately connected with the discovery 
of certain ‗rather curious difficulties‘ (OD: 48) in the earlier view, difficulties 
concerning its ability to adequately discharge its duties as a theory of denoting. 
 
So what are the duties of a theory of denoting? What is a theory of denoting 
supposed to do? This chapter will set about answering these rather general questions by 
introducing PoM‘s ‗theory of denoting concepts‘, and addressing the question of why 
Russell introduced it. 
 
One answer to this question is that endorsed by James Levine in the following 
passage: 
 
Russell broke with idealism toward the end of 1898, but he introduced the 
theory of denoting concepts sometime in 1901, only after coming to accept 
Cantor‘s theory of the infinite. The introduction of denoting concepts was a 
response to certain epistemological difficulties raised by this change in Russell‟s 
early philosophy. (Levine 1998: 416, emphasis added) 
 
There is certainly some merit in this view, for Russell did hold that the theory of 
denoting concepts resolved the epistemological worries to which Levine refers.
1
 
However I shall be proposing an alternative account of the origins of the theory of 
denoting concepts (and so of Russell‘s interest in denoting). According to the view I 
shall defend, the notion of denoting is central to Russell‘s account of generality. The 
theory of denoting concepts is introduced not in response to any specific 
epistemological problem, but as a basic component of his logical apparatus. That there 
is some connection between denoting and generality is acknowledged by some 
commentators.
2
 But the precise nature of the connection has not been discussed in the 
                                                 
1
 PoM: §72. 
2
 Hylton 2005d: 195-96; Wahl 2007: 12; Landini 2009: 285. 
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literature. I will describe how Russell ‗derives‘ (in a certain sense of that word) 
denoting concepts from predicates, and will stress the connection between denoting 
concepts, predicates, and classes. The notions of denoting and of class are, for the 
Russell of PoM, basic logical notions to be used in the logicist reduction of the truths of 
mathematics to truths of logic. They share a deep connection in virtue of a common link 
to the nature of predicates.
3
 
 
The present chapter has two main aims. The more general aim is to introduce the 
basic Russellian framework within which this entire thesis is situated. To this end I 
begin, in §§2-3, by introducing Russell‘s general metaphysical and epistemological 
position in PoM. The second, more particular, aim is to investigate the nature of 
Russell‘s interest in denoting. In §3 I discuss the epistemological problem to which the 
above quotation from Levine refers. In giving a brief primary account of the theory of 
denoting concepts, I explain how it addresses this problem. In §4 I argue for what I shall 
call ‗the logical genesis view‘ of the origins of the theory of denoting concepts. The 
view favoured by Levine and others—the ‗epistemological view‘ as I shall call it—rests 
on an equivocation. I shall argue that in identifying and resolving this equivocation, one 
renders the epistemological view poorly motivated. 
 
2. Terms, Propositions, and Acquaintance 
Having broken free from neo-Hegelian idealism, Russell and G. E. Moore embraced an 
extreme realism.
4
 On this view the world is ultimately composed of a number of 
discrete, self-subsistent, mind- and language-independent entities, which Russell calls 
‗terms‘. 
 
Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false 
proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is the widest 
word in the philosophical vocabulary. I shall use as synonymous with it the 
words unit, individual and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every 
term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being, 
i.e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimaera, 
                                                 
3
 They also share a deep connection to propositional functions. Although I say very little about 
propositional functions in this chapter, they feature frequently in later chapters. 
4
 Russell often acknowledged his intellectual debt to Moore: e.g. ‗On fundamental questions of 
philosophy, my position, in all its chief features, is derived from Mr G. E. Moore‘ (PoM: xviii) (cf. 
MTCA: 21; MPD: 54). The precise extent to which Moore led the way is a matter of dispute (Baldwin 
1990: 6-7; Cartwright 2003: 109; Griffin 1991: §7.2). 
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or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term; and to deny that 
such and such a thing is a term must always be false. (PoM: §47, 43) 
 
Terms are possible objects of thought but, as Moore is careful to point out, this is not a 
defining feature of them, but ‗merely states that they may come into relation with a 
thinker‘ (Moore 1899: 179).5 
 
Terms are the constituents of propositions, and propositions—complexes of terms, 
unified in a distinctive manner—are the objects of judgement and meanings of 
declarative sentences.
6
 The crucial difference between terms and propositions is that the 
latter are capable of truth or falsehood, while the former are capable of neither. The 
proposition that Jones is a madman is (say) true, while the simple term Jones is not the 
kind of thing that could have a truth-value. For Russell, during this period, truth is not a 
matter of correspondence between a proposition and something else. The proposition is 
composed of the very entities to which the words in the sentence refer
7
; hence there is 
nothing left over for the proposition to correspond to. Rather, Russell‘s view is that 
truth is an un-analysable property of some propositions: 
 
It may be said – and this is, I believe, the correct view – that there is no problem 
at all in truth and falsehood; that some propositions are true and some false, just 
as some roses are red and some white. [. . .] What is truth, and what falsehood, 
we must merely apprehend, for both seem incapable of analysis. (MTCA: 75-6) 
 
If this account of truth is to be at all convincing, Russell owes an explanation of the 
distinction between simple terms and propositions.
8
 Moore had attempted to explain the 
distinction between simple terms and propositions by way of relations: 
 
                                                 
5
 He adds that ‗in order that they may do anything, they must already be something‘ (Moore 1899: 179), 
emphasising their independence of the mind. Moore makes his comments regarding what he calls 
‗concepts‘. Moore‘s concepts are not precisely the same as Russell‘s terms, but, for our immediate 
purposes here, the differences are unimportant. 
6
 Not all complexes of terms are propositions (e.g. classes-as-many are non-propositional complex 
objects); but all unified complexes of terms are propositional (PoM: §439, 466). Note that Russell follows 
Moore in holding that the object of perception is an existential proposition (MTCA: 21; cf. Moore 1899: 
183). 
7
 Thus Russell insists, as against Frege, that Mont Blanc—the actual mountain, snowfields and all—is a 
component part of the proposition expressed by the sentence ‗Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high‘ 
(Frege 1980: 169). 
8
 Russell‘s account of truth is difficult in a number of respects. For insightful discussion see Korhonen 
2009. 
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A proposition is constituted by any number of [terms], together with a specific 
relation between them; and according to the nature of this relation the 
proposition may be either true or false (Moore 1899: 180). 
 
On this view, that propositions are truth-apt is attributable to their complexity; and the 
distinction between complex and simple terms is that the former, but not the latter, 
contain relations. Such a view leads straight to the problem of the unity of the 
proposition, of which Russell later commented: ‗I recognize that it is my duty to answer 
[the problem] if I can, and, if I cannot, to look for an answer as long as I live‘ (Griffin 
1993: 159 (Russell to Bradley, 30 Jan 1914)). Russell encountered the problem on many 
occasions throughout his career
9
, but here is one statement of it
10
: 
 
Consider [. . .] the proposition ―𝐴 differs from 𝐵.‖ The constituents of this 
proposition, if we analyze it, appear to be only 𝐴, difference, 𝐵. Yet these 
constituents, thus placed side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition. The 
difference which occurs in the proposition actually relates 𝐴 and 𝐵, whereas the 
difference after analysis is a notion which has no connection with 𝐴 and 𝐵. [. . .] 
A proposition, in fact, is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the 
unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition. (PoM: §54, 
49-50) 
 
Moore‘s explanation of unity does not bear close scrutiny. On his view, if 
proposition 𝑝 is composed of terms 𝑥1, . . . 𝑥𝑛, there is some relation 𝑟, also occurring in 
𝑝, such that 𝑟 relates 𝑥1, . . . 𝑥𝑛 one to another. The nature of 𝑟 will determine 𝑝‘s truth-
value, but of 𝑟‘s nature nothing more can be said (Moore 1899: 180). This isn‘t really an 
explanation at all. Moreover, the idea that propositional unity can be explained in this 
way succumbs to Bradley‘s Regress. If 𝑝 is composed of 𝑥1, . . . 𝑥𝑛 and relation 𝑟, then 𝑟 
is the explanation of the relatedness of 𝑥1, . . . 𝑥𝑛. But what is the explanation of the 
relatedness of 𝑥1, . . . 𝑥𝑛 and 𝑟? We may, if we like, posit a further relation, 𝑟′, such that 
𝑟′ relates 𝑥1, . . . 𝑥𝑛 and 𝑟, but this only leads to the demand for a further relation, 𝑟′′, 
and then 𝑟′′′, and so on.11 
 
Like Moore, Russell is convinced that propositional unity is derived from the nature 
of the relation: unlike Moore, he attempts to clarify its status. Relations, he suggests, 
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 Hylton 2005b; Griffin 1993; Stevens 2005. 
10
 Cf. PoM: §§55, 136, 439; MTCA: 28; MPD: 63. 
11
 Cf. Bradley 1930: Ch. II. 
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can occur in propositions in a different manner to other terms; and it is in this difference 
of mode of occurrence that the explanation of propositional unity is to be found. But 
before we discuss distinctions among terms and their modes of occurrence in 
propositions, it will be helpful to turn first to Russell‘s account of the relation between 
mind and world. 
 
2.1. Acquaintance 
Terms are radically independent of the mind, which is to say that they are what they are 
independently of their being thought of. The mind is in the world—it is a term among 
other terms—but it is not, in any significant sense, constitutive of the world. This sets 
the realism of Russell and Moore clearly apart from the idealism against which they 
were reacting, by drawing a distinct line between the mind and its objects. But if this 
separation is maintained and genuine knowledge of reality is to be possible, there must 
be some cognitive capacity capable of spanning the gap between mind and world. That 
cognitive capacity is acquaintance.
12
 
 
From Russell‘s perspective, what is crucial about acquaintance is that it is a direct, 
unmediated relation between a mind and a term, the converse of the relation of 
presentation between a term and a mind (KAKD: 201). Thus to have acquaintance with 
Socrates is to be (or have been) directly aware of Socrates, for him to have been 
presented to one. The possibility of this unmediated cognitive relation between mind 
and term underwrites the possibility of genuine knowledge of terms.
13
 But to have 
acquaintance with Socrates is not, in itself, to know any fact about him, but only to 
stand in a direct cognitive relation to him. To know of a term 𝑡 that it has property 𝐹, is 
to know a proposition, ⟨𝑡 is 𝐹⟩, whose constituents include 𝑡 and 𝐹.14 Acquaintance is 
‗prior‘ to judgement in the logical sense that it is presupposed by it: one must have 
acquaintance with 𝑡 in order to entertain a judgement about it. Russell notes that while 
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 Russell says very little about epistemological matters in PoM. Explicitly epistemological discussions 
begin to appear more frequently in the CP4 manuscripts (esp. PAD and OMD). 
13
 The contrast with Frege‘s position serves to bring out the sense in which acquaintance is, for Russell, 
unmediated. On Frege‘s view, to grasp a thought about Mont Blanc is to grasp a Thought in which occurs 
a Sinn (Sense) which stands in a certain relation to Mont Blanc. Thought is in this way mediated by Sinne. 
For Russell there is no such intermediary: a thought about Mont Blanc involves a proposition in which 
the mountain itself occurs. Thought must be unmediated in this sense, Russell claims, for ‗if we do not 
admit this, then we get the conclusion that we know nothing at all about Mont Blanc‘ (Frege 1980: 169).  
14
 I use angle brackets (‗⟨‘ and ‗⟩‘) to distinguish propositions (worldly items) from sentences (linguistic 
items). 
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acquaintance is logically independent of judgement, ‗it would be rash to assume that 
human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance with things without at the same time 
knowing some truth about them‘ (PoP: 25). 
 
Propositions, though complex, are terms nonetheless, and one may have 
acquaintance with them. Having acquaintance with a proposition 𝑝 is not, however, 
equivalent to judging that 𝑝 for, as we have said, to have acquaintance with a term is not 
yet to know anything about it (while to judge that 𝑝 is to take a stand on its truth-value). 
Acquaintance is a form of ‗knowledge of things‘, while judgement is a form of 
‗knowledge of truths‘15 (PoP: chs. 4-5 passim). 
 
Acquaintance is an unmediated cognitive relation between a mind and a term; its 
linguistic counterpart is reference or indication. Indication is a direct, unmediated 
semantic relation between a word and its meaning—and the meaning of a word is a 
term: ‗Words all have meaning, in the simple sense that they are symbols which stand 
for something other than themselves‘ (PoM: §51, 47). The meaning of a (declarative) 
sentence is a kind of concatenation or complex of the meanings of the words in the 
sentence: that is, the meaning of a sentence is a proposition. The sentence ‗Brutus 
murdered Caesar‘ contains three words ‗Brutus‘, ‗murdered‘, and ‗Caesar‘, which 
indicate the three terms Brutus, murder, and Caesar respectively. The sentence 
expresses the proposition ⟨Brutus murdered Caesar⟩, a proposition containing (let us 
suppose) just Brutus, murder, and Caesar.
16
 But there is more to a proposition than just 
its constituents. 
 
For one thing, there is, as we have seen, something that explains why those 
constituents constitute a proposition rather than a mere juxtaposition of terms (though 
we have not yet seen what, for Russell, this is). But there is also an issue concerning the 
structure of the proposition. The propositions ⟨Caesar murdered Brutus⟩ and ⟨Brutus 
murdered Caesar⟩ contain precisely the same constituents, but are obviously distinct. 
The distinction is a matter of their respective structures. This is seen most clearly by 
                                                 
15
 Of course not all judgements constitute knowledge. 
16
 The parenthetical caveat alludes to the fact that the proposition may also contain some instant (or 
instants) of time, corresponding to the tense of the verb. Maybe there are other constituents corresponding 
to other grammatical properties of the sentence, but for simplicity let us follow Russell‘s lead in ignoring 
such factors. 
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returning to the sentential level: if one wishes to express the proposition ⟨Brutus 
murdered Caesar⟩, one needs a sentence containing the words ‗Brutus‘, ‗murdered‘, and 
‗Caesar‘; but it is absolutely essential that they are structured appropriately (the verb in 
the middle, ‗Brutus‘ to its left, ‗Caesar‘ to its right). Propositions are not just unified 
complexes of terms: they are structured, such that if two distinct propositions 𝑝 and 𝑞 
have the same constituents, they may be distinguished by way of their structural 
properties. 
 
To judge a proposition is not simply to have acquaintance with it, nor yet simply to 
have acquaintance with all of its constituent terms, but is to have acquaintance with all 
of its constituent terms and some insight into their structure. The capacity for insight 
into propositional structure is presumably un-analysable (at least there is nothing in 
PoM to suggest otherwise); it amounts to the capacity to recognise, for any proposition 
that one can entertain, the conditions under which that proposition would be true. That 
is to say, there is a relation in which one may stand to a proposition whereby one need 
not have made a judgement as to its truth-value, but whereby one knows what would 
have to be the case in order that it be true. Call that relation ‗entertainment‘: then if 𝑆 
entertains proposition 𝑝, 𝑆 knows 𝑝‘s truth-condition. If 𝑆 judges that 𝑝, then 𝑆 takes 𝑝‘s 
truth-value to be Truth. That 𝑆 judges that 𝑝 entails that 𝑆 entertains 𝑝; and both 𝑆‘s 
judging that 𝑝 and 𝑆‘s entertaining 𝑝 entail that 𝑆 has acquaintance with all of the 
constituents of 𝑝. These are the cognitive relations between minds, terms, and 
propositions that the realism espoused by Russell (and Moore) must posit in order to 
maintain the possibility of genuine knowledge of a radically mind- and language-
independent world. 
 
2.2. Analysis and propositional structure 
In The Philosophy of Leibniz (PoL), published in 1900, Russell had written: ‗That all 
sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions, is a truth too evident, 
perhaps, to demand a proof‘ (PoL: §7, 8). In PoM analysis is primarily taken to involve 
the decomposition of a complex entity into the simple (or simpler) entities of which it is 
14 
 
composed. The goal of this kind of analysis is to reveal the fundamental constituents of 
propositions, and hence of the world.
17
 
 
An air of paradox surrounds this notion of analysis, for the terms yielded by the 
analysis of a proposition do not, placed side by side, reconstitute the proposition. 
Analysis does not, therefore, bring to light the precise nature of the proposition: it yields 
the constituents of a proposition, without explaining the distinctive unity in which, prior 
to analysis, they were bound. Moreover, since a proposition is ‗essentially a unity‘ 
(PoM: §54, 50) analysis is inherently falsifying, in the sense that it transforms a 
proposition into that which, by its very nature, it is not (i.e. a unity of terms becomes an 
aggregate of terms; that which is inherently one becomes that which is inherently 
many). Russell is aware of this but takes it as indicating only that analysis has its 
limitations, not that it should be rejected as a valid philosophical method. Analysis, he 
writes, ‗gives us the truth, and nothing but the truth, yet it can never give us the whole 
truth‘ (PoM: §138, 141). 
 
Before we come to the analysis of any particular proposition, a word or two about 
how analysis should be carried out. Russell‘s concern is directed explicitly towards 
propositions as opposed to sentences: towards the world itself rather than any 
representation of it. But from a practical point of view, analysis is almost unavoidably 
the analysis of a sentence. One may use a pencil to write a sentence expressing a certain 
proposition upon a page, but one cannot put a proposition on a page or in a book. The 
assumption is therefore that sentences can represent propositions, and that the 
manipulation of a sentence by an analyst may represent the manipulation of the 
proposition that sentence represents. The view is that there are sufficient similarities of 
structure and constituency between a sentence and the proposition it expresses that the 
analysis of the proposition can be represented by the analysis of the sentence. I quote 
Russell‘s account of philosophical grammar at length. 
 
The study of grammar, in my opinion, is capable of throwing far more light on 
philosophical questions than is commonly supposed by philosophers. Although a 
grammatical distinction cannot be uncritically assumed to correspond to a 
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 This kind of analysis assumes different forms depending upon one‘s ontological sensibilities. For 
Russell the world is composed of terms, and analysis reveals these. For Frege, the world is composed of 
functions and objects: his version of decompositional analysis reveals these.  
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genuine philosophical difference, yet the one is primâ facie evidence of the 
other, and may often be most usefully employed as a source of discovery. 
Moreover, it must be admitted, I think, that every word occurring in a sentence 
must have some meaning: a perfectly meaningless sound could not be employed 
in the more or less fixed way in which language employs words. The correctness 
of our philosophical analysis of a proposition may therefore be usefully checked 
by the exercise of assigning the meaning of each word in the sentence expressing 
the proposition. On the whole, grammar seems to me to bring us much nearer to 
a correct logic than the current opinions of philosophers; and in what follows, 
grammar, though not our master, will yet be taken as our guide. (PoM: §46, 42) 
 
In acknowledging that grammar is only the guide and not the master, Russell 
acknowledges that there is a higher authority against which the correctness of an 
analysis is to be gauged. In a footnote to the above passage, he suggests that ‗The 
excellence of grammar as a guide is proportional to the paucity of inflexions‘ (PoM: 
§46, 42n.). This suggests that inflections are, at least potentially, misleading; but to be 
aware that this is so is to have the capacity to notice the points at which grammar fails 
as a guide. This latter capacity presupposes an independent insight on the part of the 
analyst into the structural properties of the proposition in question. But then grammar 
can reveal nothing to us that we did not already know (or at least have access to); it may 
act as a guide, but only on a route for which we already have a reliable map, if only we 
trouble ourselves to consult it. 
 
The philosophical grammar of PoM looks, to our eyes, extraordinarily naive. 
Russell seems somehow to have slipped from the acceptable claim that: 
 
(𝑖) the analysis of a proposition 𝑝 can be represented by a series of 
operations upon (manipulations of) a sentence 𝑠 (where 𝑠 expresses 𝑝); 
 
to the claim that: 
 
(𝑖𝑖) the analysis of a sentence 𝑠 can (in general) be taken as a reliable guide 
to the analysis of 𝑝 (where 𝑠 expresses 𝑝). 
 
Claim (𝑖) is a basic assumption common to all philosophy in the analytical tradition. 
Claim (𝑖𝑖), understood as a claim about sentences of English, is not a basic 
16 
 
assumption—and we have Russell himself to thank for pointing this out in OD (this was 
his great contribution, according to Wittgenstein (1922: 4.0031)). But although Russell 
soon came to drop the assumption of claim (𝑖𝑖) (understood as a claim about sentences 
of English), what he never abandoned was the claim that a sentence has something in 
common with the proposition it expresses: 
 
syntax—i.e. the structure of sentences—must have some relation to the structure 
of facts, at any rate in those aspects of syntax which are unavoidable and not 
peculiar to this or that language. (MPD: 157) 
 
It is this thought that underwrites (𝑖): we can represent the analysis of a proposition by 
using a sentence of English, but often only by using English in such a way that it is 
forced to mirror the structural properties of the proposition, leading to unwieldy and 
unnatural modes of expression. Alternatively we can employ a formal language whose 
syntax has been developed expressly in order that propositional analysis may be 
accurately represented by the manipulation of its sentences. In employing such a 
language—assuming always that it has been accurately developed—the propositions 
themselves can be left behind, so to speak.
18
 As such, (𝑖𝑖), restricted to such a formal 
language, may be reinstated. But of course (𝑖𝑖) is reinstated only on the understanding 
that the syntax of the formal language has been developed on the basis of a prior 
understanding of the structural, logical properties of the propositions one intends to 
analyse. There is therefore a very clear sense in which, for Russell, all sound philosophy 
should begin with an analysis of propositions‘ (PoL: §7, 8, emphasis added)—it cannot 
begin with an analysis of sentences unless those sentences are sentences of a suitably 
developed language, or, if not, have been manhandled into a suitable form. 
 
There is a good deal more to be said about Russell‘s conceptions of analysis, 
philosophical grammar, and the idea of a language suitable for philosophy.
19
 For now 
the above must suffice. I shall discuss these matters in a little more detail in Chapter 
Three, comparing Russell‘s position in PoM with his later view in OD. 
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 Cf. definition: ‗as soon as the definition is found, it becomes wholly unnecessary to the reasoning to 
remember the actual object defined, since only concepts are relevant to our deductions‘ (PoM: §63, 63). 
19
 For an excellent discussion of these matters see Hylton 2007. 
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2.3. Things and concepts: occurrence as subject, occurrence as concept 
Now that the basics of Russell‘s PoM account of the relation between sentences and 
propositions has been set out, let us return slowly to the question of propositional unity. 
Russell accepts from Moore the idea that the unity of the proposition is to be explained 
by way of a relation; but he goes further than Moore in distinguishing between different 
ways in which a term can occur in a proposition. Ultimately Russell will suggest that 
propositional unity is explained by the fact that in every proposition at least one term 
occurs in such a way as to unite the other constituent terms. Whether this constitutes 
any real progress remains to be seen. Beforehand, we must bring out Russell‘s 
distinction between the different modes of occurrence that certain terms may have in a 
proposition. 
 
Every term is the logical subject of some proposition (for instance, every term 𝑡 is 
the logical subject of a true proposition of the form ⟨𝑡 is a term⟩). As I shall use the 
expression, the logical subject of a proposition is always a constituent of that 
proposition. We shall see presently that denoting concepts introduce complications; for, 
where denoting concepts are concerned, it may be the case that a proposition is about a 
term that is not a constituent of it. In such cases I will not describe the term that the 
proposition is about as its logical subject. (Nothing hangs on this stipulation, but it is as 
well to be clear.) When a term occurs in a proposition as its logical subject
20
, the 
proposition may be thought of as asserting some property of that term—of being the 
assertion that such and such is the case. Here Russell has in mind a logical sense of 
assertion, distinct from the more familiar psychological or linguistic senses. In these 
senses, thinkers and language users assert propositions whenever they make statements, 
or believe, doubt, or worry that such-and-such is the case. In Russell‘s logical sense 
however, a proposition is described as ‗asserted‘ if it stands in a certain sort of internal 
relation to its truth-value: in Russell‘s words it ‗in some way or other contains its own 
truth or falsehood as an element‘ (PoM: §52, 48). This is not a very clear explanation; 
indeed a clear explanation is not to be found in PoM, and is difficult to reconstruct. The 
thought, roughly, is that propositions, when they are not embedded in other 
propositions, present themselves as being the case. We might say that they occur in (a 
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 Or as one of its logical subjects—propositions may have more than one logical subject. 
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non-linguistic analogue of) the indicative mood. Thus proposition ⟨1⟩ is said to assert 
that Socrates is mortal, and hence one judging that ⟨1⟩ judges that Socrates is mortal.  
 
⟨1⟩ ⟨Socrates is mortal⟩ 
 
⟨1⟩ presents the mortality of Socrates as actually being the case—it presents itself as 
being true (whether or not it is true). However, what ⟨1⟩ asserts to be the case—the 
mortality of Socrates—can occur in other propositions in ‗unasserted‘ form. For 
example, the sentence ‗If Socrates is mortal, then someone will perish‘ expresses a 
proposition asserting that the mortality of Socrates implies that someone will perish. 
Here the mortality of Socrates has more of the character of an assumption than an 
assertion.
21
 One judging that ⟨if Socrates is mortal, then someone will perish⟩ does not 
judge that Socrates is mortal. Russell will describe the mortality of Socrates as a 
‗propositional concept‘ (sometimes as an ‗unasserted‘ proposition). The propositional 
concept the mortality of Socrates is not distinct from proposition ⟨1⟩: it is proposition 
⟨1⟩ occurring—to return to the analogy employed above—in a different (i.e. non-
indicative) mood. Propositional concepts bear a merely external relation to the truth-
values to which, qua asserted propositions, they bear an internal relation. 
 
Propositions may be analysed into subject term(s) and that which is asserted of 
them. Unhelpfully, Russell proceeds to call the part of the proposition which is asserted 
(in the sense of ‗predicated‘) of the subject term(s) the ‗assertion‘. He then claims that 
the term which ensures that the proposition as a whole is an asserted proposition (rather 
than an unasserted propositional concept) will be found among the part of the 
proposition that he now calls the ‗assertion‘. Thus in ⟨1⟩, the subject term is Socrates, 
and the assertion is the rest of the proposition, less Socrates (i.e. is mortal). The term 
which ensures that the proposition as a whole is an asserted proposition is then to be 
found among is mortal. The assertion is mortal is composed of two constituents 
(corresponding to the two words in its linguistic expression). Thus although a 
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 Russell‘s unasserted propositions bears obvious comparison with Meinong‘s ‗assumptions‘ 
(Annahmen), which he (Russell) discusses in MTCA. 
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proposition may be analysed into subject and assertion, this will not be ultimate, since 
the assertion will, in general, be further analysable.
22
 
 
Russell identifies three parts of speech as of particular importance in discussions of 
logic and the nature of the proposition: substantives, adjectives, and verbs. In line with 
his philosophical grammar, these grammatical distinctions correspond to logical 
distinctions among terms. Substantives such as proper names correspond to a class of 
terms called things. The distinguishing feature of things is that they can only occur in a 
proposition as the subject of an assertion, never as the assertion itself.
23
 Adjectives and 
verbs correspond to what Russell calls concepts, among which he distinguishes 
predicates from relations.
24
 A predicate is a term that is indicated by an adjective; a 
relation is a term indicated by a verb.
25
 Thus the proposition ⟨Plato admires Socrates⟩ is 
composed of three constituent terms, corresponding to the three words: ‗Plato‘ and 
‗Socrates‘ indicate things, ‗admires‘ indicates a concept, in particular a relation. The 
proposition ⟨Plato is human⟩ contains a thing (Plato) and two concepts: a predicate 
(humanity) and a relation (being).
26
 
 
Every term is a logical subject, and predicates and relations are no different.
27
 
Hence there are propositions whose subjects are predicates or relations (e.g. ⟨humanity 
is a predicate⟩ or ⟨greater than is a relation⟩). In the sentences expressing such 
propositions, we find phrases that are substantive in character but which have predicates 
or relations for their meaning. Russell describes such substantives as ‗derived from 
adjectives or verbs, as humanity from human or sequence from follows‘ (PoM: §46, 42), 
but insists that he is ‗not speaking of an etymological derivation, but of a logical one‘ 
(PoM: §46, 42). 
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 Note that an assertion is not the same as a propositional function: propositional functions contain 
variables, assertions (in general) do not. 
23
 They may be part of an assertion. 
24
 Although not unrelated, Russell‘s use of the word ‗concept‘ should be sharply distinguished from 
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Concepts have the peculiar property that they may occur in propositions in more 
than one manner. Take the predicate humanity. It may occur in a proposition as part of 
the assertion, as in ⟨Socrates is human⟩; but may also occur as the subject of an 
assertion, as in ⟨humanity characterises Socrates⟩. Things, on the other hand, can only 
occur as the subject of an assertion. The distinction between things and concepts may 
therefore be illustrated as follows. The proposition ⟨Socrates is human⟩ can be analysed 
as subject and assertion in only one way
28
: Socrates as subject, the rest of the 
proposition as assertion. The proposition ⟨humanity characterises Socrates⟩ on the other 
hand, can be analysed such that humanity is the subject, or that Socrates is the subject, 
or that both are. On this basis, Russell argues that the two propositions, though 
equivalent, are distinct: 
 
In ⟨Socrates is human⟩, the notion expressed by human occurs in a different way 
from that in which it occurs when it is called humanity, the difference being that 
in the latter case, but not in the former, the proposition is about this notion.  
(PoM: §48, 45, angle-brackets added)
29
 
 
In the simple cases (i.e. those not involving denoting, which I discuss presently), a 
proposition is always about at least one of the terms that occurs in it. By distinguishing 
those constituent terms that a proposition is about from those that it is not about, Russell 
is able to characterise the distinction between the two modes of occurrence as follows. 
If a proposition 𝑝 is about a given constituent term 𝑡, then 𝑡 occurs in 𝑝 as subject.30 
 
Russell has rather helped himself to the notion of aboutness here; and it would 
appear difficult to characterise aboutness without relying on the notion of subject of a 
proposition. But let us grant that the idea is sufficiently intuitive to be acceptable. Then 
it is the distinguishing feature of concepts, as opposed to things, that they may occur in 
a proposition not only as subject, but also in some other manner. Let us call that other 
manner of occurrence, occurrence as concept. 
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The ultimate test of whether a term occurs in a proposition as subject or as concept 
concerns its substitutability conditions. We may substitute a term into a proposition to 
form a new proposition, but that term must have the same mode of occurrence as the 
term it replaces or the resultant complex will either fail to be propositional, or, if still 
propositional, will be differently structured. If a term may be substituted for any term at 
all (thing or concept), such that the resultant proposition has the same structure as the 
original, then that term occurs as subject. If, when substituting a term, the structure of 
the proposition is preserved only if the term is substituted for a concept, then that term 
occurs as concept. Extending our terminology, we may take the position in a 
proposition occupied by a term occurring as subject to be a ‗subject-position‘. Similarly, 
the position in a proposition occupied by a term occurring as concept may be called a 
‗concept-position‘. 
 
Let us take an example. In the proposition ⟨Socrates is human⟩, Socrates can be 
substituted for any term at all to yield a proposition of the same structure: substituting a 
thing, ⟨Plato is human⟩ is a true proposition; substituting a concept, ⟨insanity is human⟩ 
is a false proposition; both propositions have the same structure as the original. Socrates 
occurs in ⟨Socrates is human⟩, therefore, as subject (or in a subject-position). But 
compare the following substitutions for human. Substituting a concept we get, say, 
⟨Socrates is ugly⟩, a proposition of the same structure. But substituting a thing yields, 
say, ⟨Socrates is Plato⟩, which, given the sense that is has here (i.e. predicative), is 
either not a proposition at all (since Plato cannot be asserted of anything), or, if we alter 
the sense of is (to the ‗is-of-identity‘), is a proposition of a different structure (the 
original proposition was of subject-predicate form: the new one is relational). Human 
cannot therefore be substituted (while retaining the original propositional structure) for 
a thing, but only for another concept: that is to say, it occurs in ⟨Socrates is human⟩ as 
concept (or in a concept-position).
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 A complicating factor should be noted here, though it does not materially affect any point I wish to 
make. In standard relational propositions, the relata occur as subject. In ⟨Plato admires Socrates⟩, for 
example, the two relata of admires occur as subject. This being so, if—as Russell sometimes seems to 
have done—one takes the ‗is‘ of predication to be a relation, one may feel pressured to claim that human 
occurs as subject in ⟨Socrates is human⟩. Yet Russell would be adamant that human is not a logical 
subject of the proposition. Something has to give. Klement (2004a: 104-05) claims that Russell takes is to 
be a special kind of relation: one for which one relatum occurs as concept. He does not, however, provide 
any reference to support the interpretation. My own feeling is that Russell takes human to occur as 
concept and simply fudges the issue of whether is is a relation or not. 
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Consider now the proposition ⟨humanity characterises Socrates⟩. Humanity and 
human are, Russell maintains, the exact same term. The differences between the 
⟨humanity characterises Socrates⟩ and ⟨Socrates is human⟩ are a consequence of the fact 
that human (= humanity) occurs differently in each. Thus Russell describes predicates 
and relations as ‗capable of [a] curious twofold use‘ (PoM: §48, 45). This 
‗twofoldedness‘ is demanded by fact that whatever is is a term. Predicates and relations 
must be able to occur as the logical subject of a proposition, on pain of contradiction.
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2.4. The unity of the proposition again 
Russell is, in this period, continually moved by the fear of a certain kind of 
contradiction—not the famous contradiction, the Russell paradox, but a different one. 
He describes it as ‗the contradiction always to be feared, where there is something that 
cannot be made a logical subject‘ (PoM: §74, 76)33. It threatens the claim, which for 
Russell is axiomatic, that whatever is, is a term (since every term is a logical subject of 
some proposition).
34
 
 
Frege‘s problems with the concept horse (Frege 1892b) may be seen as an instance 
of this ‗contradiction always to be feared‘. In Frege‘s system, while one may say that 
‗the city Berlin is a city‘, and thereby express a Thought35 about a certain city, one may 
not say that ‗the Fregean concept horse is a Fregean concept‘ and thereby express a 
thought about a certain Fregean concept. By Frege‘s lights, ‗the Fregean concept horse‘ 
is a proper name; but proper names, on his view, only ever refer to objects, never to 
Fregean concepts. Frege puts this down to ‗an awkwardness of language‘ (Frege 1892b: 
185): 
 
By a kind of necessity of language, my expressions, taken literally, sometimes 
miss my thought; I mention an object, when what I intend is a [Fregean] 
concept. I fully realize that in such cases I was relying upon a reader who would 
be ready to meet me halfway – who does not begrudge a pinch of salt. (Frege 
1892b: 192) 
 
                                                 
32
 Similarly for propositions: in having both asserted and unasserted forms, propositions are ‗twofold‘. 
33
 Cf. PoM: §52, 48. 
34
 Once the theory of denoting concepts is introduced, the mantra whatever is, is a term is seen to be false, 
as Russell introduces objects, strange combinations of terms, which are not themselves terms. This, he 
comments, leads to ‗grave logical problems‘ (PoM: §58, 55n.). 
35
 I use capitalisation to signal Frege‘s technical notion of a Thought (Gedanke). 
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For Russell, on the other hand, this supposed awkwardness of language is a serious 
logical problem: ‗If there can be something which is not an object, then this fact cannot 
be stated without contradiction; for in the statement, the something in question becomes 
an object‘ (Russell to Frege, 24 June 1902, in Frege 1980: 134). The implication is that 
there cannot be something which is not an object (in Russellian parlance, whatever is, is 
a term). 
 
This particular Russell-Frege debate is of special interest here because of its 
relation to the question of propositional unity. For Frege there are objects and Fregean 
concepts, and these play fundamentally distinct roles (Fregean concepts being 
incomplete (ungesättigt) and essentially predicative). For Russell, a (Russellian) 
concept is a term with the potential for a ‗curious twofold use‘: it may occur in a 
proposition as either subject or, predicatively, as concept. It is this ‗twofoldedness‘ that 
Russell invokes in explanation of propositional unity. He calls our attention to the two 
modes of occurrence that a relation may have, calling this the distinction between a 
‗relation in itself‘ and a ‗relation actually relating‘ (PoM: §54, 49) (a ‗relating-relation‘). 
In every proposition there occurs a relation actually relating. When a relation occurs in 
this mode, it relates the other terms, uniting them as a proposition. If we imagine the 
mode of occurrence of that same relation changed, however, the proposition will be 
transformed from an asserted proposition to an unasserted proposition (a propositional 
concept). We can illustrate the transformation at the linguistic level by comparing ‗Plato 
admires Socrates‘ with ‗Plato‘s admiration of Socrates‘: the former expresses a 
proposition, the latter a propositional concept. Thus Russell writes: 
 
when [a relation] occurs as [concept], it actually relates, but when it occurs as 
[subject] it is the bare relation considered independently of the terms it relates. [. 
. .] Owing to the way in which the [relation] actually relates the terms of a 
proposition, every proposition has a unity which renders it distinct from the sum 
of its constituents. (PoM: §55, 52) 
 
Superficially at least, Russell‘s view is distinct from Frege‘s.36 It is distinct from 
Moore‘s in that, although unity is explained by the presence of a relation in a 
proposition, the distinction between the possible modes of occurrence of that relation 
                                                 
36
 When fully examined, it is less clearly distinct from Frege‘s than is immediately apparent. For a 
detailed discussion of the relations between the respective positions see Gaskin 2008 (especially §29). 
24 
 
allows for the distinction between a proposition and a mere aggregate of terms. A 
proposition contains a relation occurring as concept (a relating-relation), a mere 
aggregate of terms does not. Moreover, the relation of the relating-relation to the terms 
that it relates is explained in terms of the relating-relation‘s mode of occurrence; hence 
no further relation need be posited, and Bradley‘s Regress cannot get underway.37 
 
Russell‘s explanation of the problem of unity is only as good as his explanation of 
the connection between the relating-relation and the relation in itself. Generalising, what 
is required is an explanation of the relation between the two modes of occurrence that a 
concept may have in a proposition.
38
 We saw above that Russell can only explain the 
distinction between occurrence as subject and occurrence as concept in terms of a 
proposition‘s being about some term, and suggested that the notion of aboutness cannot 
be explained without recourse to the notion of the subject of a proposition. While we 
may decide to grant Russell the intuitive notion of aboutness, this can only help him to 
explain the difference in function between a term occurring as subject and a term 
occurring as concept. But what is required at this point is an explanation of the identity 
of a particular term occurring as subject and that same term occurring as concept. 
Occurring as concept, a relation may have the property of uniting a collection of terms 
into a proposition: occurring as subject, that relation does not have the property of 
uniting the collection into a proposition. How, then, are the two identical, if the one has 
a property which the other lacks? 
 
This problem may not be intractable
39
, but Russell offers no explanation of it. The 
status of a term occurring as concept, and its connection with that same term occurring 
as subject, lies at the heart of Russell‘s metaphysics of propositions, but is shrouded in 
mystery. The relation of the two modes of occurrence will be of great importance in 
subsequent chapters. 
 
3. The Theory of Denoting Concepts: Epistemological Considerations 
Onto the framework surveyed above we must now superimpose the theory of denoting 
concepts. It is here that the issues in play in OD begin to come to the fore. 
                                                 
37
 The relating-relation stands in certain relations to each of the terms it relates; but these relations are 
external to the proposition in question. Cf. PoM: §55. 
38
 A similar issue occurs in the Gray‘s Elegy Argument. 
39
 Though I think it probably is. 
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Words have meaning, says Russell, in that they stand for, or indicate, something 
other than themselves. This kind of meaning—call it ‗linguistic meaning‘—is in a sense 
accidental: take any word you like, and it is the case that that string of letters could have 
stood for something other than what it actually does. Unless we are essentialists about 
word-meaning (and Russell was not), the word ‗Socrates‘ could have indicated 
something other than Socrates. Of course, once the word has been introduced into a 
linguistic community, it is plausible to suppose that it names Socrates if it names 
anything at all (if it named something else it would be a different word). But once 
established, it names Socrates independently of any facts about, or properties of, 
Socrates. Words, for Russell, have linguistic meaning because they are endowed with it 
by a linguistic community. In and of themselves, words are inert and meaningless. 
 
However Russell acknowledges another kind of meaning, which we might call 
‗logical meaning‘. It is easiest to understand logical meaning through its opposition to 
linguistic meaning. If an entity 𝑒 has linguistic meaning, then, though intrinsically 
meaningless, it has been endowed with a meaning by some agents. If 𝑒 has logical 
meaning it is meaningful independently of anybody‘s endowment of meaning upon it: 
that is to say, it is intrinsically meaningful. Since Russell takes logic to be concerned 
with propositions (rather than sentences), and since propositions do not contain words, 
Russell concludes that linguistic meaning is ‗irrelevant to logic‘ (PoM: §51, 47). Where 
logic is concerned with meaning, it must be meaning in the other sense—the logical 
sense. The entities that have logical meaning are denoting concepts: 
 
such concepts as a man have meaning in another sense [i.e. in the logical sense]: 
they are, so to speak, symbolic in their own logical nature, because they have the 
property which I call denoting. That is to say, when a man occurs in a 
proposition (e.g. ⟨I met a man in the street⟩), the proposition is not about the 
concept a man, but about something quite different, some actual biped denoted 
by the concept. (PoM: §51, 47, angle-brackets added)
40
 
 
                                                 
40
 In this quotation Russell misrepresents his own view. The proposition is not about some actual biped on 
his view, but about some strange combination of all men. See §4.2.1 below. 
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Denoting concepts thus mark a significant departure from the framework. A proposition 
may contain a term in subject-position without being about that term. Where this is so, 
that term is sure to be a denoting concept. 
 
Why introduce a theory of denoting concepts at all? What does the theory do? 
There are two respects in which a theory of denoting is crucial, one logical, the other 
epistemological. On the logical side, a theory of denoting constitutes an account of 
generality: an account, that is, of the possibility of propositions (and so of thought) 
about some collection of entities specified by way of a common property, rather than 
enumeration. For Russell, working on the reduction of the truths of mathematics to 
truths of logic, a coherent theory of generality was indispensable: mathematics and logic 
abound with variables, and are therefore shot through with generality. On the 
epistemological side, one notes that our thoughts and judgements extend beyond just 
those entities with which we have direct acquaintance. The theory of denoting concepts 
offers an explanation of our ability to entertain the propositions involved in such 
judgements: the propositions in question might be about a certain entity (with which 
one lacks acquaintance) without containing that entity. 
 
Commentators—notably Levine (1998) and Makin (2000)—often suggest that 
Russell introduced the theory of denoting concepts in response to epistemological 
concerns regarding infinite classes. In this section I outline these epistemological 
concerns and illustrate how the theory of denoting concepts solves them. In §4 I argue 
that this ‗epistemological view‘ is mistaken, rests on an equivocation, and that the true 
explanation sheds far more light on the development of Russell‘s philosophy. 
 
3.1. Infinite classes and the problem of aboutness 
Around 1900, Russell came to accept Georg Cantor‘s theory of the infinite. Cantor‘s 
theory predicts the existence of (an infinity of) infinite classes. According to a 
commonly espoused view, for Russell to accept that there could be infinite classes 
required a modification of the framework described in §2. 
 
Russell describes terms as whatever may be objects of thought (PoM: §47, 43). It 
does not follow from this alone that every term is, in principle, a potential object of 
acquaintance. Nonetheless, this view is commonly attributed to Russell. Peter Hylton, 
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for instance, claims that acquaintance ‗carries with it no constraints‘ and that ‗Russell 
[in PoM] seems to assume that every term (in his sense) is a possible object of 
acquaintance‘ (Hylton 1990: 245). Interestingly, no textual support is provided for the 
claim. The closest we come to support is a claim Hylton makes—regarding not Russell, 
but G. E. Moore—that, on Moore‘s view, the world is ‗transparent to the intellect‘ and 
‗made up of the objects of thought‘ (Hylton 1990: 137) (bearing in mind, of course, that 
the objects of thought exist independently of being thought about). 
 
The view that whatever is, is a possible object of acquaintance is one which, I 
would suggest, does not sit happily with the kind of realism that Russell and Moore 
defended during the period in question in this thesis. Terms must certainly not be 
defined as possible objects of acquaintance: to define them by way of possible cognitive 
relations to minds would be to downplay their radical independence from human 
thought. Indeed, from a certain perspective, to attribute this view to Russell would be to 
cast him as a kind of anti-realist. Levine, for instance, points out the difference between 
the view which Hylton attributes to Russell in the previous paragraph, and the brand of 
realism endorsed by Thomas Nagel (1986). On this conception, what there is may be so 
radically independent of our conceptual capacities as to be, in principle, impossible for 
us to conceive of or to have acquaintance with. According to Levine, the early Russell 
(i.e. the Russell committed merely to the framework surveyed in §2 above) is not, by 
Nagel‘s lights, a realist (Levine 1998: 438). Levine‘s view is that while the framework 
surveyed above, sans the theory of denoting concepts, is anti-realist in the sense 
currently at issue, the theory of denoting concepts ‗results from a move to the sort of 
realism which enables us to countenance entities with which we cannot be acquainted‘ 
(Levine 1998: 439). 
 
Levine attributes to Russell the following view, which (we shall assume for now 
that) he held before—but not after—adopting the theory of denoting concepts: 
 
(L1) We can be acquainted with any entity; there is no entity with which we 
cannot, in principle, be acquainted. (Levine 1998: 418)
41
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 This is Levine‘s principle ‗R3‘ 
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But having accepted Cantor‘s theory of the infinite, Russell now accepts that there are 
entities with which, in principle, we could not be acquainted: infinite classes. Being 
mere mortals, limited and finite of mind, we cannot have acquaintance with an infinite 
collection such as the class of real numbers. Acquaintance with every element of an 
infinite class is, in principle, impossible: a fortiori acquaintance with the infinite class is 
impossible too. 
 
For the purposes of mathematics, and so of logicism, one must have some way of 
dealing with infinite collections. One might, for instance, wish to say of an infinite class 
that it is larger than some other class, that it is countable, or whatever. Suppose we wish 
to consider a proposition about some infinite class. From the framework as described 
thus far, a proposition is about whatever terms occur in subject-position therein. But 
given (L1), no proposition that the likes of us could grasp could contain an infinite class 
in subject-position. Thus the problem arises: how it is possible that there may be 
propositions which we entertain, but which are about an entity (or entities) with which 
we cannot be acquainted? I shall refer to this problem as ‗the problem of aboutness‘. If 
Levine‘s view is that the theory of denoting concepts is introduced in the course of 
rejecting (L1), his view is that the theory is introduced in the course of solving the 
problem of aboutness. 
 
The problem of aboutness extends beyond just those entities with which one 
cannot, in principle, have acquaintance, to those with which one cannot, practically 
speaking, have acquaintance, and to those with which one might well (practically 
speaking) have been acquainted, but with which one, as it has turned out, does not have 
acquaintance. Consider the propositions expressed by (2) and (3). 
 
(2) All men are mortal 
(3) Each dog in that room is asleep. 
 
Acquaintance with all men and each dog in that room are not required in order to 
entertain the propositions expressed by these sentences. The question then, is what 
marks the case of infinite classes out as distinct from cases such as these. Presumably 
the difference is that in the case of infinite classes, acquaintance is in principle 
impossible, while in the others it is merely contingently absent. But this difference does 
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not, at least concerning the issues at hand, amount to very much. The philosophical 
underpinnings of Russell‘s logicism must explain not only how it is possible to think 
about infinite classes, but also the possibility of thought about any other collection of 
terms (including very large or epistemologically remote classes). One might suggest, 
alternatively, that the fact that acquaintance with an infinite class is in principle 
impossible, indicates that the problem is not epistemological, but metaphysical. 
According to this suggestion, the problem stems from the fact that there cannot be a 
proposition whose subject is an infinite class. But if that were the case, then Russell 
would hold that there cannot be infinite classes at all, since whatever is, is the subject of 
a proposition.
42
 (Notice that although the problem could not then arise for infinite 
classes, with respect to very large or epistemologically remote classes it would remain). 
The problem at hand must, therefore, be considered as epistemological, in which case it 
does not only concern infinite classes. 
 
3.2. A solution to the problem of aboutness 
Suppose I took a walk this morning and bumped into Jones on the street. I might report 
this encounter by saying: 
 
(4) I met a man. 
 
Suppose you are not acquainted with Jones and, in any case, do not know which 
particular man I met this morning. Upon hearing my utterance of (4), you surely 
entertain some proposition. But which? It cannot be a proposition containing Jones, for 
you are unable to entertain any such proposition (not being acquainted with him). The 
phrase ‗a man‘, as it occurs in (4), does not then indicate Jones. Yet it seems obvious 
that it does not indicate any other thing either (for there is no thing other than Jones that 
I met), and so, by a process of elimination, one might infer that it must indicate a 
concept.
43
 
 
What mode of occurrence does this concept have in the proposition expressed by 
(4), i.e. ⟨4⟩? If it occurred as subject, then ⟨4⟩ would be about the concept a man (in the 
                                                 
42
 I explore a related suggestion in §4 below. 
43
 I take it that this inference does not commit one to the claim that one met a concept, but only that what 
occurs in the proposition is a concept. 
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same way that ⟨happiness is good⟩ is about the concept happiness). But as Russell 
points out, this cannot be the case here: 
 
If I say ―I met a man,‖ the proposition is not about a man: this is a concept 
which does not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of the logic-
books. What I met was a thing, not a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a 
bank-account or a public-house and a drunken wife. (PoM: §56, 53)
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But on the other hand, we may also rule out the possibility that the concept occurs as 
concept. If it did, ⟨4⟩ would not be about a man—neither the concept, nor any man—at 
all. For a proposition is only about those terms that occur in it as subject, not those 
occurring as concept. 
 
The solution is that the concept a man occurs in ⟨4⟩ as subject, but that, because a 
man is a denoting concept, the proposition is not about a man, but about something else: 
‗such concepts as a man [. . .] are, so to speak, symbolic in their own logical nature, 
because they have the property which I call denoting‘ (PoM: §51, 47). A man is 
therefore a denoting concept—it has meaning in the logical sense, which is what is 
meant by describing it as ‗symbolic in [its] own logical nature‘. Russell tells us that a 
concept 𝑐 is a denoting concept if, when ‗it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is 
not about [𝑐], but about a term connected in a certain peculiar way with [𝑐]‘ (PoM: §56, 
53). This ‗certain peculiar connection‘ is the logical relation of denoting.45 Consider, for 
example, sentence (5): 
 
(5) The inventor of the clarinet was German. 
 
If the unmodified view were still in place (i.e. if the inventor of the clarinet were 
considered a concept simpliciter rather than a denoting concept) we should say that ⟨5⟩ 
was about the concept the inventor of the clarinet.  But clearly it is not about the 
concept, but about whoever invented the clarinet—namely, Johann Christoph Denner. 
                                                 
44
 See n. 40 above. In such passages as this Russell unintentionally implies that a correct analysis will 
yield the result that the proposition is about the very man I met. Ultimately his analysis yields the result 
that although I met a particular man, the proposition is not about him, but about a strange combination of 
all men. These ‗combinations‘ are discussed briefly in §4.2.1. 
45
 For reasons that will only become clear in §4, it is not obviously and un-controversially the case that a 
proposition containing a denoting concept is about a term connected with it in a peculiar way. 
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Crucially, one may entertain ⟨5⟩ even if one has never heard of, and is unacquainted 
with, Denner. Denoting concepts, then, are concepts indicated by phrases of the form 
‗all F‘, ‗every F‘, ‗any F‘, ‗an F‘, ‗some F‘, and ‗the F‘, which share the common 
characteristic that, when they occur in a proposition, the proposition is not about them 
themselves, but about whatever it is that they denote. The denoting phrase ‗The inventor 
of the clarinet‘ indicates the denoting concept the inventor of the clarinet, which denotes 
Denner. For clarity, henceforth I shall distinguish denoting concepts by enclosing them 
in angle brackets (‗<‘ and ‗>‘). Thus, for example, I shall say that the sentence ‗the 
teacher of Plato is wise‘ expresses the proposition ⟨<the teacher of Plato> is wise⟩, 
which contains the denoting concept <the teacher of Plato>, which denotes Socrates. 
 
An interesting question—entirely neglected in the literature—is why Russell should 
think of denoting concepts as concepts at all. I have suggested the reason above: the 
denoting phrase in (4) does not seem to indicate a thing: it doesn‘t stand for Jones, and 
if I met any thing at all, it was certainly Jones. But denoting concepts have one of the 
hallmarks of things, namely they cannot occur in a proposition as concept. One can no 
more predicate <a man> of Socrates than one can predicate Plato of him. In the 
proposition ⟨Socrates is <a man>⟩, the ‗is‘ is the ‗is-of-identity‘ on pain of 
nonsensicality. Denoting concepts are, I think one ought to conclude, not concepts at all, 
but things—albeit things of a peculiar stripe. Denoting concepts are certainly closely 
related to concepts simpliciter. For one thing, they are obtained from them (as described 
in §4). For another, just as a proposition containing a concept is not usually about that 
concept, so a proposition containing a denoting concept is not usually about that 
denoting concept. (Though it may be. If this were impossible, denoting concepts would 
not be possible logical subjects, and so not terms at all: denoting concepts, like concepts 
simpliciter are assumed to be capable of a curious ‗twofold‘ use. This twofold use is not 
identical to the twofold use of concepts simpliciter, however. It will be the subject of 
investigation in the Gray‘s Elegy Argument.) Nevertheless, despite these similarities, 
the key fact remains: denoting concepts cannot occur as concept. This being so, all bets 
are off: denoting concepts are not concepts. 
 
The most obvious distinction between denoting concepts and all other terms is that 
they denote. For this reason they are aptly described as ‗aboutness-shifters‘ (Makin 
2000: 17-8): when a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, it ‗shifts‘ aboutness from 
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itself, onto something else. As a crude analogy, compare the use of mirror to look at an 
object around a corner. One looks at the mirror, but observes the object. The mirror, one 
might say, shifts aboutness from itself onto the object in a manner roughly analogous to 
that in which a denoting concept shifts aboutness from itself onto its denotation. In this 
way, a proposition may be about a term which does not occur in it. For instance ⟨5⟩ is 
about Denner, without his occurring therein. In the case of a sentence such as (6) 
exactly the same explanation occurs. 
 
(6) Every number has a successor. 
 
⟨6⟩ contains a denoting concept, <every number> (indicated in (6) by ‗every number‘), 
which denotes the infinite class of numbers; it does not contain every single number, 
though the denoted class does. So in general we have a solution to the problem of 
aboutness. The ability to apprehend a proposition about an entity (or entities) with 
which one is unacquainted is to be explained by the fact that it is not always the case 
that what a proposition is about is to be found among its constituents. Whenever one 
entertains a proposition about an entity with which one is unacquainted, it may be 
inferred that the proposition includes among its constituents a denoting concept—with 
which one is acquainted—that denotes the entity that the proposition is about. Thus 
Russell writes: 
 
With regard to infinite classes, say the class of numbers, it is to be observed that 
the [denoting] concept all numbers, though not itself infinitely complex, yet 
denotes an infinitely complex object. This is the inmost secret of our power to 
deal with infinity. An infinitely complex concept, though there may be such, can 
certainly not be manipulated by the human intelligence; but infinite collections, 
owing to the notion of denoting, can be manipulated without introducing any 
concepts of infinite complexity. (PoM: §72, 73) 
 
The introduction of the theory of denoting concepts means that Russell now 
distinguishes two ways in which a proposition may be about an entity 𝑒. 
 
(Ab1) A proposition may be about an entity 𝑒 in virtue of containing 𝑒 (in 
subject-position). 
33 
 
(Ab2) A proposition may be about an entity 𝑒 in virtue of containing a denoting 
concept 𝑑 (in subject-position), such that 𝑑 denotes 𝑒. 
 
Now the theory of denoting concepts is in a certain respect similar to Frege‘s theory 
of Sinn.
46
 But it should be noted that, since Frege applies his distinction between Sinn 
and Bedeutung across the board, not only to denoting phrases, he has no use for (Ab1).
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The most fundamental difference between the Russellian and Fregean positions is, 
however, that, for Russell, the theory of denoting concepts is intended as an account of 
generality.
48
 The theory is a logical theory which offers an account of the logico-
metaphysical fact that some propositions are about entities that do not occur in them. 
The Fregean theory of Sinn is largely independent of the account of generality. For 
Frege, Sinn is primarily a cognitive notion; whereas for Russell, the theory of denoting 
concepts is primarily an account of generality. 
 
4. The Theory of Denoting Concepts: The Logical Genesis View 
It is undeniable that Russell takes the theory of denoting concepts as a response to the 
epistemological worries raised by the problem of aboutness. But that does not in itself 
provide a justification of the view, notably endorsed by Levine and Makin, that Russell 
introduced the theory in response to that particular problem. Makin rightly emphasises 
the connection between the theory of denoting concepts and the mathematical context in 
which the theory is presented, but he wrongly supposes that ‗the chief consideration for 
recognizing denoting as a logical constant is its role in relation to infinite classes‘ 
(Makin 2000: 14). The truth of the matter is, I think, that Russell introduces the theory 
as a general consequence of his views on predicates and on classes. 
 
The epistemological view does find textual support. Levine points us in the 
direction of the following passage from PoM: 
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 Frege (1892a). Since they are familiar, I leave the terms ‗Sinn‘ and ‗Bedeutung‘ un-translated. 
47
 Obviously (Ab1) and (Ab2) are not given in Fregean terms, but the sense in which they might be 
applied to Frege‘s position is clear enough. 
48
 I am careful to use the phrase ‗account of...‘ rather than ‗explanation of‘ generality. As I discuss at the 
end of the chapter (§4.2.2), Russell did not think that the theory of denoting concepts explained 
generality. My view is thus different from that of Hylton (2005d: 202-03; 2005c: 165). 
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Indeed it may be said that the logical purpose which is served by the theory of 
denoting is, to enable propositions of finite complexity to deal with infinite 
classes of terms […].  (PoM: §141, 145) 
 
This passage is not from the chapter of PoM in which Russell introduces denoting. So if 
we take it at face-value, it seems strange that Russell should make so little mention of 
infinite classes in the chapter on denoting. The only mention in that chapter comes in 
§60 where Russell says that the possibility of denoting a class is ‗highly important, 
since it enables us to deal with infinite collections‘ (PoM, §60, 58).49 One sentence out 
of a thirteen page chapter is not a lot. Moreover, the epistemological view offers little 
account of the fact that the theory of denoting constitutes Russell‘s treatment of 
generality in PoM. So I suggest that it should come as no surprise if a better explanation 
of the origins of the theory of denoting concepts can be found. 
 
I will call the alternative view that I endorse the ‗logical genesis view‘, since it 
takes very seriously Russell‘s statement that: ‗The notion of denoting may be obtained 
by a kind of logical genesis from subject-predicate propositions‘ (PoM: §56, 54). I will 
begin by setting out the logical genesis view. I then argue that the epistemological view, 
as expounded by Levine, rests on an equivocation which, once resolved, leaves the 
epistemological view poorly motivated. 
 
4.1. The logical genesis view 
Russell takes it that the simplest propositions are of subject-predicate form (PoM: §57, 
54)—the following, for example: 
 
⟨7⟩ ⟨𝐴 is⟩ 
⟨8⟩ ⟨𝐴 is one⟩ 
⟨9⟩ ⟨𝐴 is human⟩ 
 
⟨7⟩-⟨9⟩ (according to PoM: §57, 54) are equivalent, respectively, to: 
 
⟨10⟩ ⟨𝐴 is <an entity>⟩ 
⟨11⟩ ⟨𝐴 is <a unit>⟩ 
                                                 
49
 Infinity (not infinite classes) is also mentioned at PoM: §59, 58.  
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⟨12⟩ ⟨𝐴 is <a man>⟩ 
 
However ⟨10⟩-⟨12⟩ ‗are not identical with the previous ones since they have an entirely 
different form‘ (PoM: §57, 54). For one thing, Russell says, in the latter group but not 
the former, is is the only term which does not occur as subject.
50
 
 
That is, in (say) ⟨9⟩, 𝐴 occurs as subject, and is (a relation) and humanity (a 
concept) occur as concept
51
; while in ⟨12⟩, 𝐴 and <a man> occur as subject, while only 
is occurs as concept. 
 
Russell then writes: 
 
A man, we shall find, is neither a concept nor a term, but a certain kind of 
combination of certain terms, namely of those which are human. And the 
relation of Socrates to a man is quite different from his relation to humanity. 
(PoM: §57, 54) 
 
A correct understanding of this passage is important. When Russell says that a man is 
neither a concept nor a term, he means that what is denoted by the denoting concept <a 
man> is neither a concept nor a term (he has misapplied his convention of using italics 
to distinguish denoting concepts). Thus Russell‘s position in the above quotation is that 
the relation of Socrates to humanity is very different to his relation to the ‗combination‘ 
of all humans. His relation to humanity is, let us suppose, that of falling under (the 
predicate): his relation to the combination of all humans is something which is, if not 
identical, then analogous to class-membership. 
 
Russell takes it that the relation of mutual implication between ⟨9⟩ and ⟨12⟩ is, in 
some sense, rooted in the fact that the predicate in ⟨9⟩, humanity, is intimately linked to 
a class-concept, man, which ‗give[s] rise‘ to the class of men (PoM: §57, 54). That is, 
⟨9⟩ implies ⟨12⟩ because the predicate in ⟨9⟩ gives rise to the class of men (in virtue of 
the relation between the predicate human and the class-concept man), and the denoting 
concept in ⟨12⟩, i.e. <a man>, denotes (as we shall see below) a kind of combination of 
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 Notice the slip here. In ⟨7⟩ is is the only term which does not occur as subject. I owe this observation to 
Murali Ramachandran.  
51
 Cf. n. 31 above. 
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the members of that class. The notion of ‗giving rise‘ is unclear, as is Russell‘s 
distinction between a predicate and a class-concept. The two issues are closely linked. 
 
As to the latter, Russell claims (PoM: §57, 54) that it will be convenient to 
distinguish a class-concept from a predicate (speaking of non-linguistic entities). Thus 
human is a predicate while man is a related class-concept. In general, a class-concept is 
associated with a certain predicate. Both ‗give rise‘ to the same class, the members of 
which all ‗have‘ (i.e. satisfy) the predicate. Nonetheless, Russell acknowledges his 
uncertainty as to the distinction between predicates and class-concepts, admitting that it 
is ‗perhaps only verbal‘ (PoM: §58, 56). 
 
Russell‘s thought is that for any member 𝑥 of a given class of which the class-
concept is 𝑢, there is a proposition of the form ⟨𝑥 is <a 𝑢>⟩. So to take his own example, 
the predicate human gives rise to a class, of which the class-concept is man; and for any 
member 𝑥 of that class, we may truly assert that ⟨𝑥 is <a man>⟩. The example is 
unfortunate, since ⟨𝑥 is <a human>⟩ (using the predicate rather than the class-concept) 
would appear to do just as well. But perhaps we can see the ‗verbal‘ distinction more 
clearly in the following example. Take the proposition, ⟨Descartes doubts⟩. Doubts—the 
predicate—gives rise to a class (doubters) of which the class-concept is doubter. Hence 
there is a value of 𝑥 for which ⟨𝑥 is <a doubter>⟩ is true. So in general we may 
distinguish a predicate from a class-concept, and both from what Russell calls the 
‗concept of a class‘ (PoM: §67, 67). In his example, human is the predicate, man the 
class-concept, and men the concept of the class; in our example, doubts is the predicate, 
doubter the class-concept, and doubters the concept of the class. (I think we must agree 
with Russell‘s suggestion that the distinction, such as it is, is merely verbal.) 
 
What is it for a predicate
52
 to give rise to a class? In one respect, it is terms (in 
general)—rather than predicates (in particular)—that give rise to classes. From the 
extensional standpoint: 
 
it is not predicates and denoting that are relevant [to the genesis of classes], but 
terms connected by the word and, in the sense in which this word stands for a 
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 What is said here about predicates applies also to class-concepts. 
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numerical conjunction. Thus Brown and Jones are a class, and Brown singly is a 
class. This is the extensional genesis of classes. (PoM: §68, 67) 
 
From the intensional standpoint, however, it is predicates that give rise to classes: 
 
We may, then, imagine a kind of genesis of classes, through the successive 
stages indicated by the typical propositions ―Socrates is human,‖ ―Socrates has 
humanity,‖ ―Socrates is a man,‖ ―Socrates is one among men.‖ [. . .] [E]very 
subject-predicate proposition gives rise to the other three equivalent 
propositions, and thus every predicate (provided it can be sometimes truly 
predicated) gives rise to a class. This is the genesis of classes from the 
intensional standpoint. (PoM: §68, 67)
53
 
 
We may now begin to plot the course of the logical genesis view. Every predicate 
gives rise to a class. This is effectively to say that, for every predicate and its associated 
class-concept 𝑢, ‗𝑥 is a 𝑢‘ is a propositional function.54 That is, for every predicate 𝑝, 
there exists a proposition asserting that something is a member of the class to which 𝑝 
gives rise (though there need not be a true proposition of this form
55
). 
 
It will be characteristic of class-concepts—as opposed to terms in general—that 
when substituted for 𝑢 in a proposition of the form ⟨𝐴 is a 𝑢⟩, the result will always be a 
proposition (PoM: §58, 56). But what mode of occurrence does the class-concept 𝑢 have 
in the proposition ⟨𝐴 is a 𝑢⟩? When a term occurs as subject, it may be substituted for 
any other term such that the structure of the proposition remains unchanged. But in our 
case, ‗𝑢 has a restricted variability if the formula is to remain a proposition‘ (PoM: §58, 
56). Thus 𝑢 does not occur as subject. This shows that ‗a 𝑢‘56 is not analysable into ‗a‘ 
and ‗𝑢‘ (‗a 𝑢‘—or ‗some 𝑢‘, ‗any 𝑢‘, etc.—is not a function of 𝑢, for, for that to be the 
                                                 
53
 The parenthetical caveat is important. In its absence, it would follow that, for every predicate, there is a 
term to which the predicate may be truly ascribed. This would lead to a larger ontology than is necessary. 
It would also follow that there is no null-class. In itself, this is unproblematic (for it also follows from the 
extensional genesis of classes that there is no null-class). But what is problematic is that it would entail 
that there are no null class-concepts and no null concepts of a class—and these are necessary for symbolic 
logic (PoM: §73). 
54
 To this point I have said nothing about propositional functions. I shall say more in Chapter Two. For 
now, a propositional function may be thought of as a function with 𝑛 variables which, when substituted 
for terms, yield a proposition. Russell: ‗We may explain (but not define) [the notion of a propositional 
function] as follows: 𝜙𝑥 is a propositional function if, for every value of 𝑥, 𝜙𝑥 is a proposition, 
determinate when 𝑥 is given‘ (PoM: §22, 19). 
55
 Cf. n. 53 above. 
56
 I use inverted commas here to mention an entity (not a phrase). I would like to use my angle bracket 
notation, for ‗a u‘ is a denoting concept (i.e. <a u>), but to do so would beg a question. 
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case, 𝑢 would have to occur as subject in the functional complex; but, as proved by its 
restricted variability, 𝑢 does not occur as subject). This leads Russell to say that a 
denoting phrase ‗consists always of a class-concept preceded by one of the above six 
words [i.e. ‗all‘, ‗every‘, ‗any‘, ‗a‘, ‗some‘, ‗the‘] or some synonym of one of them‘ 
(PoM: §58, 56). Given his account of linguistic meaning, a denoting phrase is 
meaningful in virtue of standing for a term: the denoting phrase ‗a 𝑢‘ stands for the 
denoting concept <a 𝑢>. Thus we arrive, having started with a predicate, at a denoting 
concept. Notice that while not once has it been necessary to mention infinite classes, the 
notions of class (in general) and denoting concept are intimately linked. Let us now turn 
back to the epistemological view, and try to locate where it goes wrong. 
 
4.2. Against the epistemological view 
The epistemological view—at least as it is expounded by Levine (and Levine is the only 
commentator to offer the issue serious attention)—rests on an equivocation. Levine 
argues that Russell introduces the theory of denoting concepts for the purposes of 
rejecting a principle he had previously held, namely: 
 
(L1) We can be acquainted with any entity; there is no entity with which we 
cannot, in principle, be acquainted. (Levine 1998: 418) 
 
The claim is that once Russell accepted Cantor‘s theory of infinity, he held that we 
cannot, in principle, be acquainted with infinite classes, and thus that (L1) is false. 
However, the word ‗entity‘, as it occurs in (L1), requires disambiguation. My claim is 
that, in PoM, Russell would only have rejected (L1) if ‗entity‘ is read as ‗object‘. If it is 
read as ‗term‘, on the other hand, I hold that Russell would not necessarily have rejected 
the claim.
57
 This does not, as it may appear to, commit me to the problematic claim that 
Russell thought we could be acquainted with infinite classes; this is because of an 
ambiguity in the notion of class. But before moving on to classes, we begin with the 
distinction between terms and objects. 
 
                                                 
57
 I have no general objection to the use of ‗entity‘ in discussions of Russell. Levine uses it consistently 
(see his 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2005), and I shall too, in later chapters. The problem with its employment 
in (L1) is local, so to speak. 
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4.2.1. Terms and objects 
‗Entity‘ is not a technical expression in PoM, but Russell uses ‗term‘ as synonymous 
with it. A term, as we have seen, is ‗whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur 
in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one‘ (PoM: §47, 43). It is, Russell 
says, ‗the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary‘ (PoM: §47, 43) since ‗anything 
[. . .] that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term‘ (PoM: §47, 43). However, later in the 
next chapter Russell writes in a footnote that he will ‗use the word object in a wider 
sense than term‘ (PoM: §58, 55n.), and comments that ‗The fact that a word can be 
framed with a wider meaning than term raises grave logical problems‘ (PoM: §58, 
55n.). 
 
 ‗Objects‘, for Russell, are the denotations of certain denoting concepts, namely all 
denoting concepts except those expressed by definite descriptions. Taking a finite class 
composed of 𝑎1, 𝑎2, 𝑎3 . . . 𝑎𝑛, Russell offers the following explanations (see PoM: 
§§59-61; note that parenthetical remarks are not quoted, but are intended to be 
explanatory; all else is quoted): 
 
(1) All 𝑎‘s denotes 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 and . . . 𝑎𝑛. 
 (Any such object Russell calls a ‗numerical conjunction‘.) 
(2) Every 𝑎 denotes 𝑎1 and denotes 𝑎2 and . . . and denotes 𝑎𝑛. 
 (Any such object he calls a ‗propositional conjunction‘.) 
(3) Any 𝑎 denotes 𝑎1 or 𝑎2 or . . . or 𝑎𝑛, where or has the meaning that it is 
irrelevant which we take. 
 (Any such object he calls a ‗variable conjunction‘.) 
(4) An 𝑎 denotes 𝑎1 or 𝑎2 or . . . or 𝑎𝑛, where or has the meaning that no one 
in particular must be taken, just as in all 𝑎‘s we must not take one in 
particular. 
 (Any such object he calls a ‗variable disjunction‘.) 
(5) Some 𝑎 denotes 𝑎1 or denotes 𝑎2 or . . . or denotes 𝑎𝑛, where it is not 
irrelevant which is taken, but on the contrary some one particular 𝑎 must 
be taken. 
 (Any such object he calls a ‗constant disjunction‘.) 
 
The details of the various modes of combination of terms to form objects are 
complicated, but we need not investigate them further for our purposes. The important 
point is that these five kinds of object are not themselves terms, but are combinations of 
terms: 
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There is, then, a definite something, different in each of the five cases, which 
must, in some sense, be an object, but is characterized as a set of terms 
combined in a certain way, which something is denoted by all men, every man, 
any man, a man or some man; and it is with this very paradoxical object that 
propositions are concerned in which the corresponding concept is used as 
denoting. (PoM: §63, 62) 
 
Interpreting (L1) as a claim about objects, it is certainly the case that Russell does 
not hold it in PoM. For instance, consider the denoting concept <all numbers>. This 
denotes a combination (a numerical conjunction) of 1, 2, 3, . . . [ad infinitum]. Such a 
combination is not a possible object of acquaintance (at least for finitely-minded 
beings). 
 
If we consider (L1) to be a claim about terms, Russell‘s view is less clear. We can 
however go some way towards recovering his view from the text. He says that ‗a class [. 
. .] or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term‘ (PoM: §47, 43): but 
what about infinite classes? If a finite class may be a term, then there is no reason to 
suppose that an infinite class cannot also (classes should be not classified—at least not 
at the logical or metaphysical level—by reference to our capacities to manipulate them). 
So if a finite class with 𝑛 members may be a term, then so may one with 𝑛𝑛 members, 
and so may one with (𝑛𝑛)𝑛 members, (and so on indefinitely). Why then, may not an 
indefinitely large class, be a term? The fact that we could not name or think directly 
about such a class is simply irrelevant at the logical or metaphysical level. To make a 
distinction based on such considerations would seem to be, firstly, poorly motivated, 
and, secondly, distinctly anti-realist (why should a realist suppose that what there is 
depends on what we may have acquaintance with?). So the distinction between finite 
and infinite classes does not seem to be especially relevant here. The really relevant 
distinction is between the notions of class-as-one and class-as-many. 
 
4.2.2. Classes-as-one and classes-as-many 
Classes, as we have seen, may be approached extensionally or intensionally. To define a 
class extensionally, one enumerates its members. Infinite classes cannot—by humans at 
least—be defined extensionally, and so, from a practical point of view, must be defined 
intensionally. To define a class intensionally, one specifies the concept of the class. In 
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these ways we may think of a class either as a collection of terms, or as a unified whole. 
The former is the class-as-many: the latter the class-as-one. 
 
A class also, in one sense at least, is distinct from the whole composed of its 
terms, for the latter is only and essentially one, while the former, where it has 
many terms, is [. . .] the very kind of object of which many is asserted. The 
distinction of a class as many from a class as a whole [i.e. as one] is often made 
by language: space and points, time and instants, the army and the soldiers, the 
navy and the sailors, the Cabinet and the Cabinet Ministers, all illustrate the 
distinction. (PoM: §70, 68) 
 
In a class-as-many, the member terms have some kind of unity, but ‗just so much unity 
as is required to make them many, and not enough to prevent them from remaining 
many
58‘ (PoM: §70, 69). The unity of the class-as-many is clearly different to (and 
weaker than) the unity of the proposition. Given the intractable difficulties Russell faces 
in regard to propositional unity one could be forgiven for doubting the possibility of an 
adequate explanation of the very strange and weak unity of the class-as-many. But let us 
leave that worry to one side. 
 
Might it be the case that the class-as-one and the class-as-many are one and the 
same, perhaps the same collection under different modes of presentation? Russell argues 
not, as follows. If a concept 𝑐 denotes denotation 𝑑, then, if 𝑑 is identical to 𝑑′, 𝑐 
denotes 𝑑′. The concept classes of all rational animals denotes, Russell says, the human 
race as-one, and is different from the concept men, which denotes the human race as-
many (PoM: §74, 76). If the human race as-one were identical to the human race as-
many, classes of all rational animals would denote the human race as-many, and men 
would denote the human race as-one. Since, on Russell‘s view, this is not the case 
(PoM: §74, 76), the class-as-one and the class-as-many are distinct: 
 
it is [. . .] correct, I think, to infer an ultimate distinction between a class as 
many and a class as one, to hold that the many are only many, and are not also 
one. (PoM: §74, 76) 
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 That is, not enough to make them one. 
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So a class-as-one is distinct from its associated class-as-many.
59
 And classes-as-
many are not terms, but objects: 
 
Thus man is the class-concept, men (the concept) is the concept of the class, and 
men (the object denoted by the concept men) are the class. (PoM: §67, 67, bold 
emphasis added) 
 
And it is because they have that strange kind of unity—enough to make them many 
(rather than simply disparate), but not enough to make them one—that objects are 
described as ‗very paradoxical‘ (PoM: §62, 62).60 Compare propositions: a proposition 
is a collection of terms, but is itself also a term. This is because a proposition has a 
special kind of unity, generated by a concept occurring as concept. A proposition may 
be a ‗logical subject‘. For instance, one may entertain the proposition ⟨⟨Socrates is 
mortal⟩ is true⟩, a proposition directly about a subordinate proposition. But compare a 
similar judgement concerning a class-as-many. Russell writes: 
 
In such a proposition as ―𝐴 and 𝐵 are two,‖ there is no logical subject: the 
assertion is not about 𝐴, nor about 𝐵, nor about the whole composed of both, but 
strictly and only about 𝐴 and 𝐵. (PoM: §74, 76-7) 
 
A very strange claim, but Russell‘s point is this. The proposition in question is true, yet 
the assertion ‗are/is two‘ is not true of 𝐴 (for 𝐴 is one), nor of 𝐵 (for 𝐵 is one too), nor 
yet of the whole composed of 𝐴 and 𝐵 (for this whole—qua whole—is also one61). The 
assertion is true of 𝐴 and 𝐵 considered together but severally (paradoxical as this 
sounds). Russell says, ‗Thus it would seem that assertions are not necessarily about 
single subjects, but may be about many subjects‘ (PoM: §74, 77, bold emphasis added). 
 
This consideration is used by Russell in disarming a familiar contradiction: ‗can we 
now avoid the contradiction always to be feared, where there is something that cannot 
be made a logical subject?‘ (PoM: §74, 76). The worry is that the class-as-many might 
not be a possible logical subject of a proposition; for when it is made the logical subject 
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 I investigate the relation of class-as-one and its associated class-as-many in Chapter Two. 
60
 At least plural combinations are paradoxical in this way (and they may be paradoxical in other ways 
too). Russell sometimes claims that a denoting concept such as <a man> denotes an ambiguous man. Is an 
ambiguous man many or one? I don‘t know. If not, then—though obviously problematic—he is not 
paradoxical in the above sense. 
61
 Cf. ‗every whole is one‘ (CP3: 35). 
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of a proposition, that proposition appears to have a single subject, yet the class-as-many 
is, by definition, not single, but many. Russell resolves the threatened contradiction by 
claiming that a class-as-many can occur in subject-position in a proposition, but that in 
such cases the proposition will be about the members of that class considered together 
but severally
62
. This means that the proposition ⟨𝐴 and 𝐵 are two⟩ is not exactly about 
each member of the class (indicated by the phrase ‗𝐴 and 𝐵‘) individually, but not 
exactly about the two considered together either. (Compare the previous indented 
quotation above.) 
 
Transposing from a finite class to an infinite one, the exact same considerations 
apply. Suppose we have an infinite class composed of terms 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3 . . . [ad infinitum]. 
We will denote the (transfinite) cardinal number of the class by the symbol ‗ℵ‘. Suppose 
then that there is a true proposition such as ⟨𝑡1 and 𝑡2 and 𝑡3 and . . . [ad infinitum] are 
ℵ⟩. This proposition is not about any term individually (for it is not true of 𝑡1 (say) that it 
is ℵ); but nor is it about the whole composed of 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3, . . . [ad infinitum] either (for it 
is not true of this whole—qua whole—that it is ℵ either). In fact, the proposition is 
about 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 and 𝑡3 and . . . [ad infinitum] considered together but severally. So 
Russell manages to avoid his feared contradiction in cases involving both finite and 
infinite classes-as-many. 
 
Now this purported resolution is not, perhaps, very compelling. The objects upon 
which it rests (i.e. numerical conjunctions, classes-as-many) are highly suspect. But two 
points are clear. The first is that the contradiction which agitates Russell is only 
threatened if the class-as-many is a term (for the contradiction expressly concerns terms 
qua logical subjects). The second is that Russell‘s ‗resolution‘ is in fact a denial that the 
contradiction arises here. For the class-as-many is not, like a genuine term, a single 
logical subject, but irreducibly plural. The class-as-many is an object not a term. 
Russell‘s point, in effect, is that while the notion of a term which cannot be a logical 
subject of a proposition is contradictory, this restriction does not apply to objects. So 
when Russell said that ‗a class [. . .] is sure to be a term‘ (PoM: §47, 43), he had in mind 
classes-as-one, not classes-as-many. 
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 This turn of phrase is not Russell‘s but mine. I fail to see what else he could possibly mean by saying 
that ⟨𝐴 and 𝐵 are two⟩ is not about 𝐴, nor 𝐵, nor the whole composed of 𝐴 and 𝐵, but ‗strictly and only 
about 𝐴 and 𝐵‘ (PoM: §74, 77). 
44 
 
 
A class-as-one is a term, and presumably may, relatively un-problematically, be the 
logical subject of a proposition. Consider, for instance:  
 
⟨13⟩ ⟨Men is a class⟩ 
 
Moreover, Russell says, speaking of proposition ⟨14⟩, that it ‗explicitly contains the 
class as a constituent‘ (PoM: §68, 67). 
 
⟨14⟩ ⟨Socrates is one among men⟩ 
 
Here, the very fact that one may entertain ⟨14⟩ indicates that ‗class‘ should be read as 
‗class-as-one‘ in the quoted claim; for although I believe that Socrates is one among 
men, I am certainly not acquainted with every single human (all the more so since 
Russell takes the human race to include all past, present, and future humans (PoM: §62, 
62)). If the class-as-many occurred in ⟨14⟩, it would be, practically-speaking, impossible 
for mere mortals like us to apprehend that proposition.
63
 But since Russell would not 
have accepted that we cannot entertain ⟨14⟩, one should infer that he held that the class-
as-one occurs therein. 
 
But now consider the proposition 
 
⟨15⟩ ⟨343 is one among numbers⟩ 
 
By parity of form, this proposition also explicitly contains the class as a constituent.  But 
in this case, the class is an infinite class, numbers. Given that one may, in spite of one‘s 
finitude, entertain the proposition in question, and given the preceding discussion, does 
that not entail that one may be acquainted with an infinite class-as-one? If so, then 
reading (L1) as about terms, there is no need to suppose that Russell rejected it in PoM. 
                                                 
63
 There would also be a problem with null class-concepts. If ⟨Socrates is one among men⟩ was equivalent 
to, say, ⟨Socrates is one among: Socrates, Plato, Pele, Hilary Clinton, Henry VIII, Lulu . . . [and so on, 
listing every human that ever was, is, or will be]⟩, then what proposition would ⟨Socrates is one among 
unicorns⟩ be equivalent to? 
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A null-class, a unit-class, a very large class, and an infinite class, may all—taken as-
one—be objects of acquaintance.64 
 
At this point one might mount an objection, claiming that ⟨15⟩ does not contain the 
infinite class as a constituent at all (either as-one or as-many), but, rather, contains some 
concept that denotes it. Indeed Russell does say that, for example, the concept men 
denotes (the object) men (PoM: §67, 67). If this objection is correct, then Russell‘s 
claim that ⟨14⟩ ‗explicitly contains the class as a constituent‘ (PoM: §68, 67) was 
erroneous. But moreover, if this is the case, Russell was mistaken in claiming that a 
class may be a term at all, considered either as-many or as-one. For if ⟨14⟩ does not 
contain the class-as-one, then it is difficult to see how ⟨13⟩ could. But if ⟨13⟩ does not 
contain a class-as-one, it is difficult to see how any proposition could contain a class-as-
one. And if no proposition could contain a class-as-one, then no class-as-one is a 
possible logical subject or a possible object of thought—in short classes-as-one are not 
terms; and since classes-as-many are not either, Russell was wrong to say that ‗a class [. 
. .] is sure to be a term‘ (PoM: §47, 43). 
 
There is something to be said for this objection to my interpretation, in as much as 
it highlights the inconsistencies of Russell‘s presentation (and, in all likelihood, his 
view).
65
 Moreover, as shall emerge in the next chapter, I fully accept that the status of 
the class-as-one is highly problematic for Russell. Nevertheless, I do not find the 
objection compelling since when Russell says ‗a class [. . .] is sure to be a term‘ (PoM: 
§47, 43) I take him at his word. 
 
Interestingly, even if the objection were sound, this could only provide further 
evidence in favour of the logical genesis view over the epistemological view. What is at 
issue here is the connection between classes and concepts, the objection being that I 
have not accurately represented Russell‘s view of that connection. Whether the 
interpretation I have defended above or the view touted in the objection is correct, 
Russell‘s presentation (if not his view) is inconsistent in some respect: classes-as-one 
are either terms (as I propose) or they are not (as in the objection), yet both sides of the 
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 Obviously using ‗objects‘ in a non-technical sense here. 
65
 We should certainly not be frightened to attribute inconsistencies to Russell in PoM, for they are not 
uncommon. To cite one example, in Chapter VI of Part I, we are told that there is no null-class; by 
Chapter X, however, there is. 
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debate have presented some evidence in favour of their interpretation. But wherever the 
inconsistency is ultimately located, an important point emerges. If it is true that classes 
are not terms, then this applies to all classes, infinite or not. And if, on the other hand, 
classes-as-one are terms, then there is as much reason to suppose that one may be 
acquainted with infinite ones as with finite ones—for an infinite class-as-one is simply 
one, not (infinitely) many. 
 
Returning to Levine‘s principle (L1), in the light of the preceding discussion I see 
no reason to suppose Russell committed to the claim that there are any terms with which 
we cannot, in principle, be acquainted.
66
 Some objects—some classes-as-many—are, in 
principle, beyond possible acquaintance, but that is another matter. The theory of 
denoting concepts is not, I submit, introduced to explain how we may form propositions 
about infinite classes, but as a consequence derived, by a kind of logical genesis, from 
subject-predicate propositions. The theory of denoting concepts certainly shows its 
worth in relation to infinite classes-as-many, for, in principle, we could not form 
propositions about them in any other way. But—practically speaking—we could not 
form propositions about, say, the class-as-many of men in any other way either, for that 
class just has too many members. So I conclude that the theory of denoting concepts 
was introduced in the context of a general account of the basic notions of logic—
predicate and class in particular—and was not specifically addressed to the 
epistemological worry raised by the problem of aboutness, contra the epistemological 
view. 
 
This is not to say that Russell‘s acceptance of Cantor‘s theory was not of great 
importance in sparking his renewed investigation into the nature of classes.
67
 Worries 
about the use of the notion of infinity in the logicist project clearly exercised Russell; 
and he described the problems of infinity and of infinite number as ‗soluble by a correct 
theory of any‘ (PoM: §179, 188). But this is merely the identification of an application 
for the theory of generality.
68
 It is perfectly compatible with the logical genesis view, 
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 A possible exception to this would be an infinitely complex concept: but Russell is agnostic as to the 
existence of such terms (PoM: §73, 73). 
67
 He said, for instance: ‗I was led to [the paradoxes] by considering Cantor‘s proof that there is no 
greatest cardinal number (MPD: 75). 
68
 In a similar vein, Hylton (1996: 39) describes Russell as invoking the theory of denoting concepts in 
response to the problems of infinity. If he invokes it, then it is already extant independently of the 
problem of aboutness. 
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and is not what the epistemological view attests. The general thrust (though not the 
detail) of the view that I have defended is advocated by other commentators
69
, though 
they do not provide any support for it. I have sought to justify the view since, in this 
thesis, it will be important to recognise that the theory of denoting is, for Russell, 
primarily an account of the possibility of propositions of generality.
70
 
 
This is not to say that the theory of denoting concepts is intended as an explanation 
of generality. Such a view is advocated by Hylton (2005d: 201-03; 2005c: 165). On his 
view, whereas in OD Russell assumes generality (by taking the variable as 
‗fundamental‘ (OD: 42)), in PoM Russell attempts to explain it in terms of denoting 
concepts. The theory of descriptions is able to replace the theory of denoting concepts 
without loss of explanatory value in this respect because, Hylton claims, the theory of 
denoting concepts fails as an explanation of generality. So Russell loses nothing by 
giving it up. But in fact, generality is assumed in PoM. Although the variable is not 
taken as fundamental (but treated as a denoting concept) generality is still assumed in 
virtue of the relation of denoting—the relation between a denoting concept and its 
denotation—being taken as a primitive logical relation. It is the relation that is key, and 
it is presupposed in both the OD and PoM accounts of the variable. As Hylton himself 
acknowledges (e.g. Hylton 1990: 256), the logical relation of denoting remains in OD, 
in the form of the relation between the variable and its values. 
 
Recognising the role of the theory of denoting concepts as an account of the 
possibility of propositions of generality is important in a study of this kind, for it fits in 
far more happily than the epistemological view with the general tenor of Russell‘s work 
in the period. Alasdair Urquhart, in his introduction to CP4, contends that: 
 
Most of the very voluminous secondary literature on Russell‘s Theory of 
Descriptions discusses it in isolation from its setting in the enterprise of the 
logical derivation of mathematics; the resulting separation of the logical and the 
mathematical aspects of denoting is foreign to Russell‘s own approach. 
(Urquhart, in CP4: xxxii) 
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 Hylton 2005d: 195-96; Wahl 2007: 12; Landini 2009: 285. 
70
 Note that this distinguishes the theory of denoting from the theory of Sinn. 
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It is an advantage of the position I am defending—the logical genesis view—that it ties 
in extremely closely with Russell‘s own account of his work after the completion of 
PoM. He wrote, for example: 
 
When The Principles of Mathematics was finished, I settled down to a resolute 
attempt to find a solution of the paradoxes. [. . .] Throughout 1903 and 1904, my 
work was almost wholly devoted to this matter, but without any vestige of 
success. My first success was the theory of descriptions, in the spring of 1905. 
(MPD: 79) 
 
The logical genesis view enables us to begin to set the theory of descriptions—which is 
rooted in the theory of denoting concepts—on firmly logico-mathematical ground, as 
Urquhart suggests one ought to. 
 
By focussing discussion on Cantor‘s theory and on infinite classes, the 
epistemological view does place Russell‘s discussion of denoting in a mathematical 
context. But, given that PoM is a work in the philosophy of mathematics, it would be 
nothing short of a miracle if any account of the theory of denoting concepts didn‘t 
manage to set it in some kind of mathematical context. However, at root, on the 
epistemological view, the theory of denoting concepts centres on the problem of 
aboutness; that problem is primarily epistemological, and is not, in and of itself, 
inherently mathematical. On the logical genesis view, however, denoting is an issue for 
Russell precisely because of its connection with (what he took to be) a central notion of 
mathematics, namely the notion of class. 
 
The connections between the theory of denoting concepts, the account of 
generality, and the theory of classes having been established, I shall turn in the next 
chapter to the question of why Russell, in the period 1903-05, looked to the theory of 
denoting in his attempt to solve the paradoxes that bear his name. 
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2. Denoting and the Paradoxes 
 
1. Introduction 
To one acquainted only with Russell‘s later reflections upon the production of Principia 
Mathematica (PM), it might seem that the discovery of the theory of definite 
descriptions and the search for a solution to the paradoxes at the heart of the logicist 
project were wholly unconnected. Russell writes, for example: 
 
Throughout 1903 and 1904, I pursued will-o‘-the wisps and made no progress. 
At last, in the spring of 1905, a different problem, which proved soluble, gave 
the first glimmer of hope. The problem was that of descriptions, and its solution 
suggested a new technique. (MMD: 13) 
 
However, passages such as this misrepresent the relation between the paradoxes 
and the question of descriptions and denoting. The idea that, in a serendipitous turn of 
fate, Russell happened upon ‗the first step towards overcoming the difficulties which 
had baffled me for so long‘ (Auto: 155) may have a certain charm, but is nonetheless 
demonstrably false. The theory of descriptions and the paradoxes are, in Russell‘s 
philosophy at least, bound together. Indeed evidence from Russell‘s own pen shows that 
he took the question of denoting to be relevant to the paradoxes: 
 
in April 1904 I began working at the Contradiction again, and continued at it, 
with few intermissions, till January 1905. I was throughout much occupied by 
the question of Denoting, which I thought was probably relevant, as it proved to 
be. (Grattan-Guinness 1977: 79) 
 
Of course thinking the question of denoting to be ‗probably relevant‘ is not exactly a 
ringing endorsement of its close connection to the paradoxes. But a stronger connection 
can be established. 
 
The roots of the theory of descriptions may be traced, via the Gray‘s Elegy 
Argument (GEA), back to the theory of denoting concepts from PoM. In Chapter One I 
suggested that the theory of denoting concepts is an account of generality, and best 
understood as arising by a kind of ‗logical genesis‘ from the nature of predicates. In 
arguing for the interpretation we began to see the very close connection between 
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denoting concepts and classes, and glimpsed the connection of the ‗logical genesis‘ of 
denoting concepts and the ‗intensional genesis‘ of classes. 
 
In this Chapter I develop the connection between the paradoxes and the theory of 
denoting. Russell‘s investigations into the theory of denoting in the period 1903-05 (i.e. 
between the publications of PoM and OD) were a central part of his attempt to resolve 
the paradoxes. Generalising, we find in the literature two common claims: that the roots 
of the theory of descriptions lie in the GEA; and that Russell‘s investigations in the 
period 1903-05 centred on the search for a solution of the paradoxes. Both of these 
claims are true, but what is wanting is an explanation of the connection between them.  
In the absence of such an explanation we can merely gesture towards an understanding 
of Russell‘s work in this period. My aim in this chapter is to begin to bring that 
connection out into the light. By the end of Chapter Five the connections will, I hope, be 
clear. 
 
In §2 I look at Russell‘s formulations of the paradoxes. I demonstrate—by 
appealing to a confusion in his presentation—that Russell was attempting to steer a 
course between a purely extensional and purely intensional view of classes. The 
confusion stems from his distinction between ‗classes-as-many‘ and ‗classes-as-one‘. In 
Chapter One I suggested that the status of classes-as-one is unclear. Here I shall develop 
this thought, arguing that the class-as-one occupies a kind of limbo between its 
associated class-as-many and the propositional function or predicate that gives rise to 
that class-as-many. Though I do not claim that Russell was explicitly aware of the issue 
in the terms in which I present it, I argue that the relation between a class-as-one and its 
associated class-as-many involves a blurring of the lines between extension and 
intension. I take this complex interplay of extension and intension to be a constant 
theme in Russell‘s work on the paradoxes and denoting in the period 1903-05.1 
 
In §3 I look at Russell‘s strategies for tackling the paradoxes. I am not so concerned 
to set out the precise details of the various theories he attempted to formulate, but rather 
consider the standards that Russell demanded of a satisfactory solution. In illustrating 
                                                 
1
 The connections cannot be brought out with precision as Russell never formulated the relevant concepts 
or positions with precision. For further evidence of the extension/intension interplay, in both Russell and 
Frege, see Gaskin (2008: 165ff). 
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Russell‘s concerns I argue against a widespread understanding of his commitment to the 
doctrine of the unrestricted variable. 
 
There are, I shall suggest, two main points of connection linking the paradoxes and 
the theory of denoting: the question of ‗empty‘ denoting phrases, and the question of the 
relation between that which denotes (i.e. a denoting concept or, as in Russell‘s post-
PoM works, a denoting complex or meaning) and that which is denoted. In §3.3 I 
address the former, the question of empty denoting phrases. Almost inevitably now, 
‗empty denoting phrases‘ leads us to think of ‗the present king of France‘, ‗the golden 
mountain‘, ‗the round-square‘ and so on. These immediately raise questions in ontology 
or the philosophy of language. Such questions certainly interested Russell, but I seek to 
emphasise his more strictly logical concerns in this area, and in particular the 
connection to the paradoxes. The connection is not merely such that one can construct it 
after the fact, but was rather a live question for Russell at the time. 
 
§4 turns to the relation between ‗meaning‘ and ‗denotation‘. I set out Russell‘s 
‗theory of meaning and denotation‘ and examine its relation to the theory of denoting 
concepts. Russell toyed, in his unpublished manuscripts from 1903-05, with some 
significant developments which, had they held, would have rendered the theory of 
meaning and denotation unarguably distinct from the theory of denoting concepts. I 
show that the theory of meaning and denotation upon which Russell eventually settles 
differs from the theory denoting concepts only with respect to very minor modifications 
and changes of terminology, leaving the basic structure intact. Unlike most other 
commentators, I attempt to demonstrate both how the theory of meaning and denotation 
is relevant to Russell‘s investigations into the paradoxes and how his investigations led 
to the GEA.
2
 To this end I set out Russell‘s distinction—key to the GEA—between 
‗entity-occurrence‘ and ‗meaning-occurrence‘ (§4.2). 
 
The investigation into the paradoxes is, I claim, the glue that holds together the 
theory of denoting concepts, the theory of meaning and denotation, the GEA, and the 
theory of descriptions. The theory of descriptions and the paradoxes are inextricably 
bound. The aim of this chapter is to establish the thematic ties. 
                                                 
2
 Notable exceptions include: Rodriguez-Consuegra (1989; 1992); Wahl (1993); Landini (1998a; 1998b); 
and Levine (2005). 
52 
 
 
2. The Paradoxes: Intension and Extension 
Russell reports that the ‗logical honeymoon‘ he had enjoyed since his encounter with 
the work of Peano at the International Congress of Philosophy in 1900 came to an 
abrupt end in the spring of 1901 with the discovery of the Contradiction.
3
 
 
In PoM the paradox is stated in a variety of forms. For a statement of the basic 
problem one can do worse that turn to Russell‘s statement of it from 1908: 
 
Let 𝑤 be the class of all those classes which are not members of themselves. 
Then, whatever class 𝑥 may be, ‗𝑥 is a 𝑤‘ is equivalent to ‗𝑥 is not an 𝑥‘. Hence, 
giving to 𝑥 the value 𝑤, ‗𝑤 is a 𝑤‘ is equivalent to ‗𝑤 is not a 𝑤‘. (ML: 59) 
 
Unpacking this somewhat, the point is as follows. Some classes are members of 
themselves and some are not. The class 𝑏 of badgers, for example, is a class, not a 
badger; as such, if we enumerate the members of 𝑏, we will list badgers, but not 𝑏 itself: 
𝑏 is not a member of itself. The class 𝑐 of classes, on the other hand, is a member of 
itself: it contains all and only those things that have the property of being a class, and 𝑐 
certainly has that property, so 𝑐 is included among its own members. Taking 𝑤 to be the 
class of all those classes which, like 𝑏, are not members of themselves, we note that: 
 
 If 𝑤 is a member of itself, then—as such—it is not a member of 𝑤 (for 𝑤 is 
composed of all and only those classes which are not members of themselves). 
 If 𝑤 is not a member of itself, then—in virtue of that very fact—it is a member 
of the class of classes which are not members of themselves, i.e. of 𝑤. 
 
In that case, 𝑤 is a member of itself just in case 𝑤 is not a member of itself: 𝑤 ∈ 𝑤  𝑤 
∉ 𝑤. 
 
The first statement of the paradox in PoM is given in terms of predicates (PoM: 
§78). Some predicates are, and some are not, truly predicable of themselves (𝜙 is truly 
predicable of itself if ‗𝜙 is 𝜙‘ expresses a true proposition). Being a badger, for 
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 In fact it seems that Russell did not realise the full impact of the paradoxes until he communicated them 
to Frege in 1902. On this see Kilmister 1984: 89 and G. H. Moore 1995: 234-35. I have not included an 
account of the origins of the paradox. On this see Coffa 1979, Garciadiego 1992, and G. H. Moore 1995. 
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example, is not a badger, so it is not truly predicable of itself. Being a predicate, on the 
other hand, in virtue of being a predicate, is truly predicable of itself. Consider, then, the 
following predicate: not being truly predicable of oneself (call it ‗𝜙‘). Is 𝜙 truly 
predicable of itself? Since 𝜙 is truly predicated of some term 𝑥 just in case 𝑥 is not truly 
predicable of itself, i.e. 
 
(1a) 𝜙(𝑥)  𝑥(𝑥) 
 
 𝜙 will be truly predicable of itself just in case it is not truly predicable of itself. To 
illustrate, substituting 𝜙 for 𝑥 in (1a) yields a contradiction: 
 
(1b) 𝜙(𝜙)  𝜙(𝜙) 
 
The first paradox, the paradox of classes, is sometimes thought of as the extensional 
counterpart of the second, the paradox of predicates (which is thought of as the 
intensional counterpart of the former).
4
 
 
This may, in general, be a useful distinction to draw, but it is potentially misleading 
to the student of PoM. When, in PoM, the paradox of classes is given, it is given not as 
above simply in terms of 𝑤, but in terms of Russell‘s distinction between the class-as-
one and the class-as-many: 
 
A class as one may be a term [i.e. member] of itself as many. Thus the class of 
all classes is a class; the class of all the terms that are not men is not a man, and 
so on. Do all the classes that have this property form a class? If so, is it as one a 
member of itself as many or not? If it is, then it is one of the classes which, as 
ones, are not members of themselves as many, and vice versâ. (PoM: §101, 102) 
 
(Russell is guilty of a gross slip here. The question is not, as he writes, ‗Do all the 
classes that have [the property of being, as ones, members of themselves as many] form 
a class?‘, but rather, as he surely intends, ‗Do all the classes that have the property of 
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 E.g. Stevens 2005: ch. 2. 
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not being, as ones, members of themselves as many form a class?‘) I call this version of 
the paradox the ‗mixed‘ paradox.5 
 
Though nobody seems to remark upon it
6
, it should be noted that the statement of 
the paradox given above is inconsistent with other of Russell‘s claims regarding the 
nature of classes. Russell feels the pull of two claims: that a class is a kind of plural 
object, and that a class should be the kind of entity which can be counted or of which an 
assertion could be made: 
 
Is a class which has many terms to be regarded as itself one or many? Taking the 
class as equivalent simply to the numerical conjunction ―𝐴 and 𝐵 and 𝐶 and 
etc.,‖ it seems plain that it is many; yet it is quite necessary that we should be 
able to count classes as one each, and we do habitually speak of a class. (PoM: 
§74, 76) 
 
It is, after all, axiomatic for Russell that whatever is (has being), can be the logical 
subject of a proposition (PoM: §47). 
 
Thus we must distinguish two senses in which the notion of class is to be 
employed: on the one hand a class is a term, a logical subject, the kind of thing of which 
an assertion may be made. On the other hand, classes must be considered as ‗numerical 
conjunctions‘, for it is only in this sense that number can be predicated of them: 
 
All men, for example, denotes men conjoined in a certain way; and it is as thus 
denoted that they have a number. Similarly all numbers or all points denotes 
[sic] numbers or points conjoined in a certain way, and as thus conjoined 
numbers or points have a number. Numbers, then, are to be regarded as 
properties of classes. (PoM: §109, 113, bold emphasis added) 
 
When Russell says that numbers are ‗to be regarded as properties of classes‘ he clearly 
means ‗of classes-as-many‘. Or again: 
 
A class also, in one sense at least, is distinct from the whole composed of its 
terms, for the latter is only and essentially one, while the former, where it has 
                                                 
5
 ‗Mixed‘ since it is, as I will show presently, intermediate between the extensional paradox of classes and 
the intensional paradox of predicates. 
6
 As far as I am aware. 
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many terms, is [. . .] the very kind of object of which many is to be asserted. 
(PoM: §69, 68, bold emphasis added) 
 
Russell‘s use of ‗object‘ here is deliberate, indicating that the class is to be taken as a 
numerical conjunction.
7
 
 
But the difficulty is that the class-as-many and the class-as-one are distinct: they are 
not the same thing, not even the same thing under different modes of presentation or 
different modes of occurrence. Russell writes, 
 
it is [. . .] correct, I think, to infer an ultimate distinction between a class as 
many and a class as one, to hold that the many are only many, and are not also 
one. (PoM: §74, 76)
8
 
 
This complicating factor—that the class-as-many and class-as-one are distinct—is 
rarely discussed in the literature.
9
 This is a surprising omission since, as discussed 
below, it serves to illustrate the interplay of the notions of extension and intension in 
regard to Russell‘s position on classes and the paradoxes. That the issue is rarely 
discussed may be due to a misunderstanding regarding the motivation for positing the 
distinction between the two forms of class. Cocchiarella (1987: 22), for instance, 
suggests that Russell‘s coming to distinguish the two forms of class was a consequence 
of his coming to deny, in the wake of the paradoxes, that for every class-as-many there 
is an associated class-as-one. But as I have suggested, that Russell distinguishes the 
class-as-many and class-as-one is simply due to their having different properties—
number is truly predicable only of classes-as-many, and is, as such, quite independent of 
the paradoxes.
10
 
 
Holding to this line, Russell‘s statement of the mixed paradox will not do: a class 𝛼 
is not, as one, a member of itself as many—if there is an ‗ultimate distinction‘ between 
a class-as-many and a class-as-one, then ‗itself‘ is quite out of place. Contrary to 
Russell‘s statement of the mixed paradox, 𝛼-as-one may not be a member of itself as-
                                                 
7
 Cf. PoM: §58, 55n. 
8
 And this view is confirmed later on: the class-as-one is ‗in any case not identical with the class as many‘ 
(PoM: §127, 132). 
9
 It is mentioned by Gaskin (2008: 168-69). 
10
 Dau (1986: 140), L. Linsky (1998: 634-35), and Oliver & Smiley (2005: 1041) all get this right, it 
seems to me. 
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many. In order to restate the mixed paradox in these terms, Russell must provide an 
account of the relation between the class-as-one and the class-as-many. Such an account 
is by no means impossible; but it is surprisingly difficult to give an account that does 
not blur the lines between extension and intension, as we shall see. 
 
2.1. Classes-as-many and as-one: the extensional and intensional standpoints 
PoM does not always present Russell‘s finalised position. For example, the views 
contained in the appendices are sometimes in tension with the line taken in the main 
body of the work.
11
 Russell confesses to feeling ‗little confidence in my present 
opinions‘, describing his conclusions as ‗essentially hypotheses‘ (PoM: xxi). As regards 
classes, he can only comment that ‗the contradiction [. . .] proves that something is 
amiss, but what this is I have hitherto failed to discover‘ (PoM: xxi). Neat 
characterisations of the paradoxes as, in this form extensional, in that form intensional, 
are therefore liable to pass over subtleties relevant to the development of Russell‘s 
thought. 
 
In what follows we will consider only classes with more than one member. Null- 
and unit-classes are of tremendous importance to Russell‘s project, but they introduce 
complications which, for present purposes, may be put to one side. As a final 
preliminary we must introduce some notation. Lower case roman letters (𝑎, 𝑏) will 
stand for terms. To speak of a class without explicit commitment to its being considered 
as-one or as-many I use early (in the alphabet) lower case Greek letters (𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾): to 
specify whether the class is taken as-one or as-many I use superscripted ‗1‘ or ‗M‘ (thus 
𝛼1 is distinguished from 𝛼M). I use 𝜙 and 𝜓 as predicate expressions; these in 
conjunction with 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, and the ‗hat‘, form expressions for propositional functions: 
thus 𝜙𝑥  is a propositional function yielding a proposition when a term is substituted for 
𝑥 . 
 
In Chapter One we spoke of classes as derived from predicates and class-concepts. 
(We may take predicates and class-concepts to be the same thing: Russell acknowledges 
that ‗the distinction is perhaps only verbal‘ (PoM: §58, 56), and in what follows I shall 
use the two interchangeably.) To speak in this way is not wrong, but it simplifies 
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 The main body itself is not always consistent. Compare the treatments of the null-class at §73 and 
§106. 
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somewhat. Russell‘s official view is that classes are derived from propositional 
functions
12
; and in light of the paradoxes he is uncertain as to the relation between 
propositional functions and class-concepts. It might seem obvious that any propositional 
function 𝜙𝑥  must be associated with some predicate 𝜙, and I think Russell felt the force 
of this article of common sense; but in the face of the paradoxes he felt moved to 
agnosticism as to the ontological status of such would-be class-concepts as not being a 
member of oneself, not being a member of one‟s own extension, not being truly 
predicable of oneself and so on. Though Russell deems the existence of such class-
concepts questionable, he does not doubt the existence of the associated propositional 
functions (though the ontological status of propositional functions is uncertain
13
.) What 
positive claims Russell has to make of the relation between class-concepts and classes 
may be safely extended to the relation between propositional functions and classes—
though not vice versa. That is, while Russell accepts that for any predicate 𝜙 there is an 
associated propositional function 𝜙𝑥 , he does not accept that for any propositional 
function 𝜙𝑥  there is an associated predicate 𝜙. 
 
From the extensional standpoint, a class may be ‗defined by the enumeration of its 
terms‘ (PoM: §68, 68) using the concept of ‗and‘14. Thus a class 𝛼 may be defined as: 
 
(Dfext: 𝛼) 𝑎-and-𝑏-and-𝑐 
 
(supposing that 𝛼 has just three members, 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐). On the other hand, from the 
intensional standpoint, a class is defined in terms of the propositional function which 
gives rise to it. Thus 𝛼 might be defined as: 
 
(Dfint: 𝛼) {𝑥: 𝜙𝑥 } 
 
where ‗{𝑥: 𝜙𝑥 }‘ is read ‗the class of 𝑥 such that 𝑥 is/has 𝜙‘. 
 
                                                 
12
 Though he does not put matters in these terms in the sections of PoM discussed in Chapter One (which 
is why I followed his terminology there). 
13
 Cf. PoM: §85. 
14
 Russell attributes to and the ability to combine terms in such a way that they ‗have [. . .] just so much 
unity as is required to make them many, and not enough to prevent them from remaining many‘ (PoM: 
§70, 69; cf. PoM: §§71, 130; see also Chapter One, §4). 
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It may be tempting to align the class-as-many with the class defined in terms of 
extension and the class-as-one with the class defined in terms of intension. This 
temptation should be resisted. Classes-as-one may, just as much as classes-as-many, be 
defined extensionally; and classes-as-many may, just as much as classes-as-one, be 
defined intensionally. Importantly, classes, both as-one and as-many, have extensional 
identity conditions. That is to say, they are ‗definite when their terms [i.e. members] are 
given‘ (PoM: §66, 66). On the other hand, predicates, class-concepts, and propositional 
functions, though they may have an extension, are themselves intensional entities. 
 
The class-as-one must also be distinguished, says Russell (PoM: §69), from its 
associated class-concept or propositional function, and for good reason: different class-
concepts (or propositional functions) can define the same class (this serves to further 
emphasise that the identity conditions of classes are extensional. 
 
When we come to examine the mixed paradox, the lines between the extensional 
and intensional standpoints begin to blur. We may construct a wholly extensional 
paradox of classes-as-one. Here the ‗punch-line‘ will be: 
 
(2) 𝛼1 ∈ 𝛼1  𝛼1 ∉ 𝛼1 
 
This is simply the paradox of classes as given above, quoted from ML. Now consider 
the mixed paradox. Since Russell has not noticed that his claim that 𝛼1 may be a 
member of itself-as-many cannot be quite right, he presumably takes it that (3a) captures 
the paradox as he intends it. 
 
(3a) 𝛼1 ∈ 𝛼M  𝛼1 ∉ 𝛼M 
 
If 𝛼1 and 𝛼M were identical (so that Russell‘s ‗itself‘ claim held true) then (3a) would be 
purely extensional. But since this is not so we must probe the relationship between 𝛼1 
and 𝛼M. 
 
Although they are non-identical, 𝛼1 and 𝛼M obviously do bear some rather intimate 
relationship. At heart, we might think, that relationship stems from their both being 
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derivable from the same propositional function. Suppose that that propositional function 
is 𝜙𝑥 . Then 𝜙𝑥  ‗gives rise‘ to both 𝛼1 and 𝛼M (this ‗giving rise‘ relation cannot be the 
same in both cases). We might diagram the relations as follows: 
 
 
Fig. 1
15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‗giving rise‘ relations 𝐴 and 𝐵 are perhaps not perfectly well understood, but that 
need not concern us unduly. The relation with which we are primarily concerned is 𝐶. 
We could characterise 𝐶 in terms of 𝐴 and 𝐵; but it seems natural to suppose that the 
relation between 𝛼1 and 𝛼M is not, ultimately, mediated via 𝐴 and 𝐵 and 𝜙𝑥 , but is 
independent of them. That is to say, 𝛼1 and 𝛼M are the very classes that they are by 
virtue of their containing as members just those terms that they do: their identity 
conditions are extensional and so no intensional aspect need come into their relation, 
one might suppose. 
 
Not wishing to characterise the relationship between 𝛼1 and 𝛼M in such a way as to 
introduce intensional notions, what kind of purely extensional account of the relation 
could we provide? 
 
To begin with, notice that given Russell‘s general strategy for tackling the 
paradoxes, we cannot simply take the relation to be fundamental, a basic logical fact. 
Russell‘s proposal for dealing with the paradoxes is to deny that all propositional 
functions determine a class-as-one (though all determine a class-as-many). This is 
                                                 
15
 This form of diagram was first suggested to me by a similar one—though not one involving classes—in 
Demopoulos 1999. 
𝐶 
𝐵 
𝐴 
𝛼M  
𝛼1 𝜙𝑥  
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equivalent to denying that for every class-as-many there is an associated class-as-one.
16
 
The idea is to delineate and then explain which classes-as-many have an associated 
class-as-one. Now if the relation 𝐶 is taken as a fundamental logical relation, then how 
could any class-as-many ever fail to bear it to some class-as-one? And of course it 
would not help to propose that relation 𝐶 has a sense, i.e. a direction, namely from a 
class-as-one to a class-as-many. This, it might be thought, restricts the obtaining of 𝐶 to 
those cases where both forms of class subsist. But this is clearly no great advance. Let 
𝐶′ be the converse of 𝐶, and now ask how any class-as-many could ever fail to bear 𝐶′ 
to some class-as-one? Given that 𝐶 is a fundamental relation, it is hard to deny that 𝐶′ is 
too (insofar as 𝐶′ is definable, i.e. in terms of 𝐶, 𝐶 is equally definable in terms of 𝐶′). 
 
A more fruitful line is to suggest that 𝐶 is to be characterised in terms of a class-as-
one and a class-as-many having the same members. One might posit something like the 
following condition: 
 
(𝐶𝑖) 𝐶(𝛼
1
, 𝛼M)  (𝑥)(𝑥 ∈ 𝛼1  𝑥 ∈ 𝛼M)   
 
That is, 𝛼1 and 𝛼M stand in relation 𝐶 just in case any member of 𝛼1 is a member of 𝛼M 
and any member of 𝛼M is a member of 𝛼1. But here we must be careful not to confound 
two senses of ‗∈‘. The relation of a term to a class-as-one is not identical to the relation 
of a term to a class-as-many (PoM: §76). Thus we must say rather, 
 
(𝐶𝑖𝑖) 𝐶(𝛼
1
, 𝛼M)  (𝑥)(𝑥 ∈𝑖 𝛼
1
  𝑥 ∈𝑖𝑖 𝛼
M) 
 
using subscripts to distinguish the two membership relations. The mixed paradox then 
concerns the class-as-one of those classes-as-one which are not members of the class-as-
many to which they stand in the 𝐶 relation. Is this class-as-one a member of the class-
as-many to which it stands in the 𝐶 relation? We find that it is just in case it is not. That 
is: 
 
(3b) 𝛽1 ∈𝑖𝑖 𝛽
M
  𝛽1 ∉𝑖𝑖 𝛽
M
 
 
                                                 
16
 Cf. PoM: §101. 
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But there remain two complications in this analysis that re-introduce intensional 
elements into the supposedly extensional paradox. Firstly, there is no general 
characterisation of the relation ∈𝑖𝑖 that does not necessitate appeal to intensional entities. 
Secondly, the class-as-one occupies a curious intermediate position, some way between 
the wholly extensional class-as-many and the wholly intensional class-concept 
(predicate). I deal with these in turn. 
 
The class-as-many is irreducibly plural: it is not a single term. This, it will be 
recalled from Chapter One, required Russell to introduce objects in addition to terms: 
‗The fact that a word can be framed with a wider meaning than term raises grave logical 
problems‘, says Russell (PoM: §58, 55n.). We are never explicitly told what these 
‗grave logical problems‘ are, though they all seem to concern the so-called 
‗contradiction always to be feared, where there is something that cannot be made a 
logical subject‘ (PoM: §74, 76). Presumably the following is among their number. 
 
The relation of class-membership is two-place, so that 𝑧 ∈ 𝛾 asserts a certain 
relation between 𝑧 and 𝛾. The relation ∈𝑖𝑖, we stipulated, was to hold between a term 
and a class-as-many; this was required in order for us to characterise the relation 𝐶 
holding between the class-as-one and class-as-many. But matters are not so simple, as 
Russell notes: 
 
It is plain that, since a class, except when it has one term, is essentially many, it 
cannot be as such represented by a single letter: hence in any possible Symbolic 
Logic the letters which do duty for classes cannot represent the classes as many, 
but must represent either class-concepts, or the whole composed of classes, or 
some other allied single entities. And thus ∈ cannot represent the relation of a 
term to its class as many; for this would be a relation of one term to many terms, 
not a two-term relation such as we want. (PoM: §76, 78) 
 
This is, in effect, to call into question our notation ‗𝛼M‘. No such simple expression 
could do justice to the irreducible plurality of the class-as-many. In the passage Russell 
offers three alternatives. The expression ‗𝛼M‘ might represent a class-concept; it might 
represent the class-as-one, i.e. 𝛼1; or it might represent ‗some other allied single entity‘. 
We may rule out the third as unclear and ad hoc. The second is plausible in some cases, 
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but can be of no use to us in our attempt to characterise 𝐶. If ‗𝛼M‘ represents 𝛼1, then 𝐶 
becomes: 
 
(𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝐶(𝛼
1
, 𝛼1)  (𝑥)(𝑥 ∈𝑖 𝛼
1
  𝑥 ∈𝑖 𝛼
1) 
 
which is plainly not what we want. That leaves us only the first option, namely that ‗𝛼M‘ 
represents a class-concept. A class-concept, however, is an intensional entity. It follows 
then, that there is no characterisation of the relation 𝐶 that does not involve some kind 
of appeal to, or reliance upon, an intensional notion. 
 
The second complication necessitating the re-introduction of intensional notions 
concerns the status of the class-as-one. It is clear that, for Russell, classes are, in the 
primary and most important sense, to be considered as-many.
17
 He says, for instance, 
that ‗without a single object to represent an extension, Mathematics crumbles‘ (PoM: 
§489, 515, emphasis added). We should not be misled by the word ‗single‘ here. The 
claim is that mathematics cannot get on without objects, and Russell inserts a footnote 
immediately after the word ‗object‘, directing the reader to the footnote from §58 in 
which the word ‗object‘ is introduced as having a wider sense than ‗term‘. At least part 
of the reason why mathematics cannot get on without classes-as-many is that the notion 
of number is applicable only where we have classes-as-many.
18
 This is plain in the case 
of classes having more than one member.
19
 But even as regards unit-classes, the same 
point holds. Following Frege in the Grundlagen (Frege 2007), Russell suggests that the 
sense in which any term (thus not class-as-many) may have a number (i.e. one) 
predicated of it is ‗a very shadowy sense, since it is applicable to everything alike‘ 
(PoM: §128, 132). On the contrary, he claims, the sense in which a class-as-many is a 
unit-class-as-many is precise: ‗A class 𝑢 has one member when 𝑢 is not null, and ―𝑥 and 
𝑦 are 𝑢‘s‖ implies ―𝑥 is identical with 𝑦‖‘ (PoM: §128, 132).20 This is extendable in the 
familiar way for cardinalities greater than one. Since we must be able to say of a class 
that it is a member of another class, and since a class is, in its primary sense, a class-as-
                                                 
17
 In the literature this does not always seem to be recognised. Largely, I suspect, this is because the class-
as-one, inasmuch as it is a single entity, is a relatively familiar kind of entity, while plural objects seem a 
little outré. 
18
 This is a claim that Russell later dropped, as his ontological commitment to classes lapsed. 
19
 Cf. PoM: §70: a class-as-many is ‗the very kind of object of which many is to be asserted‘. 
20
 Compare the discussion of (Quod), §3.1.2 below. 
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many, Russell is faced with another ‗grave logical problem‘. Given that ∈ is a two-place 
relation and 𝛼M (I continue to use the suspect notation for convenience) is many, not 
only can the class-as-many not occur to the right of ∈ (this is the upshot of the first 
complication above), it cannot occur to the left of it either. 
 
It seems now that the three options considered above face us once more: when ‗𝛼M‘ 
occurs to the left of ‗∈‘ it might represent a class-concept, the class-as-one, or ‗some 
other allied single entity‘. Above I suggested that our best option (the best of a bad 
bunch) was to take the expression ‗𝛼M‘ as representing a class-concept. In this case 
however, the correct course is that suggested by Landini (1998b: 71), who sees this 
issue as motivating the introduction of the class-as-one. Thus in, say, 
 
(4) 𝛼M ∈ 𝛼M 
 
the first occurrence of ‗𝛼M‘ should be understood as representing 𝛼1, the second as 
representing a class-concept. 
 
But if this is correct, then 𝛼1 has a very curious status. Its introduction is premised 
on the idea that it might explain how one class can be a member of another: that is to 
say, 𝛼‘s being a member of 𝛽 is possible because although, in its primary sense, 𝛼 is a 
class-as-many, there is yet some other sense by which an entity 𝛼1 can go proxy for 𝛼. 
Now since Russell clearly also wants it to be distinct from the associated class-concept 
(PoM: §69), 𝛼1 is left in a kind of limbo. It is not, at least not by intention, an intensional 
entity. But it is not either a class in the primary sense. What then is it? All we can say is 
that it is that entity standing in relation 𝐶 to the given class-as-many; or as Russell puts 
it: ‗the class as one may be identified with the whole composed of the terms of the 
class‘ (PoM: §74, 76). 
 
The class-as-one is introduced, so it seems, on instrumental grounds, in order to 
satisfy Russell‘s metaphysical demand that whatever is is a term, a logical subject. But 
it can only help in this regard if the fact that 𝛼1 may be the logical subject of a 
proposition in any way tempers the fact that 𝛼M cannot. But 𝛼1‘s being the logical 
subject of some proposition simply cannot temper the fact that 𝛼M cannot be a logical 
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subject, for there is an ‗ultimate distinction‘ between the class-as-one and the class-as-
many, between, that is, 𝛼1 and 𝛼M. And in any case, Russell‘s official response to ‗the 
contradiction always to be feared‘ is not that the logical subject of such a proposition as 
that expressed by (5) is some related class-as-one (i.e. 𝛼1). 
 
(5) 𝛼M is 𝜓 
 
Rather, it is to point out that ‗assertions can be made about classes-as-many, but the 
subject of such assertions is many, not one only as in other assertions (PoM: §127, 132). 
Thus the proposition expressed by (5) is not about 𝛼1, but the various members of 𝛼M 
considered ‗together but severally‘21. The introduction of classes-as-one does not, then, 
help to explain how it is possible for one class to be a member of another. It could only 
help if the class-as-one were identical to its associated class-as-many, and this, as I have 
stressed, is not the case. 
 
The correct diagnosis of the problem here is, I suspect, that Russell was simply 
confused as to the status of the class-as-one. Given that he is seemingly unaware of the 
tension between his statement of the mixed paradox and his claim that the class-as-one 
and class-as-many are distinct, it is not implausible to suggest that he had a tendency to 
think of the two kinds of class as more closely connected than he was officially entitled 
to. The class-as-one is thought of as both: (𝑖) bearing some extremely close relation (if 
not identity then at least extensional equivalence as described by (C)) to the class-as-
many; and (𝑖𝑖) offering an account of the possibility of one class being a member of 
another. This is to attribute to Russell some serious confusion, but as we have noted 
above, he himself acknowledged a good degree of uncertainty on such matters. 
 
The matters recently discussed are of necessity somewhat speculative, since my 
contention is that Russell had missed the tension at their heart. Nonetheless, we should, 
I think, accept that the mixed paradox of classes was not wholly extensional, but 
involved intensional aspects also. If this was not clear to his mind, but only confusedly 
present, then so be it. But that there is some intricate interplay of the extensional and 
intensional standpoints in Russell‘s approach to the paradox of classes should come as 
                                                 
21
 For the explanation of this idea see Chapter One, §4.2.2 and cf. PoM: §74. 
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no real surprise. Russell is adamant in PoM that the standpoints of pure extension and 
pure intension are the harsh extremes between which lie more fertile mixed positions 
(PoM: §66).
22
 Further evidence of the importance of the mixed paradox, for all its 
complications, is provided by the fact that even in the spring of 1906, when Russell was 
developing the ‗substitutional theory‘, he saw one of its chief merits as being its 
resolving the problem of the class-as-one and the class-as-many (by not positing classes 
at all): 
 
Of the philosophical consequences of the [substitutional] theory I will say 
nothing, beyond pointing out that it affords what at least seems to be a complete 
solution of all the hoary difficulties about the one and the many; for, while 
allowing that there are many entities, it adheres with drastic pedantry to the old 
maxim that, ‗whatever is, is one‘. (STCR: 189) 
 
3. Responding to the Paradoxes 
We now turn to Russell‘s strategy in the search for a solution to the paradoxes. I provide 
a brief overview of the various kinds of theory that he considered; however the main 
focus is not on the theories themselves, but on their relation to the theory of denoting. 
Two main issues arise in this regard: the matter of empty denoting phrases, and the 
relation between meaning and denotation. Empty denoting phrases are discussed in this 
section, the relation between meaning and denotation in §4. 
 
Russell considers three kinds of response to the paradoxes: type theory, restrictive 
theories (as I call them), and no-class theories.
23
 Of these, a simple theory of types is 
presented in PoM (§§497-500); the restrictive theories (e.g. the ‗zigzag‘ and ‗limitation 
of size‘ theories) are developed in the various manuscripts from 1903-05 and presented 
in the 1906 paper Difficulties; the no-classes theories (the ‗functional‘ and 
‗substitutional‘ theories), as well as being considered in the 1903-05 manuscripts, are 
discussed in Difficulties and 1906‘s STCR. 
 
                                                 
22
 For instance it was, he says, the tendency to regard classes from the purely extensional standpoint 
which obstructed the correct logical theory of infinity (PoM: §131, 135). 
23
 These classifications are not intended to be absolute. Type theories and no-class theories might both be 
considered restrictive in my sense; and no-class theories are not incompatible with type theories (witness 
PM). Moreover, as Urquhart (1988) notes, Russell did not always clearly distinguish his various theories: 
aspects of one theory often find their way into another. 
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3.1. The simple theory of types 
In PoM Russell proposed, though without much confidence, a version of the simple 
theory of types (PoM: §§104, 497-500). The universe of terms is stratified into a 
hierarchy of logical types. A type is thought of as the ‗range of significance‘ of a 
variable, that is, the range of terms which may be substituted for the variable in a 
propositional function to yield a proposition (PoM: §497). At the lowest level of the 
hierarchy, level 0, are individual terms (or just ‗individuals‘). These form the range of 
significance of propositional functions of type 1, the next level of the hierarchy. 
Propositional functions of type 1 form the range of significance of propositional 
functions of type 2, i.e. those that take propositional functions of type 1 as argument. 
And so the hierarchy extends, in this manner, with the fundamental idea being that a 
propositional function of type 𝑛 +1 may only take arguments of type 𝑛. We have here a 
hierarchy of propositional functions; but, making the analogous moves, we could have 
formed a hierarchy of classes such that a class of type 𝑛 +1 can only have members of 
type 𝑛. 
 
The hierarchy of types introduces restrictions on what can meaningfully be said. 
There will be expressions which look significant and well-formed, but which, when 
properly expressed, with suitable sensitivity to variations of type, turn out to be, strictly 
speaking, nonsense. Among these will be the problematic expressions associated with 
the paradoxes. Thus the paradox of classes becomes (using superscripts to indicate 
types): 
 
(6) 𝑤𝑛 ∈ 𝑤𝑛  𝑤𝑛 ∉ 𝑤𝑛 
 
But (6) is ill-formed: 𝑤𝑛 can only have members of type 𝑛 -1, hence it can neither be 
nor not be a member of itself.
24
 
 
For technical reasons (including a failure to handle a paradox of propositions
25
) 
which we need not examine here, the simple theory of types presented in PoM is 
                                                 
24
 Similarly for the paradox of predicates: ‗𝜙𝑛(𝜙𝑛)  𝜙𝑛(𝜙𝑛)‘ is nonsensical. 
25
 PoM: §498ff. 
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inadequate; but a simple theory of types can be made to work.
26
 And of course Russell 
himself would, eventually, come to endorse a theory of types (though a ramified, rather 
than simple, version
27
). Why then is the theory only very tentatively put forward in 
PoM, and why is it not pursued in the unpublished manuscripts of 1903-05? 
 
3.1.2. Logical common sense: quodlibet ens est unum 
Russell identified three requirements of any solution of the paradoxes (MPD: 79-80). 
The first, naturally enough, was that a solution should genuinely solve all of the 
paradoxes. The second was that the collateral damage to mathematics should be 
minimal, that the solution should not compromise any significant part of mathematics or 
any essential mathematical technique.
28
 The third, and for our purposes most 
interesting, was that: 
 
the solution should, on reflection, appeal to what may be called ‗logical common 
sense‘—i.e. that it should seem, in the end, just what one ought to have expected 
all along. (MPD: 79-80) 
 
(Russell illustrates with a criticism of Quine, whose system, though flush with ingenuity 
and ‗logical dexterity‘, seems to be ‗created ad hoc and not to be such as even the 
cleverest logician would have thought of if he had not known of the contradictions‘ 
(MPD: 80).) 
 
The simple theory of types given in PoM fails, in the main
29
, for want of accord 
with logical common sense. To introduce the hierarchy of types is to enforce restrictions 
upon the variables of logic; but for Russell there seemed to be no reason whatsoever, 
independently of the paradoxes, to make such a restriction. Thus while the theory of 
types may be a technical fix, it lacks philosophical justification. It is the need for 
philosophical justification to which the third requirement quoted above appeals. 
 
                                                 
26
 For the differences between Russell‘s PoM version and later more successful formulations see, e.g., 
Urquhart 1988: 82-3. 
27
 See ML, PM. 
28
 Cf. Russell‘s concern for mathematical induction in Insolubilia. See Stevens 2005: 58-61 for 
discussion. 
29
 I will ignore its technical shortcomings, since these are resolvable. 
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Russell is committed to the doctrine of the unrestricted variable. This is an 
extremely important theme in his work, and it is as well to clarify, at this point, quite 
what it commits him to. In so doing we will reveal its connection with ‗logical common 
sense‘ and the unease that Russell feels with regard to the theory of types. 
 
The doctrine of the unrestricted variable is naturally thought to embody a 
commitment to the view that the variable ranges over absolutely everything that is (has 
being). This however, is not a perfect fit with Russell‘s position in PoM, for reasons that 
will become apparent. The doctrine should rather be understood (at least in PoM) as 
committing one to the view that, even though there are many kinds of entities (things, 
concepts, propositions, etc.), there is only one kind of genuine variable: the entity 
variable. Let‘s isolate that claim: 
 
(UV) Doctrine of the unrestricted variable: there is only one kind of variable, 
the entity variable. 
 
Unfortunately, there is a tendency in the literature to conflate (UV), to which Russell 
was, I agree, committed, with the doctrine quodlibet ens est unum. 
 
(Quod) Quodlibet ens est unum: whatever is, is one. 
 
These two theses have been put to work in Russell scholarship in the laudable attempt to 
demonstrate a good deal more unity to Russell‘s work than he is sometimes credited 
with.
30
 They ought, nonetheless, to be kept apart, for the very good reason that Russell 
is committed to (UV) but denies (Quod) (at least in PoM).
31
 
32
 
 
That the two claims are run together is evident in two recent important works: 
Graham Stevens‘s The Russellian Origins of Analytic Philosophy (2005) and Gregory 
                                                 
30
 The view that Russell‘s work lacks unity is summed up in C. D. Broad‘s famous quip that Russell 
produced ‗a new system of philosophy every few years‘ (Broad 1924: 79). For a recent attempt to 
demonstrate its falsity see Stevens 2005; for a less recent attempt see Weitz 1951. 
31
 In OnF (written 1904) and sections of OF (written 1905), Russell acknowledges ‗mode of combination‘ 
and ‗meaning‘ variables. I do not see in this reason to suppose that Russell had abandoned (UV). It would 
be foolish to place too great an emphasis on unpublished material that is not reflected in any 
contemporary (to it rather than us) published material. 
32
 It should be borne in mind that Russell himself was not particularly careful in keeping the two views 
distinct. I thank Graham Stevens for drawing my attention to this point. 
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Landini‘s Russell‟s Hidden Substitutional Theory (1998a). Stevens describes (UV) as 
‗arguably the most important doctrine espoused by Russell in [PoM]‘ (2005: 6), and 
continues: 
 
As a formal doctrine, [(UV)] amounts to the requirement placed on any calculus 
of logic that it should have only one kind of variable (ranging over everything in 
the universe). The philosophical insight that underlies this doctrine is Russell‘s 
belief that there are no distinctions in type between existing things. Everything, 
that is, is of the same logical type, according to Russell. As he liked to put it, 
‗whatever is, is one‘ [STCR: 189]. (Stevens 2005: 6) 
 
Similarly, Landini argues that (Quod) dominated Russell‘s thinking in the period from 
the publication of PoM to the publication of PM, and suggests that, for Russell, the 
thesis amounted to the claim that: 
 
any calculus for pure logic must treat all entities alike; it must adopt only one 
style of pure and unrestricted ―entity‖ variable which regards as one whatsoever 
is. (Landini 1998a: 3, emphasis added) 
 
Both commentators, then, run (UV) and (Quod) together.
33
 
 
However, contrary to Landini‘s claim that ‗Russell‘s allegiance to the doctrine 
[(Quod)] never wavered‘ (1998a: 4), it may be easily established that at some stages at 
least, he explicitly denied it, as in the following passage: 
 
Whatever is, is one: being and one, as Leibniz remarks, are convertible terms. It 
is difficult to be sure how far such statements are merely grammatical. For 
although whatever is, is one, yet it is equally true that whatever are, are many. 
But the truth seems to be that the kind of object which is a class, i.e. the kind of 
object denoted by all men, or by a concept of a class, is not one except where the 
class has only one term, and must not be made a single logical subject. There is 
[. . .] in simple cases an associated single term which is the class as a whole [i.e. 
as-one]; but this is sometimes absent, and is in any case not identical with the 
class as many. (PoM: §127, 132) 
 
                                                 
33
 Stevens is on surer ground here than Landini here. He, in effect, casts (Quod) as the philosophical 
underpinning of (UV), thereby distinguishing them. It remains the case, however, as argued below, that 
the Russell of PoM did not endorse (Quod). 
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Landini‘s claim is not, I take it, merely the grammatical point to which Russell refers.34 
It is of course true that whatever is—in the singular—is one. But Russell is adamant 
that there are also such objects as classes-as-many. And while these cannot be said to be 
(in the singular), nonetheless they are, they have a significant and positive ontological 
status. We might put the point in this way: enumerating everything that is (in the 
singular) would not, according to Russell, exhaust the inventory of the world, for it 
would miss out the classes-as-many. This seems to capture Russell‘s position as stated 
above. But Landini‘s understanding seems to be that such an enumeration would 
exhaust the inventory of the world. 
 
Stevens, as quoted above (2005: 6), renders (Quod) as tantamount to (or at least the 
philosophical justification of) the claim that everything is of the same logical type; but it 
is unclear why (Quod) should embody any commitment to a view of types. We should 
distinguish two ways in which a purported entity may fail to be a possible value of the 
variable. One is that it is of the wrong logical type. The other is that it is not really an 
entity—i.e. term—but rather an object (and so irreducibly plural). (Quod) commits one 
to the view that whatever has positive ontological status is one: it does not commit one 
to the view that everything is of the same type. 
 
Stevens continues (not using ‗object‘ in Russell‘s technical sense, but rather as 
synonymous with ‗entity‘): 
 
If something is an object, Russell thought, then it is an object pure and simple 
and ought to be amenable to the same treatment as any other object from the 
point of view of logic. [. . .] It ought to be the kind of thing that can have certain 
properties predicated of it, for example, or that can be quantified over; in short, 
it should be possible to make it into a logical subject. (Stevens 2005: 23, 
emphasis added) 
 
Landini adopts the same position. 
 
                                                 
34
 I take it that this is not his position, though if it were it might explain his citing the passage from which 
I have recently quoted in support of the claim that (Quod) is the ‗fundamental doctrine‘ of PoM (1998a: 
54). Given that he is not making the cheap grammatical point, I fail to see how the passage supports his 
view. 
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the fundamental doctrine [of PoM] ―whatever is, is one‖ can be otherwise 
expressed as ―Whatever has being is a logical subject‖, and even more 
revealingly as ―Whatever has being can occur as a term [logical subject] of a 
proposition.‖ (Landini 1998a: 55)35 
 
This makes it a prerequisite of having ‗positive‘ ontological status that an object be a 
logical subject of some proposition. But consider a given class-as-many (we‘ll call it 
‗𝑚‘36): given that 𝑚 is a class-as-many, it is not one but many (irreducibly plural) and, 
as such, it cannot be a logical subject. 
 
In that case, we ought to have a contradiction: for here we have an object 𝑚 which 
is not a possible logical subject. But, as we noted in Chapter One (§4.2.2), the 
threatened contradiction is ‗solved‘ by denying that it arises; and that denial is 
motivated by an appeal to the distinction between terms and objects (i.e. that 𝑚 is not a 
term, but an object). So the fact that the object 𝑚 cannot be a logical subject in the same 
sense as a term can, does not, contra the accounts of Stevens and Landini, disqualify it 
from having ‗positive‘ ontological status. It simply does not follow that whatever is, is 
one.
37
 
 
We should, moreover, be careful to distinguish two senses in which ‗one-ness‘ 
might be ascribed to an entity. Russell is careful to point out that there is a distinction 
between (as we might put it) being one in the sense of being a unified (or simple) term, 
and (as we might put it) numbering one: 
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 Cf. Landini 1992: 170-71. 
36
 As we saw in §2.1 above, introducing such an expression as ‗𝑚‘ is not strictly legitimate; I do so for the 
purposes of bringing out the point in simple terms. 
37
 Further evidence against Landini‘s interpretation stems from his, as I see it, suspect reading of the 
theory of denoting concepts. Discussing the strange ‗combinations‘ of entities—i.e. objects—he writes: 
 
What, after all, are ―combinations of terms‖? Is there a single logical subject ‗Brown or Jones‘? 
Russell‘s official answer should be ―no.‖ But at times he seems to demur in spite of the obvious 
threat to the fundamental doctrine of Principles [footnote to PoM: §58, 55n, in which the notion of 
object is first introduced]. In the end the most charitable interpretation is to take Russell‘s use of 
―combinations of terms‖ simply as a heuristic device to help in clarifying the kinds of denoting 
concepts. (Landini 1998a: 60) 
 
But in fact the most charitable interpretation is that Russell meant what he said—objects are irreducibly 
plural—and that Landini‘s having taken (Quod) to be the fundamental doctrine of PoM is wide of the 
mark. Dau (1986), in his excellent study, distinguishes two conflicting versions of the theory of denoting 
concepts at play in PoM, and highlights the fact that the class-as-many is the only kind of object posited 
by both versions. This strongly suggests, it seems to me, that the class-as-many was more than just a 
heuristic device. 
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As regards the fact that any individual or term is in some sense one, this is of 
course undeniable. But it does not follow that the notion of one is presupposed 
when individuals are spoken of: it may be, on the contrary, that the notion of 
term or individual is the fundamental one, from which that of one is derived. 
(PoM: §125, 130) 
 
That every term is one is a metaphysical fact about terms: simple terms are units; 
complex terms have a certain kind of unity. But being a unit is not, fundamentally, an 
arithmetical property. The only kind of thing that can be one in the arithmetical sense is 
a class, namely a class-as-many having only one member. The attenuated sense in 
which any term is arithmetically one is merely that it may be taken as forming a unit 
class, the cardinality of which is one.
38
 But Russell‘s position is that it is essential for 
logicism that a unit class and its member not be identified. 
 
Stevens and Landini might respond to all of this by claiming that the class-as-many 
is nothing over and above its members.
39
 This would be, in effect, to charge my position 
with having ‗over-ontologised‘ the class-as-many. But this cannot be right. The class-
as-many is more than just the many entities that compose it: it has a certain kind of 
unity that distinguishes it from the mere aggregation of its terms.
40
 Thus the members of 
a class-as-many have enough unity to make them many, rather than simply disparate, 
but not enough to make them one (cf. Chapter One, §4.2.2). 
 
Moreover Landini‘s claim that the intensional viewpoint is primary overlooks the 
complex interplay of intension and extension discussed in §2. This complex interplay 
was no passing fancy: it continues into Russell‘s post-PoM manuscripts. I quote at 
length: 
 
The fact revealed by the Contradiction is this: there are collections of terms 
which can be defined distributively, in the sense that, given any term whatever, 
we can decide whether or not it belongs to the collection, but which cannot be 
defined collectively, i.e. cannot be defined as all terms having such and such a 
property, or as all the members of such and such a class. If this is the right view, 
it elicits very clearly the necessity of taking account of intension as well as 
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 Cf. PoM: §128, 132. 
39
 Cf. Landini 1998a: 70-71; Landini 1992: 164. 
40
 PoM: §70, 69. 
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extension in dealing with classes. In fact, a class is an extension defined by an 
intension; we cannot work classes except by taking them in extension, and yet it 
is essential that every class should be defined by an intension. (FN: 157) 
 
I have argued that (UV) and (Quod) come apart, and that Russell was, in PoM, 
committed only to the former. (UV) is given only as a claim about what kind of 
variables there are, not what their range is. The claim that I have sought to deny is that 
the variable ranges over absolutely everything that has being: it does not, I claim, range 
over classes-as-many. Now if the variable is on the one hand ‗unrestricted‘ and on the 
other does not include classes-as-many in its domain, is my position not embroiled in a 
contradiction? 
 
There are three points to make in response to this worry. The first is that as we have 
seen (§2), there is good reason to suppose that Russell was simply confused as to the 
relation between classes-as-many and their associated classes-as-one. Russell took it, I 
think (and I take it that I am agreeing with Landini here), that truths about classes-as-
many were somehow expressible in terms of truths about their associated classes-as-
one. This is to attribute to Russell a confusion, but so be it. The second, related to the 
first, is that even if a class-as-many is not a possible value of a variable, it does not 
follow that it is beyond our cognitive reach. Among the values of variables are all the 
denoting concepts that denote classes-as-many. So while there may not be any 
possibility of direct knowledge of classes-as-many, the possibility of denotative 
knowledge remains. The third is that although a class-as-many is not a possible value of 
the variable, it does not ‗stand outside logic‘ (in Wahl‘s (1993: 74) phrase) in at least 
the following respect: every class-as-many is, in a certain sense, the logical subject of 
some proposition: 
 
In such a proposition as ―𝐴 and 𝐵 are two,‖ there is no [single] logical subject: 
the assertion is not about 𝐴, nor about 𝐵, nor about the whole composed of both. 
But strictly and only about 𝐴 and 𝐵. Thus it would seem that assertions are not 
necessarily about single subjects, but may be about many subjects. (PoM: §74, 
76-7) 
 
That is, 𝐴-and-𝐵—a class-as-many—is not a single logical subject, but is not either 
outside logic since it can occur in propositions having many subjects. 
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It is important to be clear as to the distinction between (UV) and (Quod) because 
otherwise one might misconstrue Russell‘s concerns about the simple theory of types. 
Type-restricted variables offend against ‗logical common sense‘ not because they are 
restrictive simpliciter, but because the restrictions themselves are not such as would 
seem obvious to any logician unaware of the paradoxes. On my view, the variables of 
PoM are, in one sense, already restricted: they range only over what is one (not also 
over what are many). Now this might seem to offend common sense, but Russell is able 
to convince himself (with some effort, no doubt) that it does not offend logical common 
sense, for logical common sense is sensitive to the requirements of logical theory, and 
in particular the nature of classes. That is to say, given that classes-as-many are 
irreducibly plural—and remember that a class is, in its primary sense, a class-as-
many—it simply follows, as a matter of logical common sense, that they are not single 
logical subjects. The problem with the theory of types is that its hierarchy is not 
imposed on the basis of some positive insight into the nature of things. In Russell‘s 
manuscripts from 1903-05 we increasingly find appeals to ‗direct inspection‘. Direct 
inspection into the nature of classes reveals (let us suppose with the Russell of PoM) 
that classes-as-many are irreducibly plural: direct inspection into the nature of the 
universe does not reveal it to be stratified into a hierarchy of types.
41
 Thus the 
imposition of such a hierarchy requires a strong philosophical justification. This is 
precisely what the theory of types, at least in 1903, lacked. 
 
Overturning the Landini-Stevens interpretation enables us to recognise, what might 
otherwise remain obscure, a respect in which the theory of descriptions—which spurred 
the development of the substitutional theory—represents an advance from the PoM 
position. In Russell‘s post-PoM work, and certainly by the time he began to develop the 
substitutional theory, he is generally taken to endorse both (UV) and (Quod). The 
substitutional theory, insofar as it abandons any commitment to classes, may now be 
seen as allowing for the adoption of both principles. This is the respect in which it 
‗affords what at least seems to be a complete solution of all the hoary difficulties about 
the one and the many‘ (STCR: 189). Russell records, with satisfaction, that the 
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 At least such was Russell‘s position in 1903. Agreement between parties as to what direct inspection 
reveals is obviously not assured, nor even is agreement between one‘s earlier and later selves (as 
Russell‘s example shows). 
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substitutional theory ‗adheres with drastic pedantry to the old maxim that, ―whatever is, 
is one‖‘ (STCR: 189). The satisfaction must have been all the sweeter for the fact that in 
his earlier work, with his commitment to classes-as-many, he had not been able to 
accommodate the maxim at all. Direct inspection and logical common sense now reveal 
that whatever is, is one. Common sense had, I suspect, revealed this all along
42
; but the 
exigencies of the PoM theory of classes—in particular the primacy of the class-as-
many, relative to the class-as-one—determined that the Russell of PoM saw logical 
common sense as revealing something else. 
 
3.2. „Restrictive‟ and „no-classes‟ approaches 
Not content with the prospects of type theory, Russell‘s energies focused on two other 
forms of theory, one in which class-formation is restricted in some cases, and one in 
which class-formation is restricted in all cases. Under the head of the former are 
included his ‗zigzag‘ and ‗limitation of size‘ theories; the latter includes the functional 
theory of 1903 and the ‗substitutional theory‘. 
 
3.2.1. Restrictive theories 
The zigzag theory builds on a line of thought that had begun in PoM. There, Russell had 
identified as a common factor in the various formulations of the paradox a certain kind 
of dependence among variables: 
 
in the type of propositional functions we are considering [. . .], the argument is 
itself a function of the propositional function: instead of 𝜙𝑥, we have 𝜙{𝑓(𝜙)}, 
where 𝑓(𝜙) is defined as a function of 𝜙. Thus when 𝜙 is varied, the argument 
of which 𝜙 is asserted is varied too. Thus ―𝑥 is an 𝑥‖ is equivalent to: ―𝜙 can be 
asserted of the class of terms satisfying 𝜙,‖ this class of terms being 𝑥. If here 𝜙 
is varied, the argument is varied at the same time in a manner dependent upon 
the variation of 𝜙. For this reason, 𝜙{𝑓(𝜙)}, though it is a definite proposition 
when 𝑥 is assigned, is not a propositional function, in the ordinary sense, when 𝑥 
is variable. Propositional functions of this doubtful type may be called quadratic 
forms. (PoM: §103, 104) 
 
His thought was that some functions of the quadratic form will be held to determine a 
class-as-many, but not a class-as-one.
43
 The zigzag theory starts from ‗the suggestion 
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 This would go some way towards explaining Russell‘s failure to clearly distinguish (UV) from (Quod). 
43
 Cf. PoM: §§101, 104, 127, 484. 
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that propositional functions determine classes when they are fairly simple, and only fail 
to do so when they are complicated and recondite‘ (Difficulties: 145-46). The kind of 
complication in question is that which gives rise to quadratic forms, effectively a kind 
of self-reference.
44
 
 
Two main problems attend such a theory, Russell claims (Difficulties: 147). Firstly, 
the technical details of the theory turn out to be extremely complicated. Secondly, and 
this is by now a familiar theme, the requisite restrictions on class-formation lack 
adequate philosophical justification: ‗I have found no guiding principle except the 
avoidance of contradictions‘, Russell admits (Difficulties: 147).45 
 
The ‗limitation of size‘ theory cautions against the formation of classes from 
propositional functions involving ‗self-reproductive processes‘ (Difficulties: 152). The 
process of collecting the class of all terms is, for example, self-reproductive in that it 
generates a new term—the class of all terms. Collecting this class (this new term) 
together with its members generates a further class (a further new term), and so on. On 
this kind of basis
46
 self-reproducing classes are excluded, with the consequence that 
there is, for example, no universal class (consisting of absolutely everything). The 
difficulty with this kind of theory, Russell says, is that ‗it is not easy to see how to state 
such a limitation precisely‘ (Difficulties: 154).47 And, once more, logical common sense 
is bypassed: independently of Cantorian paradoxes, for instance, there seems no 
justification for the exclusion of the universal class. 
 
The zigzag and limitation of size theories both propose some restriction upon the 
formation of classes from propositional functions. Of course, then, the nature of 
propositional functions and their relation to classes is of the utmost importance to 
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 For plausible explanations of the sense in which quadratic forms are ‗zigzaggy‘ see Bostock 2009: 120-
121 or Urquhart 1988: 85. 
45
 Bostock (2009: 121) objects on different grounds. In general, even if a given class is definable in terms 
of a problematic function, it will also be definable in terms of unproblematic functions. This is a general 
worry for all restrictive theories. 
46
 This is a gross simplification. To be precise would require discussion of the Burali-Forti paradox and 
the theory of ordinals.  
47
 Again, Bostock (2009: 123) offers an objection to the general approach. Even if it were successfully 
formulated for the paradox of classes, it is unclear how it could be extended to (e.g.) the paradox of 
predicates. 
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Russell in this period. Before discussing this relation in more detail, I will introduce the 
no-classes theories. 
 
3.2.2. No-classes theories 
The ‗functional theory‘, which Russell pursued in 1903 after the publication of PoM, 
involved the elimination of all classes and the implementation of a system of functions 
and arguments in something like the manner of Frege.
48
 Briefly Russell thought he had 
solved the paradoxes in this way (Grattan-Guinness 1977: 78). However, the emergence 
of a paradox of non-self-applicable functions (obviously analogous to the paradox of 
predicates) soon scuppered this line of thought. 
 
The second attempt at a ‗no-classes‘ theory—the substitutional theory—yielded far 
greater success than any of Russell‘s previous approaches, but only once the theory of 
descriptions was up and running.
49
 The theory requires neither classes nor propositional 
functions. Instead of propositional functions we have matrices (written ‗𝑝/𝑎‘) and 
substitutions (written ‗𝑥/𝑎‘). The symbol 
 
 𝑝(𝑥/𝑎)!𝑞  also written: 𝑝/𝑎;𝑥!𝑞 
 
is understood to mean: ‗𝑞 results from 𝑝 by substituting 𝑥 for 𝑎 in all those places (if 
any) where 𝑎 occurs in 𝑝‘ (STCR: 168). The symbol ‗𝑝/𝑎‘ is treated as an incomplete 
symbol which we might think of as abbreviating the phrase ‗the result of replacing 𝑎 in 
𝑝 by __‘.50 Instead of speaking of classes and class-membership, we instead speak of 
substitutions yielding truths: 
 
To say that 𝑥 is a member of the class 𝛼 is now to say that for some values of 𝑝 
and 𝑎, 𝛼 is the matrix 𝑝/𝑎 and 𝑝/𝑎;𝑥 is true. (STCR: 172) 
 
Matrices such as 𝑝/𝑎 in this way do duty for the classes that are no longer admitted. (It 
should be noted that Russell need not deny that there are such things as classes, but can 
simply ‗bracket‘ the question. This appears to be his position in Difficulties (154), 
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 See Urquhart‘s introduction to CP4 (xx-xxiii) for further details. 
49
 See: Hylton 1980; Weiss 1994; Landini 1998a; 2003; and Stevens 2005. 
50
 Incomplete symbols are discussed in Chapter Three. 
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though in STCR (166) he is more forthright (‗there are really no such things as 
classes‘51); by PM (72) his agnosticism has returned.) 
 
On this theory the kinds of predications that generate the paradoxes are outlawed by 
the grammar of substitution: 
 
now ‗𝑥 is an 𝑥‘ becomes meaningless, because ‗𝑥 is an 𝛼‘ requires that 𝛼 should 
be of the form 𝑝/𝑎, and thus not an entity at all. (STCR: 172) 
 
That is to say, the nearest we can come to formulating the paradox is to put: ‗𝑝/𝑎;𝑝/𝑎‘. 
This is roughly equivalent to the nonsensically incomplete ‗the result of replacing 𝑎 in 𝑝 
by the result of replacing 𝑎 in 𝑝 by __‘. In this way the restrictions on what can be 
significantly formulated—which had appeared ad hoc on the theory of types—simply 
fall out of the grammar of the substitutional theory.
52
 
 
The above is a very inadequate outline of the substitutional theory. (I shall discuss 
it again in Chapter Five.) It suffices, however, for our purposes here, as it serves to 
indicate the great importance of the theory of denoting. Matrices are treated as 
incomplete symbols, having no significance in isolation from their proper contexts. This 
is the key to the application of the substitutional theory, and underlies Russell‘s claim 
that his pre-OD attempts at a substitutional theory had ‗failed for want of the theory of 
denoting‘, but that ‗as a consequence of the new theory of denoting, I found at last that 
substitution would work, and all went swimmingly‘ (Grattan-Guinness 1977: 80).53 54 
 
3.3. Empty denoting phrases 
We must beware of falling into step with a prevalent trend in the literature, namely, 
acknowledging the importance of the theory of descriptions in the development of the 
substitutional theory, and then neglecting to say anything more to the connection of the 
theory of denoting and the paradoxes.
55
 It is not enough, for a proper understanding of 
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 But cf. STCR: 188. 
52
 See e.g. Stevens 2005: ch. 2 for discussion. 
53
 In Chapter Five I discuss the differences between the theory of descriptions and the earlier theory with 
the aim of ascertaining why the former, but not the latter, could support the substitutional theory.  
54
 The substitutional theory ultimately succumbed to a paradox of propositions, but I will not discuss this. 
See Landini 1989; Stevens 2005: ch. 3. 
55
 See, for example: Chihara 1973: 14-15, 18n.; Farrell Smith 2005: 161; Landini 2003; Stevens 2005: 
46ff; 2009: 30-31. Of course the focus of such authors may be different to my own. 
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Russell‘s work in the period 1903-05, to only draw the connection between the theory of 
descriptions and the paradoxes: for the most part, Russell‘s work in this period was 
conducted prior to the discovery, and hence in ignorance, of the theory of descriptions. 
Moreover, the majority of Russell‘s work from 1903-05 centred not on the 
substitutional theory but the zigzag theory. Thus we must speak more to the connection 
of denoting to the restrictive theories. 
 
Some commentators emphasise the connections between the paradoxes and the 
question of empty denoting phrases. To take just one example
56
, Michael Potter writes: 
 
Since it was [. . .] evident to Russell that the solution [of the paradoxes] would 
involve accepting that some phrases which apparently denote classes do not in 
fact do so, he took an especial interest in cases (such as ‗the present king of 
France‘) where the denoting concept does not denote anything. (Potter 2004: 
123) 
 
This approach is along the right lines, but there is some detail to be filled in. 
 
In general, we have seen above, Russell‘s approach is to introduce a restriction of 
some kind upon the formation of classes-as-one from propositional functions. That is, 
while every propositional function determines a class-as-many, not all also determine a 
class-as-one. This must, as a matter of course, imply a correlative adjustment to the 
theory of denoting. Let the propositional function in question be 𝜙𝑥 . The claim is, then, 
that 𝜙𝑥  determines a class-as-many, 𝛼M, but no class-as-one, 𝛼1. Following Russell‘s 
proposal (PoM: §70) that there is only a corresponding predicate to those propositional 
functions that determine classes-as-one, we may assume that there is no predicate 𝜙 
corresponding to 𝜙𝑥 .57 
 
In Chapter One we saw how denoting concepts are derived from predicates (class-
concepts) by a kind of ‗logical genesis‘ (PoM: §57). But we now have a case where a 
denoting concept is derived from a propositional function for which there is no 
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 See also Kilmister 1981: 101; Levine 2005. 
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 He suggests, for example, that ‗the 𝜙 in [𝜙𝑥 ] is not a separate and distinguishable entity: it lives in the 
propositions of the form [𝜙𝑥 ], and cannot survive analysis‘ (PoM: §85, 88). 
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correlative predicate.
58
 The class-as-many 𝛼M is determined by 𝜙𝑥  (not from 𝜙, ex 
hypothesi), and yet 𝛼M is a ‗numerical conjunction‘, i.e. the kind of object denoted by a 
denoting concept of the form <all 𝜙> (which appears to contain, or at least be closely 
related to, the predicate 𝜙). This is a bit of a tangle, which is to be unravelled only by a 
complete and clear explication of the concepts of (at least) assertion, class-concept, 
denoting concept, predicate, and propositional function. Certainly no such explication is 
forthcoming in PoM, nor in the unpublished papers in CP4. Russell draws many fine 
distinctions in this area and begs his reader at the beginning of his discussion of classes 
‗not to regard as idle pedantry the apparatus of somewhat subtle discriminations to be 
found in what follows‘ (PoM: §66, 66). In the end, however, so many distinctions are 
introduced that the position is of only questionable coherence. The distinction between 
class-concept and predicate is a case in point. In at least three places, Russell avers 
uncertainty as to the strict metaphysical distinction between the class-concept and 
predicate. The most striking of these I quote at length: 
 
It must be held, I think, that every propositional function which is not null 
defines a class, which is denoted by ―𝑥‘s such that 𝜙𝑥.‖ There is thus always a 
concept of the class, and the class-concept corresponding will be the singular, ―𝑥 
such that 𝜙𝑥.‖ But it may be doubted—indeed the contradiction [. . .] gives 
reason for doubting—whether there is always a defining predicate of such 
classes. Apart from the contradiction in question, this point might appear to be 
merely verbal: ―being an 𝑥 such that 𝜙𝑥,‖ it might be said, may always be taken 
to be a predicate. But in view of our contradiction, all remarks on this subject 
must be viewed with caution. (PoM: §84, 88)
59
 
 
Notice the phrase: ‗Apart from the contradiction in question, this point might appear to 
be merely verbal‘. Indeed the point does appear merely verbal. Where we have a class 
collected by a propositional function 𝜙𝑥 , why may we not take that class to be collected 
by the predicate 𝜙?60 That seems, in fact, to be precisely what Russell allows in positing 
the class-concept ‗𝑥 such that 𝜙𝑥‘. Independently of the paradoxes, there seems no good 
answer to this question (and let us not forget Russell‘s appeals to ‗logical common 
sense‘). Moreover, the view that predicates and propositional functions come and go 
together is supported by Russell‘s post-PoM manuscripts: ‗Now a property, in its most 
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 That propositional functions (as opposed, or in addition, to predicates) may give rise to denoting 
concepts is an interpretation shared by Klement (2009: 69-70). 
59
 Cf. PoM: §57, §58. 
60
 The mode of collecting may be different in the two cases, but that does not appear to be problematic. 
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general form, is a propositional function‘ (Classes: 5); ‗we shall speak of the sine, the 
logarithm, the square, being a man, the property that if one is a man one is a mortal, as 
functions‘ (Functions: 51). In PoM, properties are naturally construed as predicates; so 
if predicates are properties, and properties in their ‗most general form‘ are propositional 
functions, then predicates and propositional functions would seem to come and go 
together. 
 
If, as seems plausible, there is really no principled objection to the correlation, in all 
cases, of 𝜙𝑥  with 𝜙, then we have on our hands such denoting concepts as <the class-
as-one of 𝜙s>, a denoting concept which does not denote anything (there being, in our 
example, no 𝛼1 for it to denote). It seems extremely likely that this is the source of 
Russell‘s concern, so prominent in OD, with ‗empty‘ descriptions. 
 
This general account is supported by consideration of Russell‘s unpublished papers 
from 1903-05. One may still, however, find it surprising that in OD the question of 
empty denoting phrases is couched in terms that seem so entirely unrelated to the 
paradoxes. The explanation is partly that Russell was addressing the readership of Mind, 
not all of whom could be expected to be familiar with the foundations of mathematical 
logic. I suspect, moreover, that Russell felt no unease in presenting his position in a 
more ‗popular‘ style since this reflected the wider61 philosophical aspects of the theory 
of denoting. In OD Russell wrote that ‗The subject of denoting is of very great 
importance, not only in logic and mathematics, but also in theory of knowledge‘ (OD: 
41). Given the close connection of logic to metaphysics in Russell‘s thought, this is 
effectively to claim that denoting is of very great importance to both metaphysics and 
epistemology, which is to make it one of the central issues in the western tradition. Its 
importance is, then, in some sense independent of the paradoxes, though of course since 
the paradoxes undermine a certain logical—and so for Russell metaphysical—
innocence, they are hardly less central than the question of denoting. 
 
The wider philosophical concerns of the theory of denoting, at least as discussed in 
Russell‘s 1903-05 manuscripts, include particularly the question of ‗objective 
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 That is, wider than mathematical logic strictly construed. 
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falsehoods‘.62 This was a problem arising from the combination of Russell‘s theory of 
propositions with his account of truth. I shall briefly discuss this below (§4.1), when the 
theory of meaning and denotation has been introduced. Beforehand, and in part to 
motivate the discussion of that theory, I pause to point out the reason why the question 
of empty denoting phrases cannot be the whole story of the relation between denoting 
and the paradoxes. 
 
The ‗Standard View‘ (as Griffin (1996) labels it) of the origins of the theory of 
descriptions has it that Russell‘s ontology in PoM was ‗unrestrained‘ in some (usually 
pejorative) ‗quasi-Meinongian‘ sense, and that the role of the theory of descriptions was 
to enable Russell to eliminate from it such shady characters as the present king of 
France, the round-square, and the golden mountain. This view is, however, almost 
certainly wrong and is almost universally rejected by Russell scholars (I shall discuss 
this in a little more detail in Chapter Four). 
 
To one in the grip of the Standard View, empty descriptions will assume a lead role 
in the story of OD and the development of the theory of descriptions. Having rejected 
the Standard View, we are in a position to reemphasise the status of theories of denoting 
as accounts of generality. A theory of denoting must give not only an account of what 
certain propositions are about, but also an account of how they are about it. For 
example, a sentence containing a denoting phrase is about whatever the denoting 
concept indicated by that phrase denotes. Thus (7) is not about the entity occurring in 
subject-position in ⟨7⟩, but what it denotes, i.e. Socrates. 
 
(7) The teacher of Plato is wise. 
⟨7⟩ ⟨<the teacher of Plato> is wise⟩ 
 
But we also want our theory of denoting to provide an explanation of why (7) is about 
Socrates. For this reason, it does not suffice to stipulate that the proposition expressed 
by (8) is about, say, the null-class.
63
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 There is also a growing concern with epistemological issues. 
63
 Or whatever other conventional denotation one chooses to posit. See Levine 2005 for an excellent 
discussion of Russell‘s objections to the imposition of conventional denotations. 
83 
 
(8) The present king of France is wise. 
 
As Russell points out in OD, the stipulation that (8) is about the null-class does not lead 
to logical error, but it ‗is plainly artificial‘ (OD: 47). Direct inspection does not reveal 
that (8) is about the null-class; and in virtue of what is the null-class apt to be denoted 
by <the present king of France>? To say more, to sharpen the analysis, would require an 
account of the relation between <the present king of France> and the null-class. In 
general then, I think it is fair to say that Russell‘s interest in empty denoting phrases is, 
at least partly, sparked by the need to give a genuinely explanatory account of the 
relation between that which denotes and that which is denoted—not merely by the 
difficulty of providing a denotation where one is apparently absent. 
 
4. The Theory of Meaning and Denotation 
I shall call the theory of denoting that Russell develops in the 1903-05 papers in CP4
64
 
‗the theory of meaning and denotation‘. It is largely the same as the theory of denoting 
concepts as set out in Chapter One. One might characterise the difference between the 
two in following terms. 
 
Unlike ‗denoting concept‘, the words ‗meaning‘ and ‗denotation‘ have both a 
substantive and a verbal sense. It is useful to think of the difference between the theory 
of denoting concepts and the theory of meaning and denotation as amounting to little 
more than a shift of emphasis, from the substantive sense of ‗meaning‘ (in which it is 
synonymous with ‗denoting concept‘) to the verbal sense. That is to say, whereas in 
PoM the focus had been primarily upon the denoting concepts and denoted objects (e.g. 
PoM: §61), Russell‘s prime concern in formulating the theory of meaning and 
denotation is the relation of denoting, the relation between the meaning (i.e. denoting 
concept or, in Russell‘s increasingly frequent term, denoting complex) and the 
denotation. Of course it is not the case that the relation of denoting is of no concern to 
Russell in PoM (very much the contrary), nor that the nature of meanings and 
denotations are of no concern to Russell in developing the later theory (again, very 
much the contrary). But it is useful to fix upon a difference between the two approaches 
since, firstly, the two theories are ultimately extremely similar
65
, and secondly, the shift 
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 Especially those from §III of CP4: OMDP, DVD, PAD, OMD, and OF. 
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 Wahl (1993) agrees. 
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of emphasis serves to indicate the nature of Russell‘s application of the theory of 
denoting to the paradoxes. Much of what is to be said about the theory of meaning and 
denotation will therefore be familiar. Nonetheless it is useful to plot the development of 
Russell‘s position in order to get a feel not only for the shift of emphasis that occurs, but 
also for the kind of modifications he considered and rejected.
66
 
 
In the earlier of Russell‘s 1903-05 manuscripts a particularly significant 
modification is mooted, though it is ultimately not embraced. Here the PoM position is 
modified to incorporate two word-world relations: meaning and denoting
67
. This 
indicates the growing influence on Russell, at this time, of Frege, and begins to give us 
an insight into Russell‘s claim in OD that his earlier theory had been ‗very nearly the 
same as Frege‘s‘ (OD: 42n).68 It will be noted below, however, that Russell‘s position in 
the early manuscripts is certainly not identical to Frege‘s, and the position arrived at in 
the manuscripts immediately preceding OD is far closer to the PoM view than to 
Frege‘s (and is only superficially similar to the latter69). 
 
On Russell‘s view in OMDP (written 1903), proper names have denotation but no 
meaning. Thus ‗Arthur Balfour‘ is ‗destitute of meaning, but denotes an individual‘ 
(OMDP: 284, ‗denotes‘ is here used in its linguistic sense). Verbs and adjectives, on the 
other hand, have meaning, but do not denote (OMDP: 284). Thus far, though we have 
two linguistic relations—meaning and denoting—the view is otherwise unlike Frege‘s 
in that whereas for Frege all expressions both mean and denote (i.e. have Sinn and 
Bedeutung), for Russell names only denote, and verbs and adjectives only mean. 
 
The entities that are meant by verbs and adjectives (relations and predicates) can, 
however, also be denoted (in the linguistic sense). The concept that is meant by the 
adjective in (9) is denoted by the substantive ‗Blackness‘ in (10). 
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 The unpublished papers are discussed in some detail by: Rodriguez-Consuegra (1989; 1992); Wahl 
(1993); and Klement (2004a; 2004b). None of these entirely satisfy me (though the Klement papers are 
very good). 
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 Notice that here ‗denoting‘ is used for a linguistic relation. Russell also uses it for the logical relation 
holding between a meaning (denoting concept) and its denotation. I will not provide a disambiguating 
terminology but will indicate which sense is intended as necessary. 
68
 In Coffa‘s (1980: 57) terms, the Russell of PoM was a ‗semantic monist‘; at this stage he is flirting with 
‗semantic dualism‘. 
69
 As such it may be misleading to follow Klement (2004b: 16) in labelling 1903-05 Russell‘s ‗Fregean 
Period‘. 
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(9) The table is black. 
(10) Blackness can make seeing ants difficult. 
 
The similarity to Frege is closest with regard to denoting phrases. ‗The table‘ in (9), has 
both meaning and denotation: it means a particular meaning (i.e. <the table>) and 
denotes a particular table
70
. A difference from the theory of denoting concepts should be 
noted here. On the theory of denoting concepts the significance of a denoting phrase is, 
strictly, exhausted by its indicating a denoting concept. Thus that ‗the teacher of Plato‘ 
indicates <the teacher of Plato> is a sufficient condition for its significance. The fact 
that <the teacher of Plato> denotes Socrates is interesting, but has no bearing on the 
ultimate significance of the related denoting phrase. Of course one may, if so disposed, 
posit an additional word-world relation, holding between ‗the teacher of Plato‘ and 
Socrates. This would be denoting in a linguistic sense. But, crucially, this relation—
unlike the linguistic denoting relation from the unpublished manuscripts—would be 
indirect and mediated via <the teacher of Plato>. In the absence of this linguistic 
relation, the denoting phrase would retain its significance: ‗the teacher of Plato‘ is 
significant whether or not Plato ever received instruction. However, on the view from 
the manuscripts we are considering, there is a linguistic relation—both direct and 
unmediated—holding between ‗the teacher of Plato‘ and Socrates: the former denotes 
(in the linguistic sense) the latter. This is a significant development from the position 
endorsed in PoM. 
 
Russell‘s similarity to Frege in the short period presently under discussion 
continues with his treatment of sentences as having both meaning and denotation. The 
meaning of a sentence is taken to be a complex concept: the denotation of a sentence is 
taken to be a proposition. The meaning of ‗the table‘ will be a constituent of the 
complex concept meant by (9); the denotation of ‗the table‘ will be a constituent of the 
proposition denoted by (9). In adopting this position, Russell in effect endorses Frege‘s 
‗retrograde step‘ (as Dummett (1981) considers it) of treating sentences as complex 
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 Russell shows himself well-aware of the phenomenon of ‗incomplete descriptions‘: ‗the table (with an 
unexpressed addendum of the kind giving definiteness, such as ―in that corner‖, ―at which we dined last 
night‖, etc.) both means and denotes‘ (OMDP: 284). This suggests that Strawson‘s (1950: §III, 11) 
discussion of the sentence ‗the table is covered with books‘ would not have worried Russell unduly. 
Compare OMD: 328-29. 
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singular terms. This may have seemed plausible, for a time at least, for a couple of 
reasons. The first is that sentences yield quite easily to nominalisation. For instance, the 
nominalisation of (9) yields: 
 
(9a) The table‘s being black. 
 
The second reason is that treating sentences as having both meaning and denotation 
enables Russell to propose a solution to the problem of ‗objective falsehoods‘, i.e. of the 
subsistence of false propositions. Propositions are taken to make up the fabric of reality. 
If propositions are the objects of judgement, then to believe that Socrates is Greek is to 
stand in the belief relation to proposition ⟨11⟩: 
 
⟨11⟩ ⟨Socrates is Greek⟩ 
 
But then what proposition does one believe if one believes that Socrates is Belgian? 
Presumably the false proposition ⟨12⟩: 
 
⟨12⟩ ⟨Socrates is Belgian⟩ 
 
If this is the case, Socrates‘ being Belgian makes up part of the fabric of reality. But, 
surely, to say that ⟨12⟩ is false is to say that the fabric of reality doesn‟t include 
Socrates‘ being Belgian.71 
 
It might seem then, that while ‗Socrates is Greek‘ denotes the proposition ⟨Socrates 
is Greek⟩, the sentence ‗Socrates is Belgian‘ denotes nothing. Russell‘s attempt to solve 
the problem of objective falsehoods thus begins with the recognition that he owes an 
account of apparently empty proper names. His suggestion is that some proper names be 
taken as associated with an ‗improper‘ use (OMDP: 285). ‗Apollo‘ and ‗Hamlet‘ (and 
so on) are taken as substitutes for definite descriptions and, as such, to have meaning 
(thus explaining their significance) but no denotation.
72
 When such expressions, i.e. 
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 For a fuller treatment of this problem see, e.g., Candlish 1996.  
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 This view—a precursor to the description theory of names—surfaces in OD (in league with the theory 
of descriptions). In OD Russell is explicitly committed only to the view that names of mythological or 
fictitious characters are disguised descriptions (though he also states that we cannot have acquaintance 
with matter (of the kind described by physics) or with other minds (OD: 56), suggesting certain 
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those having meaning but no denotation, occur in a declarative sentence, that sentence 
itself has meaning but no denotation. (13) for instance, means, without denoting: 
 
(13) The present king of France is bald. 
 
Russell then goes on to wonder whether such an approach could be extended to 
sentences such as (14): 
 
(14) Shakespeare was blind. 
 
Here, he suggests, though there is no failure of denotation in the parts, ‗there is a failure 
of denotation in the whole; [. . .] the phrase should denote Shakespeare‘s blindness, and 
[. . .] there is no such entity‘ (OMDP: 286-287).73 In this way, the problematic objective 
falsehoods might be jettisoned on the basis of an independently motivated philosophical 
account of meaning and denoting. 
 
Now according to Levine (2005), this position is one upon which Russell, at least 
up until OD, had settled. He quotes at length from OMDP in support of this 
interpretation, urging that Russell‘s view is that sentences such as (13) and (14) fail to 
express any proposition; he quotes, for example, the following passage: 
 
we shall have to say that [(13)] is neither true nor false; for truth and falsehood 
have to do with what a sentence denotes, not with what it means [. . .]. [. . .] 
There is a complex concept, which is the meaning of [(13)]; and this concept has 
the form of those that denote propositions. But in the particular case considered, 
the concept does not denote a proposition. (OMDP: 286; cf. Levine 2005: 42-3) 
 
Furthermore, he suggests, this view is continuous with the position endorsed in PoM. 
There, he suggests, 
 
in discussing the proposition expressed by ―Chimaeras are animals‖, Russell 
concludes that we should ―reject the proposition altogether‖ on the ground that 
                                                                                                                                               
extensions of the view). In OMDP he claims that: ‗genuine proper names, when they belong to interesting 
people, tend to become names which have meaning‘ (OMDP: 285). See also OMD (318) and EIP for 
early statements of Russell‘s descriptivism about proper names. 
73
 Cf. DVD: 298. 
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―chimaeras‖ expresses a denoting concept that does not denote anything. By 
―reject[ing] the proposition altogether‖, I take Russell to be denying that it 
expresses a proposition at all. (Levine 2005: 43n.) 
 
The error here is to take Russell too quickly at his unpublished word: we should be 
careful not to suppose Russell committed to views apparently endorsed in unpublished 
papers unless they are supported by strong independent evidence (textual evidence from 
published work, for example). In this case, it emerges in later unpublished 
manuscripts—OMD for example74—that Russell actually abandoned the view that 
sentences both mean and denote.
75
 I shall give his argument for the retraction presently. 
For the moment, I must argue against Levine‘s claim that the OMDP view that 
sentences both mean and denote, and that un-denoting ones are neither true nor false, is 
continuous with the view of PoM. 
 
Levine cites §73 of PoM, in which Russell considers the proposition expressed by 
(15): 
 
(15) Chimaeras are animals. 
 
Levine‘s claim is that, just as in OMDP Russell advocates the claim that (13) is neither 
true nor false on the grounds that it fails to denote a proposition (this on the grounds that 
its subject term fails to denote), so in PoM he advocates the claim that (15) is neither 
true nor false on the grounds that it also fails to denote a proposition (on the grounds 
that its subject term fails to denote). However a close reading of §73 reveals that 
although Russell does deny that (15) expresses a proposition, he does not hold that, as it 
occurs in (15), ‗chimaeras‘ is a denoting phrase. In §73, Russell is discussing the null-
class. (The description of §73 given in the table of contents reads: ‗there are null class-
concepts, but there is no null-class‘ (PoM: xxvii).) Russell‘s point concerning (15) is 
that although it might, from the standpoint of intension, be interpreted as asserting a 
relation of predicates (class-concepts), from the standpoint of extension, no satisfactory 
analysis is forthcoming. From the extensional standpoint, nothing is said, by (15), to be 
an animal. Hence: 
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 OMDP and OMD are both from 1903, but OMD is generally taken to be the later. 
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 Wahl (2007) also attributes to Russell the view that sentences both mean and denote, failing to 
recognise the retraction in OMD. 
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On the whole, it seems most correct to reject the proposition altogether, while 
retaining the various other propositions that would be equivalent to it if there 
were chimaeras. (PoM: §73, 74) 
 
What is rejected in this passage is the purely extensional reading of (15), according to 
which ‗chimaeras‘ is, in effect, a proper name for the class of chimaeras: there being no 
such class (taken in pure extension), there can be no such proposition as that which (15), 
on this reading, expresses. But ‗retaining the various other propositions that would be 
equivalent to [⟨15⟩] if there were chimaeras‘ amounts to an admission that the following 
propositions are not to be rejected: 
 
⟨15a⟩ ⟨<some chimaeras> are animals⟩ 
⟨15b⟩ ⟨<all chimaeras> are animals⟩ 
⟨15c⟩ ⟨chimaeras are animals⟩ 
 
That these propositions are to be retained is a simple consequence of the logical genesis 
view of the theory of denoting concepts I defended in Chapter One. Russell does not 
deny that chimaeras is a class-concept, and hence does not deny the associated denoting 
concepts derived from it. All he denies is that there is a null-class. 
 
Thus although in the section of PoM under discussion Russell denies that (15) 
expresses a proposition, it is not for the same reason that the Russell of OMDP denies 
that (13) expresses a proposition. (15) fails to express a proposition because the 
(supposed) singular term ‗chimaeras‘ is in fact meaningless, an empty sound. Given 
this, and given that Russell soon came to reject the view that (13) fails to express a 
proposition, we should not take the Russell of PoM as committed to the view that 
sentences both mean and denote. I turn now to Russell‘s argument against this view. 
 
Ironically, Russell‘s reason for abandoning the view that sentences have both 
meaning and denotation was also related to the question of objective falsehoods. 
Consider the sentence 
 
(16a) 𝑎 differs from 𝑏. 
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Nominalisation yields (16b): 
 
(16b) The difference between 𝑎 and 𝑏 
 
On the view that sentences both mean and denote, (16a) and (16b) are taken to have the 
same denotation. Now (16a) certainly affirms something, but what it affirms cannot be 
what is denoted by (16b). This is because (16a) affirms something even if it is false. Yet 
if (16a) is false, then (16b) fails to denote (there being, in this case, no difference 
between 𝑎 and 𝑏). 
 
This, Russell thinks, leads to a number of difficulties (OMD: 326-27), the most 
serious of which is simply that it denies what seems to be a natural assumption, namely 
that: 
 
if a proposition [sentence] denotes a fact, it seems as though the fact itself must 
be what we affirm [in affirming the sentence], whereas, on the view in question, 
we only affirm descriptions of the fact. (OMD: 326) 
 
This objection embodies one of the most basic tenets of Russell‘s philosophy, namely 
that in the act of judgement one, as it were, reaches all the way out to touch reality. To 
judge that Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high is to enter into a direct and 
unmediated relation with Mont Blanc itself (snowfields and all). Yet on the view that 
sentences have both meaning and denotation, Russell concludes that affirmation—a 
form of judgement—must be a relation to a kind of complex concept, not to the 
proposition in question. Instead Russell retreats to a position familiar from PoM: 
 
A proposition is a complex sui generis, and we can distinguish, in regard to it, 
(a) the terms about which it is, (b) its constituents. (OMD: 327) 
 
That is to say, in judgement (or affirmation) one stands in relation to a proposition, and 
that proposition, if it contains any denoting concepts, may be about some term (or 
terms) not found among its constituents. But crucially, the fact that (say) the sentence 
(17) below may be used to affirm the happiness of Obama is due to its expressing a 
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proposition containing a constituent that denotes (in the logical sense) him—not due its 
denoting (in the linguistic sense) a proposition in which he actually occurs. 
 
(17) The President of the USA is happy. 
 
And supposing (17) to be true, in affirming it one stands in direct relation to a fact, 
namely: 
 
⟨17⟩ ⟨<the President of the USA> is happy⟩ 
 
One does not stand in direct relation to a complex concept denoting (in the logical 
sense) the relevant fact.
76
 
 
If sentences are no longer taken as having both meaning and denotation, then (17)‘s 
being about Obama is not to be explained in terms of its denoting
77
 a proposition 
containing him. Rather (17) is about Obama in virtue of its expressing a proposition 
containing <the President of the USA> and this denoting concept‘s denoting Obama. 
The relation between the phrase ‗the President of the USA‘ and Obama is very much 
mediated by the meaning, <the President of the USA>
78
. In the primary sense, the 
phrase is significant solely in virtue of indicating this meaning. 
 
We may, if we wish, still posit two linguistic relations, meaning and denoting, such 
that proper names denote (in the linguistic sense), and verbs and adjectives mean; but 
since no expressions both mean and denote (in the linguistic sense)—for recall that the 
relation between a denoting phrase and the entity denoted by the meaning of that phrase 
is not the direct linguistic denoting relation holding between a proper name and its 
bearer—the distinction could equally be captured in terms of a distinction between the 
kinds of terms that are standardly meant and the kinds of terms that are only denoted (in 
the linguistic sense). Label the former ‗concepts‘ and the latter ‗things‘ and we arrive 
back at the original position from PoM. 
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 A fact is just a true proposition. Note that in this discussion I assume that Russell is not committed to 
Hylton‘s (1990) ‗principle of truth-value dependence‘. I defend this interpretation in Chapter Four. 
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 In the linguistic sense. 
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 Wahl (1993: 79-80) agrees. 
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I conclude this section by emphasising the fact that, ultimately, Russell‘s position 
in the 1903-05 papers differs from PoM in emphasis rather than substance. He writes: 
 
What remains to be said about denoting itself, after all these preliminaries, is 
little enough. The fact seems to be simply that denoting is indefinable and 
fundamental, that certain complexes have the property of denoting something 
other than themselves, and that, when such complexes are constituents of 
propositions, the propositions are not about the complexes, but are about what 
the complexes denote. This contains the whole of what I have to say on the 
theory of denoting [. . .]. (OMD: 327) 
 
This is not different in substance from what he had said in PoM; and he introduces the 
shift of emphasis that I wish to note in the very next clause: ‗it will conduce to clearness 
to expand and explain the two ways in which an entity may occur in a proposition‘ 
(OMD: 327). 
 
4.2. Entity- and meaning-occurrences 
In the previous section I spoke of meaning and denotation, of Shakespeare‘s blindness 
and the king of France. These, it may be thought, are some way removed from the 
paradoxes. This section brings the theory of meaning and denotation and the paradoxes 
back together. 
 
The paradoxes involve propositions in which a class, function, predicate, 
propositional function (etc.), is related, in the way appropriate way for entities of that 
kind, to itself. What Russell comes to emphasise—especially in OMD and OF—is that 
the constituents of structured complexes (i.e. propositions) have different ‗modes of 
occurrence‘.79 
 
In Chapter One (§2.3) we distinguished ‗occurrence as subject‘ from ‗occurrence as 
concept‘. A term occurs ‗as subject‘ in a proposition if it may be substituted for any 
term at all (thing or concept) such that the resultant proposition has the same structure 
as the original. If the resultant proposition only has the same structure if the term is 
substituted for a concept, then that term occurs ‗as concept‘. But as we saw, the theory 
of denoting concepts introduces complications. For (in at least some cases) when a 
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proposition includes a denoting concept, the proposition may not be about any of its 
constituents—even the one occurring in ‗subject-position‘. In proposition ⟨18⟩ for 
example, 
 
⟨18⟩ ⟨<the inventor of the clarinet> was German⟩ 
 
the denoting concept <the inventor of the clarinet> occurs in subject-position, and yet 
the proposition is not about it but about its denotation (Johann Christoph Denner).
80
 In 
OF, which contains the most revealing discussion of modes of occurrence, Russell uses 
different terms for the same distinction. ‗Occurrence as subject‘ becomes occurrence as 
entity and ‗occurrence as concept‘ becomes occurrence as meaning (henceforth I adopt 
the new terminology). 
 
Modes of occurrence are intimately related to the idea of form or structure. 
Consider propositions ⟨19⟩ and ⟨20⟩. 
 
⟨19⟩ ⟨Bradman averaged over 50⟩ 
⟨20⟩ ⟨Sobers averaged over 50⟩ 
 
We immediately recognise a similarity of form in ⟨19⟩ and ⟨20⟩. This ability is, Russell 
says, ‗one of the pre-requisites of all reasoning from the general to the particular‘ (OF: 
366). The shared form is not a constituent of the propositions; but—at certain moments 
at least—Russell toys with the idea of form as an entity, a ‗mode of combination‘, not 
unlike the ‗logical forms‘ of TK: 
 
A mode of combination, like everything else, is an entity; but it is not one of the 
entities occurring in a complex composed of entities combined in the mode in 
question. Thus e.g., in the case of ―𝐴 is greater than 𝐵‖, the mode of 
combination may be denoted by 𝑥 𝑅 𝑦 . This is a definite entity, but it is not a 
constituent of ―𝐴 is greater than 𝐵‖, of which the constituents are only 𝐴, greater 
than, and 𝐵. (OnF: 98) 
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proposition is about it rather than Denner. Notice how the notation I use is unable to represent this 
distinction: ⟨<the inventor of the clarinet> is a denoting concept⟩ is—given the understanding of the 
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Leaving the question of the ontological status of modes of combination aside, we 
can follow Russell‘s lead in isolating the shared form of ⟨19⟩ and ⟨20⟩, and represent it 
as follows: 
 
[21] m[𝜙]m/e[𝑥]e 
 
(The slash ‗/‘ simply separates variables, the bracket-plus-subscript notation (e.g. ‗m[‘ 
and ‗]m‘, and ‗e[‘ and ‗]e‘)  distinguishes the mode of occurrence of the term occurring 
within the brackets). In [21] whatever occurs in the position of 𝜙 occurs as meaning; 
whatever occurs in the position of 𝑥 occurs as entity. As such we may speak of ‗entity-
position(s)‘ and ‗meaning-position(s)‘ in a complex. Similarly ‗entity-variation‘ and 
‗meaning-variation‘ are the variation of the values of the variables in entity- and 
meaning-position respectively. 
 
Now the paradox of predicates, to take an example, involves the application of a 
predicate to itself. We have, for instance: 
 
⟨22⟩ ⟨𝜙(𝜙)⟩ 
 
⟨22⟩, like all propositions, has a structure, a form. Indeed its form is that given in [21]. 
Combining notations, ⟨22⟩ amounts to ⟨23⟩: 
 
⟨23⟩ ⟨m[𝜙]m/e[𝜙]e⟩ 
 
In ⟨23⟩ we have 𝜙 occurring in both meaning- and entity-positions. But the difficulty, 
the source of which Russell now takes himself to have discovered, is this: 
 
It seems likely that meaning-variation must be distinguished from entity-
variation, and that two variables of which one means [i.e. occurs in meaning-
position] and the other is [i.e. occurs in entity position] can only be equal by 
accident, and can‘t be kept equal throughout variation. (OF: 360, emphasis 
added) 
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That is, in ⟨23⟩, the two variables are intended to vary in tandem; yet because they occur 
in different kinds of position, their values will in general differ. Russell says: 
 
if we assert a connection between a variable in a meaning-position and a 
variable in an entity-position, we must avoid denoting complexes, since these 
will stand for their meaning in the one position and for their denotation in the 
other. (OF: 361) 
 
That is to say, if an entity that denotes—in particular, a variable—occurs in an entity-
position, it will, in that position, yield its denotation as value; but if that same entity 
occurs in a meaning-position, it will not yield its denotation as value, but something 
else. What this other value will be is not quite clear—suffice it to note that it will be 
different from the value it yields in entity-position (or at least if the two values are the 
same, this is only ‗by accident‘).81 Clearly, then, understanding the connection between 
a variable occurring as meaning and that same variable occurring as entity is going to be 
very important in the attempt to solve the paradoxes. For in forming a complex which 
genuinely applies 𝜙 to itself, 𝜙 cannot, it seems, occur both as meaning and as entity. 
 
It may not be unreasonable to speculate that Russell hoped that the grammar of the 
theory of meaning and denotation would outlaw the formulation of the paradoxes in a 
manner analogous to that in which the grammar of the substitutional theory outlaws 
their formulation. This is lent support by the conjunction of the eventual failure of the 
theory of meaning and denotation and Russell‘s later claim that his first efforts at a 
substitutional theory had ‗failed for want of the theory of denoting‘ (Grattan-Guinness 
1977: 79-80). I present this as nothing more than speculation. But whether or not 
Russell hoped that a more precise understanding of the theory of meaning and 
denotation would outlaw the formulation of the paradoxes, he surely recognised that it 
was essential for a clear statement of them. The first step towards solving a problem is 
                                                 
81
 It seems likely that Russell supposes that the variable in meaning-position will denote its meaning. If 
so, variables—denoting concepts generally—have meanings. Yet we have been led to believe that 
denoting concepts are meanings! There is some confusion here, generated by the fact that Russell does 
not consider in sufficient detail the question of how a proposition can have a denoting concept as its 
logical subject. When, in OF, he does begin to seriously consider this issue, he discovers the GEA. As we 
shall see in Chapter Four, in the GEA Russell considers two versions of the theory of meaning and 
denotation: one in which denoting phrases indicate denoting complexes, which in turn have both meaning 
and denotation; one in which denoting phrases indicate denoting complexes, which are identified with 
meanings. These complications are not essential to any of the discussions in this or the previous chapter. 
They are discussed at length in Chapter Four. 
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often to get clear as to its proper formulation. The relation of meaning to denotation, 
and the role of modes of occurrence, therefore emerge as central issues in the search for 
a solution to the paradoxes. These issues—on which, it should be said, Russell is 
terribly unclear—will be probed by Russell in the GEA, and lead eventually to the 
demise of the theory of meaning and denotation. But this is the subject of the Chapter 4. 
 
4.3. Intension and extension again 
I want to conclude by briefly drawing a loose connection between the interplay of 
extension and intension that we encountered in relation to the ‗mixed paradox‘ (§2.1), 
and the relation of meaning to denotation.
82
 
 
A class-as-many and its associated class-as-one are closely connected. Indeed, I 
suggested above that Russell may at times have over-estimated the extent of their 
connection, though he also—in more careful moments—acknowledges an ‗ultimate 
distinction‘ between them. I attempted above to characterise their relation, and 
suggested that in this regard there is no avoiding a certain blurring of the lines between 
extension and intension. There was, I suggested, no purely extensional characterisation 
of the relation 𝐶 (from Figure 1), holding between a class-as-many and its associated 
class-as-one. That relation stands, therefore, in need of investigation; for until it is 
clearly set out, ‗the hoary difficulties about the one and the many‘ (STCR: 189) will 
remain. 
 
 We have recently set the scene for another set of equally ‗hoary difficulties‘. These 
are the difficulties concerning the relation of meaning and denotation. Notice, to begin 
with, that in this field we find the same tripartite arrangement as we saw in Figure 1: 
 
                                                 
82
 I will expand upon this in Chapter Five. 
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Fig. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The relations 𝑋 and 𝑌 are linguistic: 𝑋 is meaning and 𝑌 is denoting (in the linguistic 
sense). Relation 𝑍 is the logical relation of denoting. 
 
The GEA focuses upon 𝑍. It is at least arguable that similar problems as attend 
relation 𝐶 attend relation 𝑍. I will make some tentative proposals in this regard in 
Chapter Five. The point I wish to indicate here—though its force will not be felt until 
Chapter Four—is that the GEA challenges the theory of meaning and denotation to 
explain the relation between meaning and denotation. That relation cannot, ultimately, 
be mediated via the denoting phrase (i.e. 𝑍 cannot simply be characterised in terms of 𝑋 
and 𝑌), and yet it cannot simply be taken as fundamental (both will lack sufficient 
explanatory value). It will be argued in Chapter Four that the GEA demonstrates the 
failure of the theory of meaning and denotation to account for the relation between 
meaning and denotation in a manner sufficiently robust to meet the requirements of a 
theory of denoting. The failure is attributable, I will suggest, to an inability of the theory 
of meaning and denotation to satisfactorily accommodate the demands imposed upon it 
from the dual standpoints of intension and extension. Meeting these demands involves 
more subtlety than the theory of meaning and denotation can accommodate. Its failure 
in this respect, as well as the discovery of a means of doing without it, leads Russell to 
abandon it. Similarly, I think, for the interplay of intension and extension in relation to 
classes, and those ‗hoary difficulties‘ of the one and the many: once Russell found a 
way of doing without classes-as-many and classes-as-one, he was happy to let them go. 
 
‗The 𝐹‘ <The 𝐹> 
𝑍 
𝑌 
𝑋 
The 𝐹 
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3. ‘On Denoting’ and the Theory of Descriptions 
 
1. Introduction 
OD marks a fundamental shift in Russell‘s philosophy. Its introduction of the theory of 
descriptions signalled the recognition that systems of symbolism—particularly ordinary 
languages—are potentially highly misleading to the philosopher; it signalled a greater 
concern with language than had been previously evident, a concern that was to 
characterise all of Russell‘s subsequent work. He would later write: 
 
There is a good deal of importance to philosophy in the theory of symbolism, a 
good deal more than at one time I thought. I think the importance is almost 
entirely negative, i.e., the importance lies in the fact that unless you are fairly 
aware of the relation of the symbol to what it symbolizes, you will find yourself 
attributing to the thing properties which only belong to the symbol. (PLA: 185)  
 
Language is most obviously misleading when expressions purporting to pick out an 
individual in fact fail to do so. In OD Russell was to claim that denoting phrases were of 
this kind: that, though every sentence in which a given denoting phrase occurs has a 
meaning, that phrase ‗does not, like most single words, have any significance on its own 
account‘ (OD: 51). This amounted to the recognition of a class of ‗incomplete symbols‘. 
 
This chapter introduces the theory of descriptions. The theory is well-known, 
having found application in a good deal of subsequent analytical philosophy. However I 
shall emphasise the connection between the central principle of the theory—that 
denoting phrases are incomplete symbols—and the development of Russell‘s 
conception of analysis between PoM and OD. The notion of an incomplete symbol, at 
least as Russell employs it, is intimately bound to the notion of what I shall call 
‗structurally-radical interpretive analysis‘ (building on certain distinctions introduced to 
the literature on analysis by Michael Beaney
1
). The neglect of the connection between 
incomplete symbols and structurally-radical interpretive analysis has induced, I will 
argue, a tendency to mischaracterise the nature of Russell‘s theory. Emphasising the 
connection will serve to demonstrate the distance between the theory as Russell presents 
                                                 
1
 For an overview of these distinctions see Beaney 2009. For an earlier discussion of different forms of 
analysis in Russell‘s philosophy, see Weitz 1951. 
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and uses it, and the modified version of it advocated by many contemporary 
philosophers of language. The theory that Russell advocated in OD is not, I will argue, 
at all well-suited for a role in a compositional semantics of natural language. And, on 
the other hand, had Russell originally developed the theory advocated by contemporary 
philosophers of language, it is arguable that he would not have been able to use it in 
developing the substitutional theory of classes. This last point, however, will not be 
discussed until Chapter Five. 
 
I begin (§2) with Russell‘s use of ‗denoting‘. OD is an extremely difficult paper. Its 
difficulty stems, in part, from the fact that it is not entirely clear how the word 
‗denoting‘ is to be understood. I discuss Russell‘s use of ‗denoting‘, and of another key 
term ‗about‘, identifying broad, general senses of these terms. §3 begins with an 
exploration of the role of ‗decompositional‘ analysis in PoM, and its connection to the 
‗philosophical grammar‘ of that work (§3.1). I then (§3.2) introduce the notion of an 
‗incomplete symbol‘, and examine the connection between incomplete symbols, 
decompositional analysis, and structurally-radical interpretive analysis. The 
development of Russell‘s analytical practice is, I will suggest, more fundamental than a 
related development in his view, namely the introduction, in OD, of a syntactic (rather 
than semantic) criterion for being a denoting phrase. A propensity to focus undue 
attention upon this latter development can lead, I will argue, to failure to pay due 
attention to the fact that OD offers an account of the entire sentential contexts in which 
denoting phrases occur, rather than an account of those denoting phrases themselves. 
This distinction may seem minor, but I will show how the failure to recognise it leads to 
a puzzle which ought not to arise. In §4 I set out the theory of descriptions, as presented 
in OD. I will argue that because the theory involves a commitment to structurally-
radical interpretive analysis, it is ill-suited to the semantics of natural language. I will 
argue that when modified to accommodate the demands of natural language semantics, 
the resultant theory is significantly different to Russell‘s original. I then (§5) discuss the 
famous logical puzzles offered in OD, presenting Russell‘s solution of them by appeal 
to ‗scope‘-ambiguity. The Chapter ends (§6) with a formulation of what I take to be the 
central question raised in OD, namely: How is it that sentences containing denoting 
phrases come to be about whatever it is that they are about? I will suggest that the 
objections that Russell presents in OD—to Meinong and Frege—are all objections to 
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rival answers to the central question. The main objection is the Gray‘s Elegy Argument 
(GEA). This, however, is the subject of Chapter Four. 
 
2. Loose Use of ‘Denoting’ and ‘About’ 
As in PoM, in OD Russell presses the importance of denoting. In PoM he had claimed: 
 
This notion lies at the bottom (I think) of all theories of substance, of the 
subject-predicate logic, and of the opposition between things and ideas, 
discursive thought and immediate perception. (PoM: §56, 53) 
 
And in the introduction to OD he again urges: 
 
The subject of denoting is of very great importance, not only in logic and 
mathematics, but also in theory of knowledge. (OD: 41) 
 
In both works, when the discussion is at its most general, Russell is best understood as 
using ‗denoting‘ to mean (roughly): that notion, whichever it is, that grounds the 
possibility of propositions about some collection of entities specified by way of a 
common property, rather than enumeration. In this sense, the notion of denoting is 
inextricable bound to the notion of generality. 
 
An advocate of the theory of denoting concepts (or the theory of meaning and 
denotation
2
) might well claim that the denoting phrase ‗the father of Charles II‘ 
denotes—in some sense of that word—Charles I. For the denoting phrase indicates <the 
father of Charles II>, which denotes (in the technical, logical sense) Charles I. Hence 
sentences containing ‗the father of Charles II‘ express propositions about Charles I. On 
the other hand, an advocate of the theory of descriptions might be reluctant to claim that 
‗the father of Charles II‘ denotes—in any sense of that word—Charles I. For as we shall 
see, on the theory of descriptions, sentences containing ‗the father of Charles II‘ are 
perhaps more appropriately described as expressing propositions about a complex 
propositional function, rather than as expressing propositions about Charles I. However, 
using ‗denotes‘ in the broad sense I wish to identify, the Russell of OD is quite at liberty 
to say: 
                                                 
2
 The theory of denoting concepts and the theory of meaning and denotation differ very little, as argued in 
Chapter Two. 
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[I]f ‗𝐶‘ is a denoting phrase, it may happen that there is one entity 𝑥 (there 
cannot be more than one) for which the proposition ‗𝑥 is identical with 𝐶‘ is true 
[. . .]. We may then say that the entity 𝑥 is the denotation of the phrase ‗𝐶‘. Thus 
Scott is the denotation of ‗the author of Waverley‘. (OD: 51) 
 
Notice that the broad conception says nothing about the mechanics of denoting. In 
PoM the mechanics of denoting are held to involve denoting concepts and a primitive 
logical relation, which Russell also calls ‗denoting‘.3 But this technical sense of 
denoting is distinct from the broader sense, and it is denoting in the broader sense to 
which Russell attributes, in both PoM and OD, such great importance.
4
 Since denoting 
in PoM‘s technical sense is an explication of the broader notion, to attribute ‗very great 
importance‘ to the latter just is, in PoM, to attribute it to the former. Nonetheless, the 
distinction between the two is clear. 
 
It is also worth attending to the broad sense of ‗denoting‘ in order to ward off a 
worry that might otherwise occur to one. David Kaplan attributes to the Russell of OD 
the following two views: that denoting is a notion of great importance; and that there is 
no logical relation of denoting, but only a linguistic one. He writes: 
 
There is something very odd about urging the epistemological importance of 
denoting at the beginning of a work whose purpose is to show that the 
propositions we entertain when we know, judge, suppose, etc. contain no 
denoting elements. [. . .] Denoting has been [in OD] reduced to a property of 
proper definite descriptions [. . .]. It sidles into the OD picture through mere (and 
meaningless!) linguistic phrases. An ignoble end for a notion ‗of very great 
importance‘. (Kaplan 2005: 977-78) 
 
But there is no tension here. Denoting in the broad sense is epistemologically important 
(e.g. in account for the extension of knowledge beyond the realm of acquaintance), and 
OD offers an account of it; and while OD might be thought to signal an ‗ignoble end‘ 
                                                 
3
 To recapitulate a point raised in Chapter One, the theory of denoting concepts should not be seen as an 
explanation of generality: in taking the logical relation of denoting as primitive, it assumes generality 
from the outset. Contrast the view of Hylton (2005d: 202-03; 2005c: 165). 
4
 When Russell says ‗the fact that description is possible—that we are able, by the employment of 
concepts, to designate a thing which is not a concept—is due to a logical relation between some concepts 
and some terms, in virtue of which such concepts inherently and logically denote such terms‘ (PoM: §56, 
53) I take him to be claiming that denoting (‗description‘) in the broad sense is made possible by 
denoting in the technical sense. 
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for PoM‘s logical relation of denoting5, this in no way constitutes an ‗ignoble end‘ for 
denoting in the broad sense. 
 
Commensurate with the broad use of ‗denotes‘, Russell employs a broad sense of 
‗about‘. As we shall see below, there is a sense in which, according to the theory of 
descriptions, the sentence ‗the father of Charles II died on the scaffold‘ is not strictly 
about Charles I, but rather asserts a complex existential quantification.
6
 However 
accurately this represents the theory of descriptions, it does not accurately represent 
Russell‘s terminology. ‗All thinking‘ he says, ‗has to start from acquaintance; but it 
succeeds in thinking about many things with which we have no acquaintance‘ (OD: 42). 
That is, in thinking that the father of Charles II died on the scaffold, I think about 
Charles I, whether I am acquainted with him or not.
7
 Thus just as the Russell of OD is at 
liberty to claim that ‗the father of Charles II‘ denotes Charles I, so may he claim that 
‗the father of Charles II died on the scaffold‘ is about Charles I. 
 
3. Incomplete Symbols and Analysis 
Russell described his philosophical method as one of analysis, and maintained that in 
approaching philosophical questions ‗only by analysing is progress possible‘ (MPD: 14-
15). ‗Analysis‘ is a wide-ranging term, masking many subdivisions. For present 
purposes I wish to emphasise two forms of analysis employed by Russell during the 
period in question: ‗decompositional‘ and ‗interpretive‘. The significance of Russell‘s 
discovery of a class of ‗incomplete symbols‘ is most clearly seen in connection with the 
notion of a variety of interpretive analysis which I shall label ‗structurally-radical 
interpretive analysis‘. But I begin with Russell‘s use of decompositional analysis in 
PoM. 
 
3.1. Decompositional analysis in PoM 
Analysis in PoM is most often the decompositional analysis of a complex into its 
constituents.
8
 Typically this will involve the breaking down of a proposition to reveal its 
                                                 
5
 This would be a mistake, I think. The upshot of OD—in particular the GEA—is that denoting 
complexes (i.e. complex denoting concepts) are eliminated from the ontology. But the logical relation of 
denoting (in PoM‘s technical sense) arguably remains as that relation holding between the variable (now 
taken as fundamental) and its values. Cf. Hylton (1990: 254-56; 2007: 97). 
6
 That there is exactly one 𝑥 such that 𝑥 sired Charles II and 𝑥 died on the scaffold. 
7
 Contrast Kaplan‘s ‗presuppositional‘ interpretation of Russell (Kaplan 2005: 984). 
8
 Cf. Chapter One, §2.2. 
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constituents, namely the terms (entities) of which it is composed.
9
 This form of analysis 
is at the heart of the ‗new philosophy‘10 inaugurated by Moore and Russell. Moore had 
written that ‗A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent 
concepts‘ (Moore 1899: 182), and that ‗we cannot define anything except by an 
analysis‘ (in ‗the most important sense of ―definition‖‘11) (Moore 1993: 61).12 Russell 
agreed, as he made clear in distinguishing mathematical from philosophical definition: 
‗definition, in mathematics, does not mean, as in philosophy, an analysis of the idea to 
be defined into constituent ideas‘ (PoM: §31, 27). 
 
Russell‘s use of analysis is, in a certain sense, metaphysical: it aims at revealing the 
fundamental constituents of the world. If it is to do this, the subject of analysis must be 
the world itself, or at least a certain part of it. Russell‘s analyses are therefore analyses 
of propositions.
13
 But of course propositions, being unified complexes, cannot be 
literally broken down by analysis.
14
 Nor can propositions, qua abstract entities, be 
literally ‗put on‘ the pages of philosophy books. Practically then, some medium is 
required, in which philosophical analysis can be represented. Ideally this will be a 
language the syntax of which has been developed with the purposes of philosophical 
analysis in mind. Discussing the nature of such a language, Russell later wrote: 
 
In a logically perfect language, there will be one word and no more for every 
simple object, and everything that is not simple will be expressed by a 
combination of words. [. . .] A language of that sort will be completely 
analytic
15
, and will show at a glance the logical structure of the facts asserted or 
denied. The language which is set forth in Principia Mathematica is intended to 
be a language of that sort. [. . .] Actual languages are not logically perfect in this 
                                                 
9
 Beaney (2003) distinguishes two forms of ‗resolutive‘ analysis: ‗decompositional‘ analysis, typified by 
Russell‘s analysis of a complex whole into its constituent parts (whole-part analysis); and the ‗function-
argument‘ analysis characteristic of Frege. Russell‘s analysis of a sentence into subject and assertion 
might be thought of as a kind of function-argument resolutive analysis; but it should be remembered that 
assertions were not, for Russell, ultimate, but susceptible to further analysis—decompositional in 
nature—revealing their constituents. In this they resemble propositional functions (which, like assertions, 
yield to further analysis). 
10
 As Russell termed it (MPD: 54). 
11
 This being the sense in which Moore argues that ‗good‘ cannot be defined. 
12
 Cf. PoL: §11, 18. 
13
 Cf. the claim that ‗all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions‘ (PoL: §7, 8). 
14
 ‗What nature has joined together, mere philosophical analysis cannot rend asunder‘ as Griffin (2007: 
77) puts it. 
15
 As Hylton (2007: 91) points out, Russell does not mean that every sentence in the logically perfect 
language will be analytic (as opposed to synthetic), but rather that every sentence will be fully analysed 
(i.e. not susceptible to further analysis). 
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sense, and they cannot possibly be, if they are to serve the purposes of daily life. 
(PLA: 197-98) 
 
A logically perfect language will be ‗transparent‘ in that the grammatical properties 
of a sentence will correspond to logical properties of the proposition it expresses: every 
simple expression indicates a simple object; the way the expressions are combined in 
the sentence corresponds to the way in which the objects are arranged in the 
proposition. By the time of PLA—in fact ever since OD—Russell had come to the view 
that ordinary language is not at all transparent: ‗if you take [ordinary] language as a 
guide [to analysis] [. . .] you will be led astray‘ (PLA: 191). However in PoM, as we 
have seen (Chapter One), he took the almost completely opposite view, stating that the 
grammar of ordinary language, ‗though not our master, will yet be taken as our guide‘ 
(PoM: §46, 42). In this respect, the analysis of sentences of ordinary language is taken, 
in PoM, to have metaphysical implications.
16
 We may characterise the difference 
between the Russell of PoM and post-OD Russell in the following way. Although both 
hold that the analysis of a proposition is to be represented by the analysis of a 
sentence—of a suitable language—expressing that proposition, the Russell of PoM 
does, while the post-OD Russell does not, hold that ordinary language is suitable for 
this purpose.
17
 
 
I want now to raise a point whose relevance will only become apparent later on. 
Certain contemporary philosophers of language—namely those who investigate the 
properties of a compositional semantics of natural language—are in a certain respect 
closer to the Russell of PoM than the Russell of OD. For the Russell of PoM, unlike the 
Russell of OD, demonstrates a concern that his analysis of a proposition should be more 
or less faithful to the form of the sentence of natural language expressing it. Of course 
the notions of ‗logical form‘ at play in contemporary philosophy and linguistics are not 
equivalent to the Russellian notion. For example, Chomskyian ‗LF‘ is a level of 
syntactical representation, unlike a Russellian proposition. But we can make the 
following comparison. The relationship between a natural language sentence and its LF 
                                                 
16
 I borrow the italicised phrase from Hylton (2007: 94). I am indebted to Hylton‘s excellent discussion in 
the present section (Hylton 2007). 
17
 In presenting all these points, I ignore the fact that Russell‘s commitment to propositions lapses 
sometime around 1907; nothing of substance is materially affected. I also ignore the fact that, on the PoM 
view, one need not be committed to the claim that all logical properties of the proposition are to be easily 
discerned in the sentence: the role of tense, for example, is not obvious. The salient point is just that what 
is apparent in the grammatical form of the sentence is transparent and not misleading. 
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representation on the one hand, and that sentence and the proposition predicted by the 
philosophical grammar of PoM on the other, both involve a structural isomorphism. For 
example, both approaches hold that the logical form of a sentence of the form ‗𝑎 is 𝐺‘ 
is, as we might put it, ‗𝐺(𝑎)‘, whether ‗𝑎‘ is a genuine singular term or a denoting 
phrase. Suppose our sentence is of the form ‗some 𝐹 are 𝐺‘. According the Russell of 
PoM sentences of this form express propositions involving denoting concepts. We 
might represent their form thus: 𝐺(<some 𝐹>). According to, say, the system of 
restricted quantifiers employed by Stephan Neale
18
, the logical form of the sentence 
may be given thus: [some 𝑥: 𝐹𝑥](G𝑥). Neither approach has any deep objection to the 
claim that the logical form of the proposition expressed by a sentence of the form ‗𝑎 is 
𝐺‘ (where ‗𝑎‘ is either a singular term or a denoting phrase) may be represented as 
‗𝐺(𝑎)‘, and then the respective roles of ‗𝐺‘ and ‗𝑎‘ explained. This will be of some 
relevance below. 
 
3.2. Incomplete symbols and „structurally-radical‟ interpretative analysis 
Analysis in PoM is primarily a matter of breaking a sentence down to its constituents, 
and then pairing each constituent of the sentence to a constituent of the associated 
proposition. Let us call the propositional constituent to which a subsentential expression 
is ‗paired‘ its propositional complement.19 Russell‘s dictum that ‗Words all have 
meaning, in the simple sense that they are symbols which stand for something other 
than themselves‘ (PoM: §51, 47) then amounts to the claim that every significant 
subsentential expression has a propositional complement. With this terminology 
onboard we may say that what the Russell of OD comes to recognise is that an 
expression can occur significantly in a sentence without having a propositional 
complement. As he would later put it, denoting phrases are ‗incomplete symbols‘. 
 
 Fundamental Principle of OD: Denoting phrases are incomplete symbols. 
 
But what exactly is an incomplete symbol? 
 
In PM Whitehead and Russell write: 
                                                 
18
 See, e.g., Neale 1990; 1993. 
19
 E.g. Socrates is the propositional complement of ‗Socrates‘; redness is the propositional complement of 
‗red‘; and <the teacher of Plato> is the propositional complement of ‗the teacher of Plato‘ (on the theory 
of denoting concepts). 
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By an ‗incomplete‘ symbol we mean a symbol which is not supposed to have 
any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain contexts. (PM: 66) 
 
And they contrast incomplete symbols with proper names: 
 
‗Socrates‘, for example, stands for a certain man, and therefore has a meaning by 
itself, without the need of any context.
20
 (PM: 66) 
 
We may, if we like, label proper names ‗complete‘ symbols. But to do so is perhaps to 
encourage a misunderstanding. Frege drew a sharp distinction between objects and 
functions. Functions, unlike objects, harbour a ‗gap‘, an argument place into which an 
object can be fitted, to yield a value of that function for that argument. At the symbolic 
level the incompleteness of functions is represented either by leaving a gap in the 
symbol for a function, or by using a Greek letter, e.g. ‗(  ) + 7 = 12‘, or ‗𝜉 is greater than 
27‘. Such expressions may then be said to be ‗incomplete‘, their incompleteness 
mirroring an incompleteness in the world. Correspondingly, the completeness of objects 
is mirrored in the completeness of proper names. Now although Russell‘s proper names 
may be complete in the same sense as Frege‘s, his incomplete symbols are not 
incomplete in Frege‘s sense. In the Fregean sense, a symbol is incomplete if it stands for 
an incomplete kind of entity. But for Russell, an incomplete symbol stands for nothing 
at all.
21
 
 
This point is worth emphasising since it seems to discredit a certain interpretation 
of Russell‘s position. Alexander Miller (1998: 62), for example, attributes to Russell the 
view that definite descriptions have second-level functions for their semantic values, and 
so accuses him of having mis-described his own position (Miller 1998: 311n.).
22
 But 
Russell‘s view is that descriptions have no significance on their own account. This is 
what it means to say that ‗denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves‘ 
(OD: 43). To suppose that Russell‟s theory involves the claim that denoting phrases 
                                                 
20
 Russell does not really think that ‗Socrates‘ is a genuine proper name (at least certainly not on the lips 
of anyone other than Socrates himself). 
21
 A further difference is that, for Frege, incompleteness is called upon in explanation of the unity of the 
proposition (cf. Frege 1892b: 193). Quite how much of a difference this ultimately amounts to is 
questionable (cf. Gaskin 2008). 
22
 Gandon (2007) demonstrates how one might follow through this proposal, though he does not attribute 
the claim to Russell. 
107 
 
have second-level functions for their semantic values, is, it seems to me, analogous to 
supposing that his theory involves, say, a Gricean theory of utterance interpretation. 
Such modifications may be implemented—and rightly so, for certain purposes—but 
they are modifications, and ought not to be read back into Russell‘s position. 
 
Russell‘s position was that denoting phrases are incomplete symbols, having no 
propositional complements. Such symbols occur frequently in natural languages
23
 and it 
is fortunate that they do, for otherwise sentences might be enormously long and 
unwieldy. Such exigencies also guide the construction of a logically perfect language. 
Hence the language of PM includes incomplete symbols in order to shorten its 
formulae. Such expressions  as ‗(℩𝑥)(𝜙𝑥)‘ are given a ‗contextual definition‘ however: 
 
we must not attempt to define ―(℩𝑥)(𝜙𝑥),‖ but must define the uses of this 
symbol, i.e. the propositions in whose symbolic expression it occurs. (PM: 67)
24
 
 
It follows from the fact that incomplete symbols have no propositional complements, 
that if an incomplete symbol is to be defined at all, it must be given a contextual 
definition. That definition will specify the manner in which the incomplete symbol may 
be eliminated from the symbolism in which it occurs. 
 
The details of Russell‘s theory of denoting phrases as incomplete symbols must 
wait until the following section. But even now we are in a position to begin to 
appreciate the radical alteration that OD brings to his view. In PoM, although ordinary 
language was not held to be logically perfect (grammar being only the guide, not the 
master), it was nonetheless deemed sufficiently transparent for the purposes of 
philosophy. Ordinary language and use might suggest that, say, ‗the teacher of Plato‘ 
stands for Socrates; and while the theory of denoting concepts reveals that language is 
misleading in this regard (since ‗the teacher of Plato‘ stands for <the teacher of Plato>, 
not Socrates), it is at least trustworthy in providing something for the phrase to indicate. 
By OD however, Russell‘s view is that ordinary language is thoroughly unsuitable for 
philosophy: denoting phrases, though having the character of substantives, in fact fail to 
indicate any entity whatsoever. 
                                                 
23
 Particularly if one is, like Russell, a descriptivist about (merely) grammatically proper names. 
24
 Hence: ∗14.01: [(℩𝑥)(𝜙𝑥)] . 𝜓(℩𝑥)(𝜙𝑥) . = : (∃𝑏) : 𝜙𝑥 . 𝑥 . 𝑥 = 𝑏 : 𝜓𝑏 Df (PM: 173). 
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Decompositional analysis in PoM proceeded on the assumption that every 
significant subsentential expression had a propositional complement. That assumption 
lapsing in OD, the decompositional analysis of a sentence must now be preceded by a 
preliminary analytic process which purges the sentence of any incomplete symbols. 
This process may itself be many-staged. If the sentence contains any proper names, 
these may have to be recast as the definite descriptions that they disguise (assuming one 
endorses such descriptivism), before being eliminated as incomplete symbols.
25
 But 
however many of these stages there be, they must all be carried through prior to the 
decompositional stage of the analysis.
26
 Immediately prior to the decompositional stage 
of the analysis, one should arrive at a sentence in something approximating a logically 
perfect language (at least in the sense that every subsentential expression will have a 
propositional complement). What I should like to stress is that the need for this initial 
stage of analysis—this essential preliminary to the decompositional stage—is intimately 
bound up with the notion of an incomplete symbol.
27
 
 
This initial stage will primarily involve what Michael Beaney calls ‗interpretive 
analysis‘.28 In the broadest terms, interpretive analysis ‗involves ―translating‖ 
something into a particular framework‘ (Beaney 2007c: 198). Beaney cites the Cartesian 
development of analytical geometry, which allowed for solutions to geometrical 
problems by ‗translating‘ them into algebraic terms, as a prime example.29 
 
Beaney (2003: 156ff) distinguishes ‗paraphrastic‘ and ‗reductive‘ forms of 
interpretive analysis. Paraphrastic interpretive analysis involves the rephrasal of the 
                                                 
25
 Similarly, scope ambiguities may have to be resolved. I discuss scope in §5 below. 
26
 This process may involve reference to the syntactic form of expressions (e.g. for identifying denoting 
phrases), or perhaps a recognition that some descriptions of the appropriate syntactic form are not apt for 
the theory to handle (cf. Moore‘s examples ‗the heart pumps blood into the arteries‘, ‗the lion is the king 
of beasts‘ and so on). Recognising that a proper name is a disguised incomplete symbol might involve 
epistemological considerations (such as whether one could possibly be acquainted with the purported 
bearer of the purported name). In such respects as these, the process may be ‗epistemologically driven‘, as 
Hylton (2005c: 167) puts it. Hylton has repeatedly stressed the role of epistemological factors in 
constraining and guiding the analytical process (e.g. Hylton 1996; 2007). He is quite right to do so. 
Epistemological issues are not the main focus of this thesis however, so I have not given them the 
attention that, in a larger study, they would certainly warrant. 
27
 Cf. Hylton (2005d: 204): ‗The idea of an incomplete symbol made an immense difference to Russell‘s 
thought. [. . .] After [OD], Russell‘s idea of analysis is quite different‘. 
28
 Beaney 2003; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2009. Sometimes it is referred to as ‗transformative‘ or 
‗explicatory‘. 
29
 This is not to say that it may not also be an example of other forms of analysis. Distinctions among 
forms of analysis are not exclusive. 
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analysandum such that its logical form is more clearly displayed, but carries with it no 
‗positive‘ metaphysical commitments. Reductive interpretive analysis will involve 
rephrasal, but will go ‗a step further in aiming to reveal ―deep structure‖ and ―ultimate 
constituents‖‘ (Beaney 2003: 156). In his article, Beaney cites Frege‘s analysis of 
existential statements in terms of the second-level predicate ‗𝜉 is instantiated‘ as an 
example of (mere) paraphrastic analysis, and the theory of descriptions as an example of 
reductive analysis. Beaney‘s distinction suits his purpose of comparing Frege and 
Russell, but it will not suffice here: the PoM analyses of sentences containing denoting 
phrases may be cast as both paraphrastic and reductive. This quashes any hope of 
characterising the development of Russell‘s style of analysis between PoM and OD in 
such terms. To illustrate with an example, a defender of the theory of denoting concepts 
might analyse sentences of the form ‗some 𝐹 are 𝐺‘ as expressing propositions of the 
form ‗𝐺(<some 𝐹>)‘. This would count as paraphrastic, for there is certainly a 
rephrasal; and also counts as reductive, since it aims to reveal the ultimate constituents 
of the proposition. But what we require is a form of analysis that can be seen as 
applying to OD but not to PoM. Neither paraphrastic nor reductive interpretive analysis 
will fit this bill. 
 
As an alternative I propose that we take the form of analysis associated with 
Russell‘s account of incomplete symbols as essentially involving a restructuring of the 
sentence to be analysed. Here ‗restructuring‘ is to be understood as stronger than mere 
rephrasal. We intuitively recognise the difference between sentences of (say) subject-
predicate form (i.e. ‗𝐹𝑎‘), relational form (i.e. ‗𝑎𝑅𝑏‘), and existentially quantified form 
(e.g. ‗(∃𝑥)(𝐹𝑥)‘): I will describe an analysis as involving restructuring if the 
analysandum has one of these forms, and the analysans another. This kind of analysis is 
paraphrastic in Beaney‘s sense, but unlike merely paraphrastic analysis, it is here 
guaranteed that analysandum and analysans are of different form. For the sake of 
having a name, let‘s call this form of analysis ‗structurally-radical interpretive analysis‘, 
or ‗SR-interpretive analysis‘ for short. 
 
By treating denoting phrases as incomplete symbols, Russell commits himself to 
SR-interpretive analysis for sentences involving denoting phrases. In ordinary language, 
denoting phrases are substantives. Hence the sentences in which they occur are of either 
subject-predicate or relational form. But, given the details of the theory of descriptions 
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(to be set out presently), all sentences involving denoting phrases will now be taken to 
express propositions having quantificational forms.
30
 Thus it emerges as a significant 
difference between the OD and PoM theories of denoting, that while the former does, 
the latter does not, involve a commitment to SR-interpretive analysis. 
 
I am claiming that by endorsing the fundamental principle of OD—that denoting 
phrases are incomplete symbols—Russell commits himself to the claim that the 
decompositional analysis of a sentence containing a denoting phrase must be preceded 
by a process of SR-interpretive analysis designed to eliminate any incomplete symbols, 
thereby recasting the sentence in a radically different structure. The subject of SR-
interpretive analysis will always be an entire sentence (rather than an isolated phrase). 
But in order to discern those sentences that require SR-interpretive analysis, one must 
have some method of recognising denoting phrases within sentences. That is, there must 
be some criterion by which an expression counts as a denoting phrase, and by which 
one may recognise it as such.
31
 In this regard it is often noted that in OD Russell offers a 
syntactic criterion for denoting phrases: ‗A phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its 
form‟ (OD: 41). This is to allow that the significance of a denoting phrase is 
independent of its descriptive condition being satisfied or of its indicating anything (a 
denoting concept, for instance). This is sometimes presented as a development from the 
position in PoM. Thus Kaplan: 
 
In PoM, a phrase was said to be a ‗denoting phrase‘ because it was a phrase that 
denoted.
32
 Now, a phrase will be said to be a ‗denoting phrase‘ whenever it has 
the appropriate syntactical form. No semantic matters are presupposed. (Kaplan 
2005: 969) 
 
                                                 
30
 To be strict, ‗form‘ here is syntactic form, rather than logical form, since one might claim that ⟨<the 𝐹> 
is 𝐺⟩ is of quantificational form in virtue of containing a denoting concept. In the sense of ‗form‘ 
currently under discussion, I intend that such a proposition be understood as having subject-predicate 
form. 
31
 This arguably means that SR-interpretive analysis—or almost any interpretive analysis at that—will 
never be purely interpretive, but will also involve some other form of analysis. In the present case, a kind 
of initial decompositional analysis of the sentence is applied in order to discern the significant 
subsentential expressions. One may distinguish forms of analysis without claiming that they are wholly 
independent of one another. Hence Beaney: ‗in actual practices of analysis, [various] modes are typically 
combined‘ (Beaney 2007c: 197). 
32
 Russell did not hold that denoting phrases denote in the technical sense (only denoting concepts do 
that). Kaplan is here aping Russell‘s familiar carelessness in separating linguistic items from the entities 
they indicate. More carefully, a phrase is a ‗denoting phrase‘ if it indicates a denoting concept. 
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For those us concerned to understand Russell‘s developing views on denoting, this 
appears to be important point. 
 
A number of points should be raised in response, however. Firstly, I am not aware 
of any passage in PoM in which Russell gives a criterion for denoting phrases (and 
Kaplan does not cite one). Russell gives a criterion for being a denoting concept, but 
that is another matter. Secondly, the observation that every class-concept is guaranteed 
an associated array of denoting concepts derived from it
33
, suggests that the position in 
PoM is not incompatible with a syntactic criterion. One might say that a phrase is a 
denoting phrase if it consists of one of the determiners (‗all‘, ‗every‘, ‗any‘, etc.) 
annexed to an expression for a class-concept. What denoting concepts there are is 
determined by what class-concepts there are: hence if ‗𝐹‘ is a name of a class-concept, 
‗det 𝐹‘ (‗det‘ for ‗determiner‘) is certain to indicate a denoting concept. A semantic 
matter is presupposed here—namely that ‗𝐹‘ indicates a class-concept—but this is 
equally a presupposition of the OD position. These two points suggest that Russell 
might have intended a syntactic criterion in PoM. In fact I doubt that this is the case, for 
the simple reason that Russell was not so concerned with language in PoM that the 
matter was likely to have occurred to him. If pushed, he would most likely have offered 
the kind of semantic criterion that Kaplan supposes. But the interesting point is that 
even if this is so, the development from the semantic to the syntactic criterion is 
subordinate to a more fundamental development, namely the recognition of a class of 
incomplete symbols. If denoting phrases ‗are not assumed to have any meaning in 
isolation‘ (OD: 42) then it follows as a matter of course that they are not to be identified 
by appeal to the entities they indicate. Thus had we chosen to interpret the Russell of 
PoM as endorsing a semantic criterion, that criterion could not have applied to the OD 
theory. But such a development would be premised upon, and so secondary to, the more 
fundamental development, namely Russell‘s coming to endorse the fundamental 
principle of OD. 
 
Failure to recognise that the development of a syntactic criterion is secondary to the 
discovery of the fundamental principle of OD encourages one to focus unduly on 
denoting phrases, rather than on the sentences in which they occur. What OD provides 
                                                 
33
 Cf. the ‗logical genesis view‘ defended in Chapter One. 
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is a theory of the analysis of the sentences in which denoting phrases occur, not, strictly 
speaking, of the denoting phrases themselves. Unfortunately, Russell was not very clear 
in marking out this distinction. For instance, in the opening paragraph of OD he tells us 
what he means by ‗denoting phrase‘ and then indicates that the problem to be addressed 
is ‗the interpretation of such phrases‘ (OD: 41). Or again, turning from indefinite to 
definite descriptions, he writes ‗It remains to interpret phrases containing the‘ (OD: 44). 
However, in (what will appear to anyone of my view as) a more careful mood, he 
summarises his theory as giving ‗a reduction of all propositions [i.e. sentences] in which 
denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur‘ (OD: 45 emphasis 
added). It is also plain that the definitions of denoting phrases he provides are all 
contextual definitions (as discussed in the following section). 
 
The opposition between giving an account of denoting phrases and giving an 
account of the sentences in which such phrases occur may seem minimal.
34
 Perhaps it 
seems all the more minimal for the influence of contemporary philosophy of language. 
For in constructing a compositional semantics of natural language it is imperative to 
speak to the meaning of all significant subsentential expressions, denoting phrases 
included. But asking after the meaning, or the interpretation, or the proper analysis of a 
denoting phrase—rather than the sentences in which it occurs—is what OD aims to 
warn us against (whether Russell was clear on this matter or not). The point is 
important, and will recur later on. It can be illustrated by considering a certain puzzle 
discussed by Stephen Neale. 
 
Neale describes Russell as aiming to provide a ‗theory of how descriptions bear on 
propositional content‘ (2005: 817). As an interpretation of Russell this is, I have 
claimed, misleading and to be avoided. But it is natural that Neale should put things this 
way, since he has produced a celebrated defence of a Russellian
35
 theory of descriptions 
                                                 
34
 One discerns in the literature a failure to adhere strictly to the distinction. For example Hylton describes 
the theory of descriptions as ‗a method of analyzing definite descriptions‘ (2005d: 185). This is not the 
best way of putting things. Note that later on he describes the theory as ‗a method of analyzing complete 
sentences‘ (2005d: 187)—a much better way of putting things. My point is not that the first quotation gets 
Russell wrong exactly, but that it is potentially misleading and that the second quote is by far to be 
preferred. See also Gandon (2007: 117): ‗Incomplete symbols have a logical content which is displayed 
by the contextual definition‘. This is not wrong exactly, but it is misleading: it isn‘t the incomplete 
symbol that has logical content, but the entire context. 
35
 Only Russellian since, as I will argue in §4, the theory Neale defends differs significantly from 
Russell‘s official view. 
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as a contribution to the semantics of natural language.
36
 The puzzle is outlined in a 
footnote. I quote at length. 
 
Before we even get to the details of Russell‘s positive proposal, there is a serious 
issue about how to describe what it is that Russell is going to give us. Suppose 
Russell provides a perfectly good description that uniquely specifies the 
contribution ‗the 𝜙‘ makes to the proposition expressed by ‗𝐶(the 𝜙)‘, the 
following for example: 
 
(𝑖) the contribution ‗the 𝜙‘ makes to the proposition expressed by ‗𝐶 
(the 𝜙)‘. 
 
Suppose we name whatever it is that (𝑖) describes ‗𝑚‘. If a name‘s meaning is 
just its bearer, then whatever it is that (𝑖) describes, namely, 𝑚, is the meaning of 
‗𝑚‘, and thereby the contribution ‗𝑚‘ makes to the proposition expressed by 
‗𝐶(𝑚)‘. So now ‗𝐶(m)‘ and ‗𝐶(the 𝜙)‘ seem to express the same proposition, 
for surely 𝐶‘s contribution is constant! Russell refuted before we even get to the 
details of his proposal! (Neale 2005: 817n.) 
 
One‘s immediate reaction here is to point out that there can be no genuine name ‗𝑚‘; 
for if descriptions are incomplete symbols, (𝑖) fails to describe anything (hence there is 
nothing for ‗𝑚‘ to name). This is a point Neale immediately makes, and so the ‗puzzle‘ 
ought to be dismissed here. Nevertheless he continues: 
 
But why should our use of descriptions (and our own powers of description) be 
so curtailed, given that Russell aims to show us the way ‘the 𝜙’ bears on 
propositional content? – don‘t the italicized words before the dash constitute a 
definite description? Ditto ‗how “the 𝜙” bears on propositional content‘, ‗the 
relation between “the 𝜙” and the identity of the proposition expressed by “𝐶(the 
𝜙)”‘, and even ‗how “the 𝜙” works‘. There seems to me to be a genuine puzzle 
here, not unrelated to the one Russell is discussing in the Gray‘s Elegy passages. 
(Neale 2005: 817-18n., bold emphasis added) 
 
Now it is true that the various descriptions Neale offers are all, on Russell‘s view, 
empty. And if Russell‘s aim in OD really were to give an account of the way ‗the 𝜙‘ 
bears on propositional content, then the fact that the description ‗the way ―the 𝜙‖ bears 
                                                 
36
 Elsewhere in his paper Neale‘s expresses himself in a way compatible with my interpretation of 
Russell. My claim is not that Neale is consistently wrong on this matter, but rather that the issue is not 
clearly addressed—indeed most often missed—and that, as such, there is a tendency to equivocate. Neale 
is not alone here: the same phenomenon occurs elsewhere in the literature (cf. n. 34).  
114 
 
on propositional content‘ is empty would be puzzling (though I doubt the puzzle has 
anything to do with the Gray‘s Elegy passages). But as I have stressed, Russell‘s aim is 
not to provide a ‗theory of how descriptions bear on propositional content‘. What he 
provides is a method for applying an SR-interpretive analysis to any sentence 
containing a denoting phrase. To ask after the contribution of some particular phrase to 
the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it occurs, is to be more in tune with 
the Russell of PoM than OD. It is to engage with a ‗picture of analysis [. . . ] which will 
go word by word, or phrase by phrase, rather than sentence by sentence‘—this quotation 
is from Hylton (2005c: 164), describing analysis in PoM. I suggested above (§3.1) that 
some contemporary philosophers of language are in certain respects closer to the 
Russell of PoM than the Russell of OD. This, I would suggest, is one of those 
respects.
37
 
 
4. The Theory of Descriptions 
The conclusions of the previous section were these. Analysis in PoM had been primarily 
a matter of breaking down (decomposing) a sentence to its constituents, and then 
pairing each of them up with a constituent of the proposition expressed by that sentence. 
OD brings with it significant changes. In endorsing the fundamental principle of OD—
that denoting phrases are incomplete symbols having no meaning in isolation from the 
sentential contexts in which they occur—Russell commits himself to the view that the 
kind of decompositional analysis at work in PoM must be preceded by a stage of SR-
interpretive analysis. This stage of analysis will take a sentence containing a denoting 
phrase and reformulate it, thereby attributing to it a radically different structure, and 
eliminating the incomplete symbols occurring therein. Russell should therefore be seen 
as offering, in OD, a theory of the analysis of the sentences in which denoting phrases 
occur, rather than of the denoting phrases themselves, considered in isolation. Let us 
turn now to the details of that theory. 
 
                                                 
37
 Throughout the puzzle Neale, in effect, gives vent to a kind of bewilderment: after all, the description 
(𝑖) seems a perfectly standard description for a philosopher to ponder. To an extent I share this sense of 
bewilderment. However, what is really bewildering (I suspect) is not so much that Russell should endorse 
the view that I attribute to him (on which the puzzle is not genuine), but that his work should be at such a 
remove from contemporary concerns in the philosophy of language. 
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Russell takes as ‗ultimate‘ and ‗fundamental‘ the notions of the variable and of a 
propositional function C(𝑥) being true for all values of 𝑥 (OD: 42).38 He then offers the 
following contextual definitions of the most primitive denoting phrases ‗everything‘, 
‗nothing‘ and ‗something‘ (OD: 42): 
 
(𝑖) 𝐶(everything)  . . . ‗𝐶(𝑥) is always true‘; 
(𝑖𝑖) 𝐶(nothing)  . . . ‗―𝐶(𝑥) is false‖ is always true‘; 
(𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝐶(something)  . . .  ‗It is false that ―𝐶(𝑥) is false‖ is always 
     true. 
 
Moving to less primitive denoting phrases, and taking the predicate human to 
define the class of men, Russell offers the following contextual definitions (OD: 43-4): 
 
(𝑖𝑣) ‗𝐶(all men)‘  . . . ‗If 𝑥 is human, then 𝐶(𝑥) is true‘ is always 
true; 
(𝑣) ‗𝐶(no men)‘  . . . ‗If 𝑥 is human, then 𝐶(𝑥) is false‘ is always 
true; 
(𝑣𝑖) ‗𝐶(some men)‘ . . . same as ‗𝐶(a man)‘; 
(𝑣𝑖𝑖) ‗𝐶(a man)‘  . . . It is false that ‗𝐶(𝑥) and 𝑥 is human‘ is 
     always false; 
(𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖) ‗𝐶(every man)‘ . . . same as ‗𝐶(all men)‘. 
 
(Russell‘s switching, in (𝑣𝑖𝑖), from ‗is always true‘ to ‗is always false‘ is sloppy but 
ultimately unproblematic.) 
 
Sentences containing definite descriptions are the subject of the bulk of OD. Their 
interpretation is not, in essentials, very different from the above. 
 
(𝑖𝑥) ‗𝐶(the man)‘  . . .  It is false that ‗𝑥 is human and 𝐶(𝑥), and it 
     is always true of 𝑦 that if 𝑦 is human, 𝑦 is 
     identical to 𝑥’ is always false.39 
 
More informally, Russell would later express this by saying that the sentence ‗the 
author of Waverley was Scotch‘ ‗involves‘ the following claims (IMP: 177): 
                                                 
38
 In taking the variable as fundamental Russell assumes the notion of generality. This notion had also 
been assumed in PoM, where the logical relation of denoting is taken as fundamental. Cf. n. 3 above; also 
Chapter One, §4.2.2. 
39
 Recovered from OD: 43-4. 
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(a) ―𝑥 wrote Waverley‖ is not always false; 
(b) ―if 𝑥 and 𝑦 wrote Waverley, 𝑥 and 𝑦 are identical‖ is always true; 
(c) ―if 𝑥 wrote Waverley, 𝑥 was Scotch‖ is always true. 
 
This is perhaps clearer, but it should be remembered that although the proposition 
expressed ‗involves‘ (in some sense of this word) these individual claims, it contains a 
single propositional function (rather than three distinct propositional functions 
conjoined). Commentators are not generally particularly clear on this point. Hylton, for 
example, attributes to Russell the claim that ‗the President of the USA in 1999 is a 
Democrat‘ expresses a proposition which says, of the property being President of the 
USA in 1999, 
 
that one and only one thing satisfies it or falls under it (and that thing is a 
democrat). That is how it gets to be (indirectly) about Bill Clinton: by being 
(directly) about a property which he and only he satisfies. (Hylton 2005d: 202-
203)
40
 
41
 
 
But compare the following two Russellian claims: 
 
There are, in the last analysis, only two things that can be done with a 
propositional function: one is to assert that it is true in all cases, the other to 
assert that it is true in at least one case, or in some cases. (IMP: 158) 
 
When we say ‗there are men,‘ that means that the propositional function ‗𝑥 is a 
man‘ is sometimes true. When we say ‗some men are Greeks,‘ that means that 
the propositional function ‗𝑥 is a man and a Greek‘ is sometimes true. (IMP: 
159) 
 
                                                 
40
 See also Jacquette & Griffin 2009: 7; and Lackey in Russell 1973: 19. 
41
 I hope I am not unfair to Hylton here. The passage seems to me to imply that Hylton attributes to 
Russell the following view: that ‗the President of the USA in 1999 is a Democrat‘ says of the property 
being President of the USA in 1999 that one thing falls under it, and that, whatever that thing is, it also 
falls under the property being a democrat. Whereas Russell‘s view as I understand it is that ‗the President 
of the USA in 1999 is a Democrat‘ says of the property uniquely being President of the USA in 1999 and 
being a Democrat that at least one entity falls under it. 
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It follows that when we say ‗the President of the USA in 1999 is a Democrat‘, we assert 
a proposition to the effect that the propositional function ‗𝑥 and nothing else is a 
President of the USA in 1999, and 𝑥 is a Democrat‘ is true in at least one case.42 
 
This is important because it forces the conclusion that in a sentence of the form 
(1a), the predicate expression ‗is 𝐺‘ functions in a manner analogous to an incomplete 
symbol.  
 
(1a) Some 𝐹 is 𝐺. 
 
The explanation is as follows. According to the theory of descriptions (1a) expresses a 
proposition whose form is more nearly captured by (1b) (locutions (𝑖)-(𝑖𝑥) are 
cumbersome so I employ more familiar notation): 
 
(1b) (∃𝑥)(𝐹𝑥 & 𝐺𝑥) 
 
The propositional function occurring in (1b)—𝐹𝑥  & 𝐺𝑥 —is too complex to be a 
plausible candidate for the propositional complement of the predicate ‗is 𝐺‘. But what 
else could plausibly be the predicate‘s propositional complement? The predicate has no 
propositional complement here, though it will have one when its union with a genuine 
proper name forms a sentence. In reflection of this ambiguity, we might term predicate 
expressions ‗quasi-incomplete symbols‘. 
 
Although this is an unfamiliar way of looking at things, it is actually to be expected. 
Compare the following sentences (and take ‗Socrates‘ to be a genuine proper name): 
 
(2) Socrates is Greek. 
(3) The teacher of Plato is Greek. 
 
The removal of ‗Socrates‘ from (2), corresponds to the removal of one of the 
constituents of the proposition (2) expresses—namely Socrates; and removing Socrates 
from ⟨2⟩ (i.e. the proposition expressed by (2)) leaves behind (so to speak) the 
                                                 
42
 I ignore that fact that, as I have phrased it, the propositional function here contains denoting phrases (‗a 
President of the USA in 1999‘, ‗a Democrat‘): this is an accident of English. 
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propositional constituent corresponding to the predicate expression. But because 
denoting phrases are incomplete symbols, the removal of ‗The teacher of Plato‘ from (3) 
does not correspond to the removal of one of the constituents of ⟨3⟩. Hence the predicate 
‗is Greek‘, as it occurs in (3), cannot be made to correspond to what is left over when 
the propositional complement of the description is removed from ⟨3⟩—for there is no 
such thing. (A similar kind of procedure is implemented by G. E. Moore. He argues for 
the claim that descriptions are incomplete symbols (at least sometimes) by noting that if 
we remove ‗is wise‘ from ‗the king of France is wise‘, and then from ‗there is 
somebody or other of whom it is true that he is a king of France, that nobody else is so, 
and that he is wise‘, we do not end up with two expressions having the same meaning 
(Moore 1951: 219ff).) 
 
A simple informal argument will serve to bring out the point. Suppose we have a 
sentence ‗𝐴𝐵‘, composed of two subsentential expressions ‗𝐴‘ and ‗𝐵‘, where ‗𝐴‘ is an 
incomplete symbol. And suppose that ‗𝐴𝐵‘ expresses a proposition ⟨𝑋𝑌𝑍⟩ composed of 
three constituents 𝑋, 𝑌, and 𝑍. Since ‗𝐴‘ is an incomplete symbol, none of 𝑋, 𝑌, or 𝑍, 
nor any combination of them, is its propositional complement. Let us now ask: Could 
‗𝐵‘ have a propositional complement? We will find that it could not. For suppose it did 
have a propositional complement, the compound 𝑌𝑍 say. Nothing would stop us 
assigning 𝑋, the remaining constituent of the proposition, as the propositional 
complement of ‗𝐴‘. But that would contradict the assumption that ‗𝐴‘ is an incomplete 
symbol. Hence it follows that either the propositional complement of ‗𝐵‘ is the entire 
proposition ⟨𝑋𝑌𝑍⟩, so that there is nothing ‗left over‘ for ‗𝐴‘ to correspond to, or ‗𝐵‘ 
has no propositional complement and is a quasi-incomplete symbol. The first option is 
intolerable, hence we conclude that ‗𝐵‘ is a quasi-incomplete symbol. 
 
On the interpretation that I am proposing, Russell has a slightly strange view of the 
relation between the surface grammatical form of a sentence and logical form of the 
proposition it expresses. On my interpretation, Russell holds that in a sentence of the 
form ‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ the definite description is an incomplete symbol and the predicate 
expression a quasi-incomplete symbol; hence the relation between the syntactic 
properties of the sentence and the logical properties of the proposition become a little 
obscure: logical properties cannot, for example, be simply ‗read off‘ from the sentence‘s 
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grammatical properties, and we cannot legitimately ask after the contribution of either 
the subject or predicate expressions, without inducing Neale‘s puzzle from above. These 
consequences are unexpected, but I would cite a mitigating factor. The reason they are 
unexpected is arguably at least partly due to the tendency of the analytical tradition to 
pay insufficient attention to its own history. Russell‘s great insights in this area have 
been influential in virtue of having been put to work in subsequent philosophy. Their 
origins and original purpose have not been the main focus of attention; almost 
inevitably, contemporary analytical philosophers see the theory of descriptions through 
contemporary analytical philosophers‘ eyes. Hence any interpretation according to 
which Russell‘s familiar old theory of descriptions is cast as unfamiliar and somewhat 
remote from contemporary concerns is liable to strike us unexpected. 
  
If it follows from Russell‘s official view that predicate expressions are quasi-
incomplete symbols, and so ambiguous
43
, this would seem to provide a compelling 
reason for contemporary philosophers of language to modify Russell‘s theory. In a 
compositional semantics of natural language it would be better if predicate expressions 
were not ambiguous in this way. The modification is easily effected through the 
introduction of restricted quantifiers (see e.g. Neale 1990; 1993)—though it is never 
introduced on the grounds that I am recommending. As discussed below, Neale claims 
that his employment of restricted quantifiers is a matter of choice (1990: 45). But as I 
see it, the modification is in fact forced. This being so, contemporary philosophers of 
language endorse a theory which differs from Russell‘s official version in a noteworthy 
respect. This, we shall see in Chapter Five, is of some consequence. For the theory as 
modified by contemporary philosophers of language is in fact unable to provide the 
support that the ‗substitutional theory‘ requires. Thus Russell‘s attempts to use the 
theory of descriptions to disarm the paradoxes relies upon his employment of the 
original, official version of the theory, rather than the modified version. 
 
Neale claims that to cast the theory in terms of restricted quantifiers extends its 
range of application by allowing for the treatment of determiners, such as ‗most‘, which 
otherwise resist interpretation. He says that to do so: 
 
                                                 
43
 Ambiguous because they interact differently with denoting phrases and (genuine) proper names. 
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would not be to present an alternative to the Theory of Descriptions; it would be 
to choose a language other than that of Principia Mathematica in which to state 
and apply the theory. (Neale 1990: 45) 
 
But it is not really the language in which we express the theory that is at issue. What is 
at issue is the logical form of the proposition expressed by a sentence of the form 
 
(4) The 𝐹 is 𝐺. 
 
For Russell the logical form involves a certain propositional function and the assertion 
that it is sometimes true. As we might put it: 
 
(4R) (∃𝑥)(𝐹𝑥 & (𝑦)(𝐹𝑦  𝑦 = 𝑥) & 𝐺𝑥) 
 
Whereas, for Neale, the logical form is this: 
 
(4N) [the 𝑥: 𝐹𝑥](𝐺𝑥) 
 
These are equivalent (Neale 1990: 45). But—to make the point informally—(4N) 
appears to say that something is 𝐺 (namely whatever is uniquely 𝐹), while (4R) says that 
something is uniquely-𝐹 and 𝐺. That is to say, it appears to be the case that Neale 
sanctions the representation of the logical form of (4) as, in effect, ‗𝐺(the 𝐹)‘—at least 
as a preliminary to the more accurate (4N). This reflects that fact, mentioned a couple of 
times above, that in some respects, contemporary philosophy of language is closer to the 
Russell of PoM than the Russell of OD. Or to put the same point another way: (4R) 
reflects, but (4N) does not reflect, the fact that the predicate ‗is 𝐺‘ is a quasi-incomplete 
symbol. This poses a kind of dilemma. On the one hand, it may be that (4N) is requiring 
further analysis, which will yield something of the form of (4R). (I take it that this is 
Neale‘s position, though he would not necessarily use the notation of (4R).) But if so, 
the problem raised by the ambiguity of predicate expressions remains. Yet if, on the 
other hand, (4N) does not require further analysis, then though the problem of the 
ambiguity of predicate expressions is resolved, Neale‘s theory differs significantly from 
Russell‘s. The point, let me stress, is not that there is anything wrong with Neale‘s 
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theory
44
, but simply that—to the extent that it relieves the worry about the ambiguity of 
predicates—it is not Russell‘s. 
 
I raise this point concerning Neale‘s position for two reasons. Firstly, it is, I think, 
independently quite interesting. Secondly, in drawing out the reason why his position is 
not obviously Russell‘s, we sharpen our understanding of Russell‘s position. Let us 
continue by considering a response one might pursue. One might claim that even if I am 
correct that (4R) and (4N) express (by Russell‘s standards) different propositions, Neale 
nonetheless preserves enough of what is distinctive about Russell‘s view for his theory 
to count as a modification of, rather than an alternative to, Russell‘s theory. After all, 
descriptions are still, on Neale‘s view, incomplete symbols, or so he claims. 
 
As against this, Bernard Linsky claims that while Russell, in treating denoting 
phrases as incomplete symbols, denies that descriptions contribute anything to the 
logical forms of the sentences in which they occur, Neale (1990) holds that descriptions 
do contribute to logical form (Linsky 1992: 681). If so, it would seem that Neale does 
not honour Russell‘s fundamental principle of OD, that denoting phrases are incomplete 
symbols. Now in a certain sense, Linsky may be correct that on Neale‘s view 
descriptions do contribute to logical form; but given the very different conceptions of 
logical form employed by Neale and Russell, it is not clear that this could be used as the 
basis for a compelling objection that Neale fails to treat descriptions as incomplete 
symbols.
45
 Neale provides an example in demonstration of the point. Consider the 
sentence ‗the king likes Russell‘. The theory of descriptions, cast in terms of restricted 
quantifiers, predicts the following logical form: 
 
(5N) [the king 𝑥](𝑥 likes Russell) 
 
Neale writes: 
 
                                                 
44
 Neale‘s position is undoubtedly better suited to the semantics of natural language than is Russell‘s 
official position. One may, of course, take an entirely un-Russellian view of the role of definite 
descriptions in natural language, rejecting both Neale‘s and Russell‘s positions. 
45
 I am inclined to think that Linsky‘s discussion of the relation between Neale‘s conception of logical 
form and the Russellian notion of proposition is quite good. Given the general tenor of Neale‘s response 
to it however, he may not agree (Neale 1993: 90-2). 
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The variable ―𝑥‖ occupies the ―subject position‖ of the formula ―(𝑥 likes 
Russell)‖ and, so to speak, marks the position upon which the quantifier 
operates, the position that, in effect, represents the spot the quantifier occupies in 
surface syntax. [. . .] Now there is a sense in which the variable in (5N) might be 
thought of as complete-with-respect-to-a-sequence by virtue of standing for an 
object in its own relativized way [. . .]. But however you look at it, the quantifier 
―[the king 𝑥]‖ that binds the variable is an incomplete symbol. It doesn‘t even 
purport to stand for an object, not even when relativized to a sequence. (Neale 
1993: 92-3)
46
 
 
As a response to Linsky‘s charge, this is compelling. But it will be of no use in response 
to the objection I have raised. I have argued that Neale fails to honour Russell‘s 
commitment to the fundamental principle of OD by failing to recognise that, in a 
sentence of the form ‗det 𝐹 is 𝐺‘, it is not only the denoting phrase that lacks a 
propositional complement. For Russell, sentences of the forms ‗det 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ and ‗𝑎 is 𝐺‘ 
(taking ‗𝑎‘ as a genuine singular term) express propositions having radically different 
forms: in particular, they do not both predicate 𝐺-ness. Neale‘s interpretation of the 
theory does not reflect this view.
47
 
 
Neale, it seems to me, runs together interpretive and decompositional analysis in a 
way that the Russell of OD does not. Neale‘s analysis has to be (to some extent) 
decompositional in the first instance precisely because—unlike Russell—his project is 
that of compositional semantics: he has to take a sentence of natural language, break it 
down to its constituent expressions, and then show how the meaning of the whole can 
be recovered from the meaning of its parts and the way they are arranged. In relation to 
his project, it is entirely appropriate to enquire after the denotation of such descriptions 
as he ponders in the puzzle discussed above (i.e. ‗the way ―the 𝜙‖ bears on 
propositional content‘, and so on). There is a puzzle here for Neale—one that his use of 
restricted quantifiers solves quite neatly. But there is, as we saw, no puzzle for Russell. 
Why? Because what he aims to provide is not an account of the way descriptions bear 
on propositional content, but an SR-interpretive analysis of any sentential context in 
which a denoting phrase occurs. As we shall see in Chapter Five, it is important for 
                                                 
46
 I have made very minor alterations to Neale‘s notation and numbering. 
47
 In the preface to Descriptions (1990: ix) Neale claims to be defending the central theses of OD. I claim 
that the central theses of OD include a commitment to the primacy of SR-interpretive analysis. Neale does 
not, I claim, defend this aspect of Russell view (and nor should he, given his purposes). 
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Russell‘s purposes that his theory works in just the way it does: the modified theory at 
work in philosophy of language would not be suitable for these purposes. 
 
5. The Three Logical Puzzles and the Notion of Scope 
In OD Russell sets out three logical puzzles which an adequate theory of denoting will 
solve (OD: 47-8). It is sometimes thought that the puzzles are intended as either 
evidence in favour of Russell‘s view or part of an objection to rival theories. As against 
the first disjunct it should be noted that the puzzles merely present a condition of 
adequacy for theories of denoting: a theory that does not solve them is not fit for 
purpose. But the fact that a theory does solve them is not, in itself, evidence that that 
theory is to be endorsed. So the evidence in favour of Russell‘s view is not simply that 
it solves the puzzles—Frege‘s theory does this too—but is rather: 
 
derived from the difficulties which seem unavoidable if we regard denoting 
phrases as standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal 
expressions they occur. (OD: 45) 
 
That is, the evidence for Russell‘s theory is that those theories based upon the denial of 
the fundamental principle of OD face unavoidable difficulties. Meinong‘s, he will 
argue, leads straightforwardly to contradiction; while Frege‘s—and so by extension the 
theory of denoting concepts and the theory of meaning and denotation—leads to the 
‗inextricable tangle‘ of the GEA. The theory of descriptions wins by default as it were, 
as the last man standing. 
 
If the main argument against Frege is the GEA, then the role of the puzzles in OD 
becomes puzzling in itself. Being placed immediately after the initial criticism of 
Frege‘s view (OD: 46-7), they seem to be part of the objection to Frege (and possibly 
Meinong too)—which is what the second of the two disjuncts above attests. However, 
the paragraph that introduces them (beginning: ‗A logical theory may be tested...‘ (OD: 
47)) makes no mention of Frege, and gives no indication that they form part of an 
objection to anybody‘s view. This is, then, rather strange, if the puzzles form part of an 
objection to Frege. 
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It could be that all criticism of Frege‘s view stops where the puzzles begin. This is 
the view of Michael Kremer (1994), who uses the positioning of the puzzles to motivate 
the claim that Frege is not targeted by the GEA. But Kremer‘s view is extremely 
implausible, for textual evidence makes it overwhelmingly likely that the GEA targets 
both Frege and the theory of denoting concepts.
48
 The correct interpretation is, I think, 
that the puzzles are not explicitly intended to form part of an objection to Frege. 
Admittedly this makes the placement of the puzzles strange indeed, but we might 
speculate that there is a rather sad reason for this. It is likely that Russell wrote OD in 
just 12 days towards the end of July 1905. We know also that his close friend Theodore 
Llewelyn Davies—one of the first friends he made at Cambridge—died on the 25th in a 
freak accident.
49
 No surprise then if the article is less well-structured than it could have 
been (and no surprise either that the GEA could stand a re-write or two). 
 
So the puzzles are not, I think, explicitly intended as part of an objection to Frege, 
or anyone else. They are, rather, intended to present a condition of adequacy for theories 
of denoting: a way of testing such theories. I will discuss the initial objections to 
Meinong and Frege in §6. For now I set out the solution of the puzzles by the theory of 
descriptions. 
 
The first puzzle concerns the substitution of co-referring expressions, though it is 
phrased in terms of the substitution of entities in propositions (rather than expressions in 
sentences) (OD: 47-8). If 𝑎 and 𝑏 are identical then whatever is true of one is true of the 
other; and substituting one for the other in a proposition should not alter the truth value 
of that proposition. Since George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of 
Waverley, and since Scott was the author of Waverley, we seem to be able to infer that 
George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. But this is presumably false. 
George IV did not wish to know anything about Scott‘s self-identity. As Russell puts it, 
‗an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of 
Europe‘ (OD: 48).50 
 
                                                 
48
 This is discussed more fully in Chapter Four. 
49
 Urquhart 1994. 
50
 Attributing an interest in the law of identity to the first gentleman of Europe is not, by Russell‘s 
standards, the same as attributing such an interest to George IV. This is nit-picking of course. 
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On Frege‘s view the puzzle is avoided because, in intensional contexts, only 
substitutions of expressions having the same meaning (Sinn) are guaranteed to be truth-
preserving. ‗Scott‘ and ‗the author of Waverley‘ express different meanings (Sinne), 
hence the substitution of one for the other is truth-preserving only in extensional 
contexts. Or, to engage with Russell‘s statement of the puzzle, Frege denies that the 
propositional complements of ‗Scott‘ and ‗the author of Waverley‘ are identical; so 
Leibniz‘s Law does not come into it, and the puzzle cannot get off the ground. The 
theory of descriptions also denies that ‗Scott‘ and ‗the author of Waverley‘ have 
identical propositional complements—though unlike Frege‘s view, it denies that ‗the 
author of Waverley‘ has a propositional complement at all. Again then, Leibniz‘s Law 
does not come into it, and the puzzle cannot get started. 
 
Although the denial that ‗Scott‘ and ‗the author of Waverley‘ have the same 
propositional complement suffices to defuse the puzzle, one may be left unsatisfied. For 
surely there is a sense in which George IV, by virtue of wishing to know whether the 
author of Waverley was Scott, did wish to know whether Scott was identical to Scott. 
Admittedly he would not have raised the question in those terms; but, to take an 
example of Russell‘s, had he seen Scott from a distance George IV might well have 
wondered ‗is that Scott?‘ (OD: 52). 
 
Frege‘s response holds up here, for he can deny that ‗Scott‘ has the same 
propositional complement as ‗that‘ (or whatever referring expression is chosen). But 
Russell, for whom, co-referring expressions—such as ‗Scott‘ and, in the example, 
‗that‘—do have the same propositional complement, must find another way.51 The 
solution invokes the distinction between ‗primary‘ and ‗secondary‘ occurrences, or 
‗scope permutations‘. According to Russell (OD: 52), sentence (6) is strictly ambiguous 
between two readings. 
 
(6) George IV wished to know whether Scott is the author of Waverley. 
 
It could be taken to mean something like: 
 
                                                 
51
 Again I make the un-Russellian assumption that ‗Scott‘ and ‗that‘ (as used in the example envisaged) 
are genuine singular terms referring to Scott. 
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(6a) One and only one man wrote Waverley: George IV wished to know 
whether that man was Scott. 
 
But normally (or so Russell claims
52
) we take it to mean something along these lines: 
 
(6b) George IV wished to know whether: one and only one man wrote 
Waverley and Scott was that man. 
 
Sentence (6a) results from according the description in (6) what Russell calls a ‗primary 
occurrence‘—‗wide scope‘53. On this reading, (6) is taken to have a subject-predicate 
grammatical form, ‗𝐺(the 𝑊)‘, where ‗𝐺‘ is the predicate ‗George IV wished to know 
whether 𝜉 is identical to Scott‘, and ‗𝑊‘ the predicate ‗𝜉 wrote Waverley‘. We then 
apply SR-interpretive analysis, eliminating the description from this sentence (OD: 52), 
moving from the subject-predicate form ‗𝐺(the 𝑊)‘ to the existential quantification 
(6a′): 
 
(6a′) (∃𝑥)(𝑊𝑥 & (𝑦)(𝑊𝑦  𝑦 = 𝑥) & 𝐺𝑥) 
 
That is: there is an 𝑥 such that 𝑥 wrote Waverley, only 𝑥 wrote Waverley, and George IV 
wished to know whether 𝑥 is identical to Scott. Or as Russell puts it: ‗George IV wished 
to know, concerning the man who in fact wrote Waverley, whether he was Scott‘ (OD: 
52). This seems to capture the intuition that, in a certain sense, George IV did wish to 
know, of Scott, whether he was identical to Scott. 
  
In (6b) on the other hand, the description from (6) has been accorded a ‗secondary 
occurrence‘—‗narrow scope‘54. On this reading, (6) is taken to have the subject-
predicate form, ‗𝐺(𝑠 = the 𝑊)‘, where ‗𝐺‘ is the predicate ‗George IV wished to know 
whether 𝜉 is true‘, ‗𝑠‘ is Scott, and ‗𝑊‘ is the predicate ‗𝜉 wrote Waverley‘. We then 
apply the SR-interpretive analysis, eliminating the description from the subordinate 
sentence ‗𝑠 = the 𝑊‘, concluding that (6b) asserts that George IV wished to know 
                                                 
52
 Russell must be wrong here. A Strawsonian view is far more plausible: we normally intend a version of 
(6a), though what occurs to the left of the colon is presupposed rather than asserted. See Strawson (1950). 
53
 More precisely, wider scope than the verb of propositional attitude. 
54
 More precisely, narrower scope than the verb of propositional attitude.  
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whether (∃𝑥)(𝑊𝑥 & (𝑦)(𝑊𝑦  𝑦 = 𝑥) & 𝑠 = 𝑥) is true.55 That is: ‗George IV wished 
to know whether one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott was that man‘ (OD: 
52). 
 
Scope permutations are also called upon in response to the second puzzle (stated at 
OD: 48). For any well-formed declarative sentence, either it or its negation is true (but 
not both). But consider the sentence ‗the present King of France is bald‘. By the 
aforementioned principle, one might suppose that either it or ‗the present King of 
France is not bald‘ must be true. Yet since there is neither a bald present King of France 
nor a hairy one, neither sentence is true. 
 
The sentence ‗the present King of France is bald‘ is analysed thus:56 
 
(7) The present King of France is bald. 
(∃𝑥)(𝐾𝑥 & (𝑦)(𝐾𝑦  𝑦 = 𝑥) & 𝐵𝑥) 
 
But there are two ways of denying (7) according as the description is afforded wide or 
narrow scope relative to the negation. Giving it wide scope (a primary occurrence), the 
denial of (7) is: 
 
(7a) The present King of France is not-bald. 
(∃𝑥)(𝐾𝑥 & (𝑦)(𝐾𝑦  𝑦 = 𝑥) & 𝐵𝑥) 
 
This is the reading that seems to give rise to the puzzle, for (7a) is false. But if the 
description is given narrow scope (a secondary occurrence), the denial of (7) is: 
 
(7b) It is not the case that: the present King of France is bald. 
(∃𝑥)(𝐾𝑥 & (𝑦)(𝐾𝑦  𝑦 = 𝑥) & 𝐵𝑥) 
 
                                                 
55
 A knowledge of the notation of elementary logic can no more be attributed to the first gentleman of 
Europe than can an interest in the law of identity. I merely intend to indicate the structure of the 
proposition he entertains, according to Russell‘s theory. 
56
 Taking ‗𝐾𝑥‘ as ‗𝑥 is presently King of France‘ and ‗𝐵𝑥‘ as ‗𝑥 is bald‘. 
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This sentence, which denies the existence of a bald present King of France, is true. 
Hence one of ‗the present King of France is bald‘ or its denial is true if the denial is read 
as (7b). The puzzle is thus resolved. Notice, however, that a similar response is open 
to Frege. Maintaining that the definite description is a singular term, he can trade on the 
ambiguity between internal and external negation, denying either the predicate (yielding 
either the False or a truth-value gap) or the sentence (yielding the True). 
 
The final puzzle, concerning denials of being (OD: 48), does not require the notion 
of scope. If there is no difference between A and B, then we may say ‗the difference 
between A and B does not subsist‘. But if this sentence is true, its subject expression 
picks out nothing of which the predicate can be predicated. Meinong is prepared to bite 
the bullet and accord a kind of ontological status to the non-subsistent difference 
between A and B. This solution is to be avoided however (cf. §6 below). Russell‘s 
solution is familiar. To affirm the subsistence of the 𝐹 (i.e. the difference between 𝐴 and 
𝐵) is not to attribute some particular thing with a certain property (subsistence), but 
rather to assert that a certain propositional function is true for at least one value. Hence 
to deny the being of something is to assert that no value of a certain propositional 
function is true—that is, to express a proposition of the form ‗(∃𝑥)(𝐹𝑥 & (𝑦)(𝐹𝑦  𝑦 
= 𝑥)).57 Again, a similar Fregean response is available. Subsistence, existence, and so on 
are not taken to be properties of objects, but of concepts (cf. Frege 2007: §53). The 
sentence ‗the difference between 𝐴 and 𝐵 does not subsist‘ thus affirms that the concept 
difference between 𝐴 and 𝐵 is null. 
 
Russell‘s theory thus provides elegant solutions to the three puzzles.58 But other 
theories—notably Frege‘s—offer solutions too, and hence appear to have something 
going for them. Russell‘s initial objections to rival views will be discussed in the 
following section. The major objection presented in OD—the GEA—must wait until 
Chapter Four. 
 
                                                 
57
 Notice how in his explanation of the solution Russell freely employs the loose use of ‗denotation‘ 
discussed above (§2): ‗according to the meaning of denotation lately explained, ―the difference between 𝐴 
and 𝐵‖ has a denotation when 𝐴 and 𝐵 differ, but not otherwise‘ (OD: 53). 
58
 It should not be supposed that Russell‘s solutions to the puzzles are necessarily the best available. My 
intention has been to set out Russell‘s solutions, not to provide detailed assessment of them. 
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6. The Central Question of ‘On Denoting’ 
OD offers a theory of denoting. Such a theory will explain how it is that a sentence 
containing a denoting phrase comes to be about whatever it is about (understanding 
‗about‘ in the broad sense). As such we may frame the central question of OD thus: 
 
 Central Question of OD: How is it that sentences containing denoting phrases 
come to be about whatever it is that they are about? 
 
OD offers the following response. Taking the ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ as an 
example, the Central Question asks how this sentence comes to be about Socrates. 
Russell‘s answer is that ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ is about Socrates in virtue of 
containing a denoting phrase that denotes him. The explanation of this use of ‗denotes‘ 
is as follows: 
 
if ‗𝐶‘ is a denoting phrase, it may happen that there is one entity 𝑥 (there cannot 
be more than one) for which the proposition ‗𝑥 is identical with 𝐶‘ is true [. . .]. 
We may then say that the entity 𝑥 is the denotation of the phrase „𝐶‟. Thus Scott 
is the denotation of ‗the author of Waverley‘. (OD: 51, emphasis added) 
 
To say that ‗the teacher of Plato‘ denotes Socrates is to say that the proposition 
expressed by (8) is true.
59
 
 
(8) (∃𝑥)(𝑇𝑥𝑝 & (𝑦)(𝑇𝑦𝑝  𝑦 = 𝑥) & 𝑥 = 𝑠) 
 
Thus ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ is about Socrates because the denoting phrase 
occurring therein denotes him. 
 
Crucially, Russell‘s answer to the Central Question relies upon the fundamental 
principle of OD: ‗the teacher of Plato‘ denotes Socrates, but neither Socrates nor 
anything else is its propositional complement. The theories to which Russell objects in 
OD all rely upon the denial of the fundamental principle. His strategy is thus to provide 
what amounts to an extended reductio of this denial, i.e. a reductio of the claim that 
every denoting phrase has a propositional complement of some kind. 
                                                 
59
 Taking ‗𝑇𝑥𝑦‘ as ‗𝑥 taught 𝑦‘, ‗𝑝‘ as ‗Plato‘, and ‗𝑠‘ as ‗Socrates‘. 
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The simplest such view is that the propositional complement of a description is the 
entity which, uniquely, satisfies its descriptive condition. A version of this position is 
attributed to Meinong, who endorses ‗the principle of the indifference of pure Objects to 
being‘ (Meinong 1904: 86). Russell objects to Meinong as follows: 
 
[Meinong‘s] theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as 
standing for an object. Thus ‗the present King of France‘, ‗the round square‘ 
etc., are supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not 
subsist, but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a 
difficult view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to 
infringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent 
present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is 
round, and also not round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can be 
found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred. (OD: 45) 
 
This is the core objection to Meinong.
60
 It is straightforward but has tended to be 
somewhat misunderstood.
61
 
 
Russell describes the view that the round square does not (even) subsist as ‗difficult 
in itself‘. He does not stop to explain, but no explanation is required: it just is difficult to 
make sense of something that neither exists nor subsists. This is not an objection so 
much as an observation. The objection is that, regardless of their ontological status, 
such objects generate contradictions. If being square implies not-being round, then the 
round square is both round and not-round; the existent present King of France exists but 
does not exist, and so on. Meinong granted all of this, but denied any contravention of 
the law of non-contradiction: such objects he held to be beyond its jurisdiction. Russell 
recognised this aspect of his view
62, but deemed it ‗intolerable‘ (OD: 45). Meinong‘s 
view is thus dismissed as wildly implausible.
63
 
                                                 
60
 Others have been extracted from OD (Farrell Smith (1985; 2005) notes five, however it strikes me that 
one has to really want to see them before they appear). 
61
 E.g. Sainsbury (1979: 102-3) goes wrong by attributing to Russell a misunderstanding of Meinong‘s 
position. 
62
 Cf. ‗such objects, admittedly, are apt to infringe the law of contradiction‘ (OD: 45 emphasis added). 
63
 Farrell Smith (2005: 147) argues that the objection in OD, being based on the law of contradiction, is 
distinctively logical, and thus independent of the later objections based on Russell‘s famously robust 
sense of reality. This interpretation is lent credence by casting the objection as a dispute concerning the 
scope of the law of contradiction: Russell is a universalist, Meinong is not. But even so, the objection is 
that curtailing the law‘s jurisdiction is intolerable. What makes it intolerable is surely that it conflicts with 
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Frege‘s theory differs from Meinong‘s in providing, as the propositional 
complement of a denoting phrase, not the entity satisfying the relevant descriptive 
condition, but a meaning (a Sinn: I will follow Russell‘s terminology). Thus the 
sentence ‗the King of England is bald‘ expresses a proposition containing the complex 
meaning <the King of England> and is about Edward VII in virtue of the logical 
relation holding between the former and the latter. On the present view, the proposition 
expressed by ‗the King of France is bald‘ ought to be about the entity denoted by the 
complex meaning <the King of France>. There is, however, no such denotation: what, 
then, is the proposition about? If it is about nothing at all, then surely the (pseudo-) 
sentence must be nonsensical (for it predicates baldness of... nothing at all). But, says 
Russell, it is certain that the sentence is not nonsense, ‗since it is plainly false‘ (OD: 46). 
 
This claim is famously challenged by Strawson (1950), who maintains that, faced 
with a sincere utterance of ‗the King of France is bald‘, one would not reply ‗that‘s 
untrue‘, and, if pushed, would probably decline to agree or disagree with the statement. 
Strawson‘s contention is sound, but since the Central Question of OD does not concern 
the responses likely to be elicited by utterances of sentences containing denoting 
phrases, it is unclear what relevance it has here.
64
 In any case, even if we tolerate a 
truth-value gap in the case of ‗the King of France is bald‘, we surely cannot in Russell‘s 
next example: 
 
consider such a proposition as the following: ‗If 𝑢 is a class which has only one 
member, then that one member is a member of 𝑢‘, or as we may state it, ‗If 𝑢 is a 
unit class, the 𝑢 is a 𝑢‘. This proposition ought to be always true. But ‗the 𝑢‘ is a 
denoting phrase, and it is the denotation, not the meaning, that is said to be a 𝑢. 
Now if 𝑢 is not a unit class, ‗the 𝑢‘ seems to denote nothing; hence our 
                                                                                                                                               
logical common sense, that it involves precisely the same ‗failure of that feeling for reality which ought to 
be preserved even in the most abstract studies‘ (IMP: 169) to which Russell was later to appeal. 
64
 I do not deny that Strawson‘s point is relevant to the question of the role of the theory of descriptions in 
the philosophy of language. It is sometimes suggested that the Russell of OD must have been concerned 
(to some extent) with natural language uses of descriptions, else he would not have responded so 
emphatically, in MSOR, to Strawson‘s criticisms. It should be noted however that in MSOR Russell points 
out the differences between his approach and Strawson‘s (e.g. ‗My theory of descriptions was never 
intended as an analysis of the state of mind of those who utter sentences containing descriptions‘ (MSOR: 
243)). 
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proposition would seem to become nonsense as soon as 𝑢 is not a unit class. 
(OD: 46)
65
 
 
He thus draws the conclusion that: 
 
we must either provide a denotation in cases in which it is at first sight absent, or 
we must abandon the view that the denotation is what is concerned in 
propositions which contain denoting phrases. (OD: 47) 
 
Russell himself endorses a version of the second disjunct. When a sentence contains an 
empty description, he will maintain that there is no entity that the proposition expressed 
is about. The Fregean response is to stipulate that all empty descriptions denote the null-
class, and that, in general, an improper definite description denotes the class of objects 
satisfying the descriptive condition.
66
 Therefore in the example given, if 𝑢 is not a unit 
class, but has more than one member, the sentence ‗the 𝑢 is a 𝑢‘ is not meaningless but 
false. This fixes the logical worry: every well-formed sentence containing a denoting 
phrase is assured a truth-value even if the denoting phrase is improper.
67
 Frege‘s 
treatment is certainly neat and tidy, yet Russell is surely right to object that ‗though it 
may not lead to actual logical error, [it] is plainly artificial, and does not give an exact 
analysis of the matter‘ (OD: 47). 
 
The charge here is certainly not decisive but, in conjunction with the presentation of 
the theory of descriptions, it presents a strong case. The objection, up to this point, is 
that Frege‘s answer to the Central Question of OD involves a certain amount of 
artificiality. In the GEA, however, Russell will make a far stronger claim: any theory 
whose answer to the Central Question invokes the distinction between, and logical 
relation of, the meaning and denotation of a denoting phrase is demonstrably 
incoherent. We turn now to that argument. 
 
                                                 
65
 One might object here that Russell equivocates over the use of ‗𝑢‘, using it differently in ‗if 𝑢 is a class‘ 
and ‗the 𝑢 is a 𝑢‘ 
66
 Cf. Frege 1964: §11; but compare his earlier treatment of ‗the greatest proper fraction‘ (Frege 2007: 
§74n.) 
67
 Notice however that on Frege‘s view the sentence in question is false, not true as one might suppose it 
should be. 
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4. The Gray’s Elegy Argument 
 
As the aim of this chapter is to provide an interpretation of the notorious „Gray‟s Elegy 
Argument‟ (GEA), it may be helpful to quote the argument, in its entirety, at the outset. 
The eight paragraphs are labelled „A‟ to „H‟, following the now standard practice 
(introduced by Blackburn & Code (1978)). 
 
The Gray’s Elegy Argument (OD: 48-51) 
(A) The relation of the meaning to the denotation involves certain rather curious 
difficulties, which seem in themselves sufficient to prove that the theory which 
leads to such difficulties must be wrong. 
 
(B) When we wish to speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase, as opposed to 
its denotation, the natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas. Thus we 
say: 
 
The centre of mass of the solar system is a point, not a denoting complex; 
‗The centre of mass of the solar system‘ is a denoting complex, not a point. 
 
Or again, 
 
The first line of Gray‘s Elegy states a proposition. 
‗The first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘ does not state a proposition. 
 
Thus taking any denoting phrase, say 𝐶, we wish to consider the relation 
between 𝐶 and ‗𝐶‘, where the difference of the two is of the kind exemplified in 
the above two instances. 
 
(C) We say, to begin with, that when 𝐶 occurs it is the denotation that we are 
speaking about; but when ‗𝐶‘ occurs, it is the meaning. Now the relation of 
meaning and denotation is not merely linguistic through the phrase: there must 
be a logical relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning 
denotes the denotation. But the difficulty which confronts us is that we cannot 
succeed in both preserving the connexion of meaning and denotation and 
preventing them from being one and the same; also that the meaning cannot be 
got at except by means of denoting phrases. This happens as follows. 
 
(D) The one phrase 𝐶 was to have both meaning and denotation. But if we speak of 
‗the meaning of 𝐶‘, that gives us the meaning (if any) of the denotation. ‗The 
meaning of the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘ is the same as ‗The meaning of ―The 
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curfew tolls the knell of parting day‖,‘ and is not the same as ‗The meaning of 
―the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‖.‘ Thus in order to get the meaning we want, we 
must speak not of ‗the meaning of 𝐶‘, but of ‗the meaning of ―𝐶‖,‘ which is the 
same as ‗𝐶‘ by itself. Similarly ‗the denotation of 𝐶‘ does not mean the 
denotation we want, but means something which, if it denotes at all, denotes 
what is denoted by the denotation we want. For example, let ‗𝐶‘ be ‗the denoting 
complex occurring in the second of the above instances‘. Then 
 
𝐶 = ‗the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘, and 
 
the denotation of 𝐶 = The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. But what we 
meant to have as the denotation was ‗the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘. Thus we 
have failed to get what we wanted.  
 
(E) The difficulty in speaking of the meaning of a denoting complex may be stated 
thus: The moment we put the complex in a proposition, the proposition is about 
the denotation; and if we make a proposition in which the subject is ‗the 
meaning of 𝐶‘, then the subject is the meaning (if any) of the denotation, which 
was not intended. This leads us to say that, when we distinguish meaning and 
denotation, we must be dealing with the meaning: the meaning has denotation 
and is a complex, and there is not something other than the meaning, which can 
be called the complex, and be said to have both meaning and denotation. The 
right phrase, on the view in question, is that some meanings have denotations. 
 
(F) But this only makes our difficulty in speaking of meanings more evident. For 
suppose 𝐶 is our complex; then we are to say that 𝐶 is the meaning of the 
complex. Nevertheless, whenever 𝐶 occurs without inverted commas, what is 
said is not true of the meaning, but only of the denotation, as when we say: The 
centre of mass of the solar system is a point. Thus to speak of 𝐶 itself, i.e., to 
make a proposition about the meaning, our subject must not be 𝐶, but something 
which denotes 𝐶. Thus ‗𝐶‘, which is what we use when we want to speak of the 
meaning, must be not the meaning, but something which denotes the meaning. 
And 𝐶 must not be a constituent of this complex (as it is of ‗the meaning of 𝐶‘); 
for if 𝐶 occurs in the complex, it will be its denotation, not its meaning, that will 
occur, and there is no backward road from denotations to meanings, because 
every object can be denoted by an infinite number of different denoting phrases.  
 
(G) Thus it would seem that ‗𝐶‘ and 𝐶 are different entities, such that ‗𝐶‘ denotes 𝐶; 
but this cannot be an explanation, because the relation of ‗𝐶‘ to 𝐶 remains 
wholly mysterious; and where are we to find the denoting complex ‗𝐶‘ which is 
to denote 𝐶? Moreover, when 𝐶 occurs in a proposition, it is not only the 
denotation that occurs (as we shall see in the next paragraph); yet, on the view in 
question, 𝐶 is only the denotation, the meaning being wholly relegated to ‗𝐶‘. 
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This is an inextricable tangle, and seems to prove that the whole distinction of 
meaning and denotation has been wrongly conceived. 
 
(H) That the meaning is relevant when a denoting phrase occurs in a proposition is 
formally proved by the puzzle about the author of Waverley. The proposition 
‗Scott was the author of Waverley‘ has a property not possessed by ‗Scott was 
Scott‘, namely the property that George IV wished to know whether it was true. 
Thus the two are not identical propositions; hence the meaning of ‗the author of 
Waverley‘ must be relevant as well as the denotation, if we adhere to the point of 
view to which this distinction belongs. Yet, as we have just seen, so long as we 
adhere to this point of view, we are compelled to hold that only the denotation 
can be relevant. Thus the point of view in question must be abandoned. 
 
1. Introduction 
In PoM Russell had identified a class of propositional functions for which variation of 
argument was not independent of variation of function: 
 
In general, 𝜙𝑥 is itself a function of two variables, 𝜙 and 𝑥; of these, either may 
be given a constant value, and either may be varied without reference to the 
other. But in the type of propositional function we are considering in this 
Chapter, the argument itself is a function of the propositional function: instead 
of 𝜙𝑥 we have 𝜙{𝑓(𝜙)}, where 𝑓(𝜙) is defined as a function of 𝜙. Thus when 𝜙 
is varied, the argument of which 𝜙 is asserted is varied too. (PoM: §103, 104) 
 
Such propositional functions he called ‗quadratic forms‘. 
 
These forms, and the relations between the variables occurring therein, were clearly 
still central to Russell‘s attempts to respond to the paradoxes in 1905. In OF, still 
endorsing the theory of meaning and denotation, Russell writes: 
 
It seems likely that meaning-variation must be distinguished from entity-
variation, and that two variables of which one means [i.e. occurs in meaning-
position] and the other is [i.e. occurs in entity position] can only be equal by 
accident, and can‘t be kept equal throughout variation. (OF: 360, emphasis 
added) 
 
In the quadratic form 𝜙{𝑓(𝜙)} for instance, 𝜙 occurs in a meaning-position in its 
leftmost occurrence, but in an entity-position in its rightmost occurrence. It becomes 
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imperative, then, to attempt to understand the connection between these two modes of 
occurrence. On this point Russell recognises that: 
 
if we assert a connection between a variable in a meaning-position and a variable 
in an entity-position, we must avoid denoting complexes, since these will stand 
for their meaning in the one position and for their denotation in the other. (OF: 
361) 
 
And since variables have both meaning and denotation, the connection between the two 
occurrences of 𝜙 in 𝜙{𝑓(𝜙)} is unclear. 
 
A further problem concerns the symbolism. If ‗𝜙(𝑥)‘ represents the application of 
the value of the variable ‗𝜙‘ to the value of ‗𝑥‘, then one might assume that ‗𝜙(𝜙)‘ 
represents the application of the value of ‗𝜙‘ to itself. However since the structure of 
‗𝜙(𝜙)‘ is:1 
 
 m[𝜙]m/e[𝜙]e 
 
the variable has a different value in the different positions (or at least if it has the same 
value this is only ‗by accident‘). To symbolise the intended complex the notation must 
be altered from ‗𝜙(𝜙)‘ to something else. We might employ the subscript-plus-bracket 
notation introduced in Chapter Two, or something slightly simpler, such as a circumflex 
or inverted commas. Thus Russell: 
 
When we write 
 
⊢ : 𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞 . ⊃ 𝑞 : ≡ : 𝑞 ⊃ 𝑝 . ⊃ . 𝑝 
 
we state that the equivalence in question holds for any value. When we wish to 
speak of the function itself, i.e. the constant meaning, we write 𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞  . ⊃ . 𝑞  
instead of 𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞 . ⊃ . 𝑞. [. . .] The circumflex has the same sort of effect as 
inverted commas have. E.g. we say 
 
Any man is a biped; 
                                                 
1
 The notation here is introduced in Chapter Two, §4.2. To recapitulate: the bracket-plus-subscript 
notation (e.g. ‗m[‘ and ‗]m‘, and ‗e[‘ and ‗]e‘) distinguishes the mode of occurrence of the term occurring 
within the brackets. The slash ‗/‘ simply separates variables to keep things neat. 
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―Any man‖ is a denoting concept. 
 
The difference between 𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞 . ⊃ . 𝑞 and 𝑝 ⊃ 𝑞  . ⊃ . 𝑞  corresponds to the 
difference between any man and ―any man‖. (FN: 128-29) 
 
This addition to the symbolism appears to be innocent; but it must be ensured that we 
understand precisely what is represented at the propositional level by the circumflex or 
inverted comma notation. 
 
We have two issues, then—the connection between meaning- and entity-
occurrence, and the inverted comma notation. Russell‘s investigation of their interaction 
with the theory of meaning and denotation forms the backdrop to the Gray‘s Elegy 
Argument (GEA) which, though it occurs in OD, is first formulated in OF, just lines 
before the discovery of the theory of descriptions.
2
 
 
I hold that the GEA constitutes a decisive objection to Russell‘s earlier view: the 
role of the present chapter is simply to lay the argument out in full. I begin in §2 by 
identifying the targets of the GEA. I claim that the argument targets both Russell‘s 
earlier theory of denoting and Frege‘s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung. The two 
theories share, I will claim, a common assumption in virtue of which both are targeted. I 
shall argue against the claim that the common assumption is the thesis that definite 
descriptions are singular terms.
3
 Russell was not, I shall argue, committed to this thesis 
at all. Rather, what the earlier Russell and Frege shared—at least in Russell‘s eyes—
was the view that the answer to Central Question of OD (namely: How is it that a 
sentence containing a denoting phrase comes to be about whatever it is about?) should 
appeal to the relation between meaning and denotation. 
 
In §3 and §4 I present an original interpretation of the GEA. In §3 I give a brief 
overview of the course that the argument will take. In §4 I offer a fuller interpretation, 
including detailed analysis of the text. Finally, in §5 I briefly discuss the implications of 
the argument for Frege‘s position. The present chapter aims only at setting out the GEA. 
                                                 
2
 OD: 48-51; OF: §§35-9. When quoting from the GEA I will give the letter of the paragraph after the 
page reference, e.g. ‗OD: 50 G‘. 
3
 This view is advocated by Nathan Salmon (2005) and, indirectly, Peter Hylton (1990). 
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The demonstration of its connection with the discovery of the theory of descriptions and 
Russell‘s attempts to solve the paradoxes must wait until Chapter Five. 
 
2. The Targets of the Gray’s Elegy Argument 
Early commentaries
4
 rather took it for granted that the GEA targets Frege. There is no 
surprise in this, as the textual evidence from OD seems clearly to implicate Frege as the 
target. But since Russell claims that Frege‘s theory is ‗very nearly the same‘ (OD: 42n.) 
as his own earlier theory of denoting, it is likely, going solely on the textual evidence 
from OD, that any objection to Frege is also an objection to that theory. 
 
In its initial pre-publication formulation (in OF) the objection targeted Russell‘s 
earlier theory. It is probably for this reason that commentators have not struggled to 
identify, in the published version, underlying assumptions which Frege did not share.
5
 
In a highly influential paper, P. T. Geach, commenting on Searle‘s (1958) interpretation, 
refocused attention on Russell‘s earlier view, stating that ‗readers of [OD] will find it 
best simply to ignore [Russell‘s] use of Frege‘s name‘ (Geach 1959: 72).6 I commend 
the refocusing of attention upon Russell‘s earlier view, but it cannot be correct to 
dismiss Frege in this way: the textual evidence of OD is overwhelming in this regard 
(cf. §3.1 below).
7
 
 
In the following subsection I will briefly set out the textual evidence supporting the 
claim that the GEA targets both Frege‘s theory and Russell‘s earlier view. Since, as I 
will eventually argue (§2.3), Russell is wrong to claim that his earlier theory is ‗very 
nearly the same‘ (OD: 42n.) as Frege‘s, we must try to discover why he took them to be 
so. It could be that Russell simply misunderstood Frege‘s position. However it is both 
more charitable and more fruitful to suppose that, despite the significant differences 
between the two positions, there is some common assumption that they share. In §2.2 I 
will discuss the claim that the aim of the GEA was ‗to supplant the view that a definite 
description is a singular term‘ (Salmon 2005: 1076, emphasis added), a view which is 
                                                 
4
 E.g. Jones 1910, Church 1943, Butler 1954 and Searle 1958. 
5
 See, for example, Levine‘s (2004) careful examination of the differences in the underlying 
epistemologies of Frege and Russell. 
6
 Butler 1954 also contains an early discussion of Russell‘s position in PoM, though he still sees the GEA 
as targeting Frege. 
7
 There is obviously no justification for ignoring Frege‘s name when Russell—outside the context of the 
GEA—clearly intends to discuss Frege (e.g. OD: 45-48). And there is actually no cause for ignoring 
Frege‘s name as it occurs in the GEA passages, since it doesn‘t there occur at all. 
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commonly attributed to both Frege and the pre-OD Russell. I argue that Russell was not 
committed to the view, and, in §2.3, suggest an alternative shared assumption. 
 
2.1. Textual evidence 
Strong textual evidence supports the view that the GEA targets both Frege and the 
earlier Russell. Firstly, Russell writes: 
 
I have discussed this subject [i.e. denoting] in [PoM], Chap. V, and §476. The 
theory there advocated is very nearly the same as Frege‘s, and is quite different 
from the theory to be advocated in what follows. (OD: 42n.) 
 
Thus anyone holding that the argument targets only one of Frege‘s or Russell‘s earlier 
theory owes an explanation of why it does not also target the other, given that the two 
are, to Russell‘s mind, so similar. 
 
Secondly, although the GEA contains no explicit indication of its target, it is surely 
significant that the argument is framed in terms of ‗meaning‘ and ‗denotation‘. 
Plausibly, the GEA‘s use of ‗meaning‘ and ‗denotation‘ is continuous with their use 
elsewhere in OD. In particular, it is presumably continuous with the introduction of 
those terms in connection with Frege (OD: 45). If this suggests that the argument targets 
Frege‘s theory, then in the absence of any argument to the contrary, and given the first 
point, it suggests that the argument also targets Russell‘s earlier theory. 
 
Alternatively we may argue in the opposite direction. Given that the GEA is framed 
in terms of ‗meaning‘ and ‗denotation‘, it is reasonable to suppose that those terms are 
used with the same sense that they had in the original formulation of the argument in 
OF. After all, certain passages of the OF formulation appear verbatim in OD. If this 
suggests that the argument targets Russell‘s earlier view, then given its perceived 
similarity to Frege‘s theory, and in the absence of any argument to the contrary, it 
suggests that the argument also targets Frege. 
 
This evidence—in conjunction with the complete lack of textual support for its 
denial—is overwhelming. So strong is it, that even if it were shown that the GEA failed 
to engage in any substantive way with Frege‘s theory, it would be more plausible to 
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maintain that Russell had misunderstood Frege‘s position, than that he had not intended8 
the argument to target it. 
 
2.2. Definite descriptions as singular terms? 
Nathan Salmon (2005: 1076) claims that the suggestion that the GEA targets just Frege, 
or just the earlier Russell, or just both, is wrong: what is targeted is a certain thesis, 
common to far more philosophers than just Frege and the earlier Russell: 
 
Russell‘s ultimate aim in [OD] is to supplant the view that a definite description 
is a singular term. This view is by no means particular to Frege or the earlier 
Russell. It was also held, for example, by John Stuart Mill and Meinong. And it 
remains commonplace among language scholars today. [. . .] The burden of 
[OD] is to depose this very basic, and seemingly innocuous, account of definite 
descriptions. (Salmon 2005: 1076) 
 
It is exactly this basic, and seemingly innocuous, account—nothing less—that I 
believe Russell is ultimately attempting to refute in his ‗Gray‘s Elegy‘ argument. 
[. . .] He thus intends to overthrow by his argument both Frege and his former 
self. But not only these two. [. . .] [T]he ‗Gray‘s Elegy‘ argument effectively 
aims to debunk Mill, Frege, Meinong, and every other philosopher of language 
to have come down the pike—including the author of [PoM]. (Salmon 2005: 
1077-78) 
 
Now Frege certainly treated definite descriptions as singular terms; but I will argue that 
the Russell of PoM did not (rather, definite descriptions in PoM involve the notion of 
denoting and hence of generality). Consequently, to the extent that the assumption that 
he did so take definite descriptions informs an interpretation of the GEA, that 
interpretation is suspect. 
 
Quite how widespread this understanding of Russell‘s position in PoM is, is 
difficult to judge (it is not often discussed—perhaps because it is widely assumed). It is 
explicitly attributed by Salmon (as above) and Pelletier & Linsky (2009: 40), and is 
                                                 
8
 One might claim that since the GEA was developed in OF, in isolation from any discussion of Frege, the 
argument was not intended to target Frege, but was merely understood by Russell as having an 
application to Frege‘s position. Maybe so, but this point has to do with the semantics of ‗intention‘ and 
‗intends‘: the exegetical point stands independently of such matters. 
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almost explicit in Blackburn & Code 1978 (68) and Levine 2005.
9
 I shall argue that it is 
indirectly attributed to the early Russell in Peter Hylton‘s important work Russell, 
Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy (1990). Hylton does not explicitly 
address the question of descriptions as singular terms in PoM, but he does attribute to 
the Russell of PoM a related claim, the principle of truth-value dependence: 
 
Principle of Truth-Value Dependence (TV Dep) 
If 𝑝 is a proposition containing a denoting concept, the truth-value of 𝑝 is 
‗dependent upon the truth-value of the proposition obtained from [𝑝] by 
replacing the denoting concept by the denoted entity‘ (Hylton 1990: 251). 
 
I argue (§2.2.1) that to attribute (TV Dep) to Russell (at least as far as definite 
descriptions are concerned) is tantamount to attributing to him the thesis that definite 
descriptions are singular terms. Of course much depends on how we understand 
‗singular term‘, and part of my task is to settle on an appropriate understanding. I shall 
argue in this way: if the Russell of PoM was committed to (TV Dep), then he was also 
committed to the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms; but since he was 
not committed to the latter (§2.2.2), he was not committed to the former. Salmon and 
Hylton have, in that case, mischaracterised Russell‘s position in PoM. I will argue 
(§2.2.3) that what is most significant about OD is not, pace Salmon, that Russell no 
longer treats descriptions as singular terms, but rather that he no longer treats denoting 
phrases as having ‗meaning in isolation‘—in other words that he now endorses what in 
Chapter Three I called ‗the fundamental principle of OD‘, namely that denoting phrases 
are incomplete symbols. 
 
2.2.1. Singular terms and the principle of truth-value dependence 
Hylton introduces (TV Dep) as follows: 
 
The crucial idea for understanding denoting is that a proposition may be about 
an object which it does not contain. It is by no means obvious how to make 
sense of this idea within the context of [the general framework of PoM]. [. . .] 
                                                 
9
 One might claim that it is in a certain sense implied by introductory texts in philosophy of language 
which (implicitly perhaps) represent the Russell of OD as opposing Frege on the question of whether 
definite descriptions (and proper names) are genuine singular terms. Witness, for instance: ‗Russell was 
exercised in OD by what he took to be a number of serious defects in Proper-Name treatments of 
descriptions‘ (McCulloch 1989: 41). 
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[A] natural way to do so is to say that for a proposition containing a denoting 
concept to be about some other entity is for the truth-value of that proposition to 
be dependent upon the truth-value of the proposition obtained from it by 
replacing the denoting concept by the denoted entity. (Hylton 1990: 251) 
 
Replacing the denoting concept in ⟨1⟩ with the denoted entity, we arrive at ⟨2⟩: 
 
⟨1⟩ ⟨<the teacher of Plato> is wise⟩ 
⟨2⟩ ⟨Socrates is wise⟩ 
 
Hylton clearly intends (TV Dep) to posit a stronger connection between the truth-values 
of ⟨1⟩ and ⟨2⟩ than mere co-variance. The principle says that the truth-value of ⟨1⟩ 
depends upon that of ⟨2⟩. Thus the truth of ⟨1⟩ must be grounded in the facts that <the 
teacher of Plato> denotes Socrates, and that the result of replacing the former with the 
latter (in ⟨1⟩) is a true proposition. On this view, ⟨1⟩ attributes wisdom to some 
particular entity and is true just in case that entity is wise. That entity happens to be 
Socrates (since <the teacher of Plato> denotes him), so ⟨1⟩ is true just in case there is a 
true proposition attributing wisdom to Socrates—that is, ⟨1⟩ is true just in case ⟨2⟩ is. 
 
This is, admittedly, a neat explanation of why ⟨1⟩ is about Socrates; and since the 
notion of aboutness in PoM (and in Russell‘s work in this period generally) is unclear, 
any explanation is welcome. One drawback is that although it explains why ⟨1⟩ is about 
Socrates, it does not explain why ⟨2⟩ is. It might seem that no explanation is required 
here: after all, what else could it be about? Well it could be about wisdom couldn‘t it? 
Russell thinks not (PoM: §48), though his failure to even acknowledge the possibility is 
unfortunate given its apparent viability.
10
 At root, the difficulty is that on Hylton‘s 
interpretation, the truth of a proposition containing a denoting concept is a matter of the 
truth-value of another proposition, while the truth of a singular proposition (i.e. one 
devoid of denoting concepts) has little or nothing to do with the truth of any other 
proposition. Thus Hylton attributes to Russell a hotchpotch theory of truth. 
 
                                                 
10
 Cf. Ramsey 1931. See Gaskin 2008 for discussion and amplification. 
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Certainly Russell has nothing terribly clear to say about truth in PoM. Nonetheless, 
in MTCA, published only one year after PoM, while still endorsing the theory of 
denoting concepts, he advocates truth-primitivism: 
 
some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some 
white. [. . .] What is truth, and what falsehood, we must merely apprehend, for 
both seem incapable of analysis. (MTCA: 75-76)
11
 
 
Hylton is well aware that his interpretation stands in opposition to Russell‘s truth-
primitivism: 
 
The idea of the truth or falsehood of one proposition depending upon that of 
another is clearly quite alien to [Russell‘s general position]. It amounts, indeed, 
to the introduction of something like the correspondence theory of truth for the 
special case of those propositions which contain denoting concepts: whether 
such a proposition is true depends upon whether there is a corresponding fact, 
where a fact is a true proposition which does not contain a denoting concept, or a 
combination of such propositions. (Hylton 1990: 209) 
 
But he is willing to ascribe (TV Dep) to Russell, even in the face of this tension, as it 
seems to afford an explanation of various of Russell‘s moves in the GEA. 
 
Firstly, it is suggested that at least part of the argumentation in the GEA is intended 
to demonstrate the impossibility of there being a proposition which is about a denoting 
concept in virtue of containing that concept. For instance, the proposition ⟨<the teacher 
of Plato> denotes Socrates⟩ is apparently (or is intended to be) a true proposition about 
<the teacher of Plato>; but if (TV Dep) holds, then its truth depends upon the truth of 
⟨Socrates denotes Socrates⟩, which is obviously false: 
 
[(TV Dep)] has the consequence that there are no true propositions which say 
that one entity denotes another; but clearly there must be such propositions if the 
theory of denoting concepts is correct. (Hylton 1990: 252)
12
 
 
                                                 
11
 For a careful discussion of Russell on truth see Korhonen 2009. 
12
 One response to this problem is to distinguish different modes of occurrence. Perhaps the denoting 
concept in ⟨<the teacher of Plato> denotes Socrates⟩ occurs non-denotatively? Hylton describes the 
attempt to follow through this idea (in OF) as ‗showing Russell attempting to accommodate the failure of 
(TV Dep)‘ (1990: 253). This idea, stripped of any commitment to (TV Dep), looms large in my 
discussion of the GEA. 
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The second way in which (TV Dep) is supposedly implicated in the GEA concerns 
the final paragraph of the argument (OD: 50-51 H)
13
. There Russell implies that the fact 
that ‗Scott is the author of Waverley‘ and ‗Scott is Scott‘ express different propositions 
is problematic for his earlier view. But there is not, on the face of it, any obvious 
difficulty here for the theory of denoting concepts, which anyway distinguishes the two 
propositions. What then could Russell‘s point be? We may answer this question, Hylton 
(1990: 253) says, ‗if we suppose that Russell is taking for granted something like [(TV 
Dep)]‘. (TV Dep) has it that the truth-value of ⟨George IV wished to know whether 
Scott was <the author of Waverley>⟩ is dependent upon that of ⟨George IV wished to 
know whether Scott was Scott⟩. We are to suppose that the former is true, but since the 
latter is false, the former cannot be true, if we endorse (TV Dep). 
 
In the above ways one can attempt to make sense of the GEA by associating the 
theory of denoting concepts with (TV Dep). This will all be to no avail, however, if it 
can be demonstrated that Russell did not endorse (TV Dep). But before demonstrating 
that (TV Dep) commits one to the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms, let 
us settle on an understanding of ‗singular term‘. A singular term is, according to Salmon 
(2005: 1072), an expression whose semantic function is to designate exactly one entity. 
But what exactly is designation? 
 
Like truth, designation is connected to the notion of aboutness. To say that an 
expression designates an entity is to say that declarative sentences containing that 
expression express propositions that are about that entity.
14
 We have encountered two 
ways in which a proposition may be about an entity.
15
 
 
(Ab1) A proposition may be about an entity 𝑒 in virtue of containing 𝑒. 
(Ab2) A proposition may be about an entity 𝑒 in virtue of containing a denoting 
concept 𝑑, such that 𝑑 denotes 𝑒. 
 
Where definite descriptions are concerned, (Ab2) is in play. 
                                                 
13
 To recapitulate: when citing a passage from the GEA I use ‗A‘-‗H‘ to indicate the relevant 
paragraph(s).  
14
 In this respect Salmon‘s terminology is continuous with Russell‘s in certain of his unpublished 
manuscripts, e.g. OMD. 
15
 Cf. Chapter One, §3.2. 
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Just as we can attribute a truth-value to a sentence based upon the truth-value of the 
proposition it expresses, so we can speak of a sentence‘s being about a certain entity 
based upon the associated proposition‘s being about that entity. So if ‗the teacher of 
Plato‘ is a singular term designating Socrates, sentences of the form ‗the teacher of 
Plato is 𝐺‘ express propositions which are about Socrates in the (Ab2) sense. And if 
Russell is committed to (TV Dep), then such sentences express propositions the truth-
values of which are dependent upon the truth-value of propositions which are about 
Socrates in the (Ab1) sense. 
 
We can cash out the distinctions in play here in more contemporary terms. 
According to the theory of descriptions, (1) expresses an object-independent 
proposition, whose form is more accurately represented by (1a): 
 
(1) The teacher of Plato is wise. 
(1a) (∃𝑥)(𝑇𝑥𝑝 & (𝑦)(𝑇𝑥𝑦  𝑦 = 𝑥) & 𝑊𝑥) 
 
While—assuming that ‗Socrates‘ is a genuine singular term—(2) expresses an object-
dependent proposition, whose form is more accurately represented by (2a): 
 
(2) Socrates is wise. 
(2a) 𝑊𝑠 
 
Stephen Neale cashes out the distinction between object-dependent and object-
independent propositions in these terms: 
 
A genuine referring expression ‗𝑏‘ may be combined with a (monadic) predicate 
expression to express an object-dependent thought
16
, a thought that simply could 
not be expressed or even entertained if the object referred to by ‗𝑏‘ did not exist. 
A definite description ‗the 𝐹‘, by contrast, although it may in fact be satisfied by 
a unique object 𝑥, can be combined with a (monadic) predicate to express a 
thought that is not contingent upon the existence of 𝑥. (Neale 1990: 5-6) 
 
                                                 
16
 For present purposes read ‗thought‘ as ‗proposition‘. 
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An object-dependent proposition will be true just in case the entity upon whose 
existence it is dependent has the property expressed by the predicate expression. The 
truth of an object-independent proposition will not depend upon any particular entity‘s 
having the property expressed by the predicate expression. There may, as a matter of 
fact, be exactly one entity satisfying the descriptive condition, but the proposition would 
subsist even if no entity (or more than one) satisfied the descriptive condition; for as we 
might put it, that entity does not enter into the truth-condition of the proposition 
expressed. 
 
Returning to our example, the crucial difference between the propositions 
expressed by (1a) and (2a) is this: the state of each and every entity within the domain 
of the quantified variables is relevant to the truth-value of the proposition expressed by 
(1a), while the truth-value of the proposition expressed by (2a) is a matter only of the 
state of the entity designated by the singular term occurring therein. This is the 
distinction between object-dependent and object-independent propositions, and it 
squares up exactly to the distinction between singular terms and quantifier expressions 
(assuming that one follows Russell in taking genuine proper names to be singular terms 
and denoting phrases to be quantifier expressions). Let us then adopt the following 
loose characterisation of a singular term: 
 
(ST) ‗𝑎‘ is a singular term just in case, when it occurs in a sentence 𝑆 of the 
form ‗𝑎 is 𝐺‘, the truth-value of the proposition expressed by 𝑆 is a 
matter of how things stand with the entity designated by ‗𝑎‘.17 18 
 
Characterising singular terms in terms of object-dependent propositions involves a 
departure from Russell‘s terminology, but not from the spirit of the notions he 
employed. He writes for instance that if I assert ‗I met a man‘ then: 
 
the whole human race is involved in my assertion: if any man who ever existed 
or will exist had not existed or been going to exist, the purport of my proposition 
would have been different. (PoM: §62, 62) 
                                                 
17
 This (ST) is not to be confused with Salmon‘s (2005: 1082). 
18
 To clarify: I intend the phrase ‗is a matter of how things stand with...‘ in such a way that the truth of 
‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘—according to the theory of descriptions—is not a matter of how things 
stand with Socrates, but rather a matter of how things stand with everything within the relevant domain. 
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This sets up a clear distinction between object-dependent propositions, in which the 
entity that the proposition is about actually occurs in the proposition, and object-
independent propositions in which every entity in the relevant domain is relevant to the 
truth-value of the proposition. The distinction may only be implicit in PoM, and is 
certainly couched in different terms, but it is there nonetheless and recognisably so. 
 
(ST) enables us to see exactly why commitment to (TV Dep) would commit Russell 
to the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms. By (TV Dep), the truth of 
sentence (1) depends upon the truth of proposition ⟨2⟩. This is illustrated as follows. (1) 
is true (in the derivative sense of truth applicable to sentences) if it expresses a true 
proposition; (1) expresses ⟨1⟩; ⟨1⟩ is true, according to (TV Dep), just in case ⟨2⟩ is true; 
and the truth-value of ⟨2⟩ is a matter of how things stand with Socrates. ‗The teacher of 
Plato‘ is, then, the kind of expression which, when it occurs in a sentence of the form 
‗the teacher of Plato is 𝐺‘, expresses a proposition whose truth-value is a matter of how 
things stand with Socrates (that is, the entity designated by ‗the teacher of Plato‘). But 
to be an expression of that kind just is, according to (ST), what it is to be a singular term 
designating Socrates. 
 
According to an alternative, but perhaps common, use of ‗singular term‘, singular 
terms are simply to be contrasted with incomplete symbols. Now if to be a singular term 
is just to not be an incomplete symbol, then of course the Russell of PoM did take 
descriptions to be singular terms. But this conception of singular terms is so general as 
to be almost useless. For instance, suppose one takes it, as some do, that the semantic 
value of OD‟s denoting phrases are second-level functions.19 Are we not then entitled to 
deem OD‟s denoting phrases singular terms, since on this view they have second-level 
functions as their propositional complements? Under this proposal all quantifier 
expressions turn out to be singular terms, collapsing a distinction that ought to be 
preserved. What is wrong with the present understanding of singular terms is that it 
ignores the central issue, namely aboutness. Singular terms and quantifier expressions 
enable one to speak about the world in significantly different ways. A serviceable 
account of singular terms must therefore preserve the contrast with quantifier 
                                                 
19
 E.g. Miller (1998). 
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expressions, but the proposal that to be a singular term is simply not to be an incomplete 
symbol fails in this regard. For this reason, when we ask whether definite descriptions 
are taken, by the Russell of PoM, to be singular terms, we are asking after (say) the way 
in which a sentence such as (1) is about Socrates. (ST) offers a characterisation of 
singular terms that preserves the contrast with quantifier expressions by appealing to the 
notion of designation, which is cashed out in terms of object-dependence. As I have 
urged, though this terminology is anachronistic, the underlying notions are not. 
 
Let us pause, for a moment, to ask whether (ST) is the characterisation of singular 
terms that Salmon has in mind. One limitation of (ST) is that it says nothing of 
expressions which fail to designate. Salmon, on the other hand, writes: 
 
an expression may have the semantic function of designating a single individual 
without necessarily fulfilling its function. Hence, ‗the present king of France‘ is 
not disqualified [from being a singular term] simply because France is no longer 
a monarchy (and would not have been disqualified even if France had never 
been a monarchy). (2005: 1072n.) 
 
Thus it seems that (ST) does not capture all that Salmon‘s characterisation of singular 
terms captures. But arguably, whatever it is that (ST) leaves out can have no real 
bearing on a discussion of the views of the early Russell. To see why, let us consider 
sentence (3): 
 
(3) The present king of France is wise. 
 
If ‗the present king of France‘ is a significant expression, as the Russell of PoM 
certainly held that it was, then (3) certainly expresses a proposition (call it ‗⟨3⟩‘). Now 
there either is or is not some unique entity satisfying the descriptive condition is 
presently king of France. Let us consider the two possibilities. 
 
(𝑖). If there is no entity satisfying the descriptive condition, then the proposition 
must be false.
20
 Notice the contrast here with the treatment of the arch singular term, the 
(genuine) proper name. Russell‘s view is that there can be no such thing as a genuine 
proper name that lacks a bearer: 
                                                 
20
 It must be true or false—and it certainly isn‘t true. 
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―𝐴 is not‖ must always be either false or meaningless. For if 𝐴 were nothing, it 
could not be said not to be; ―𝐴 is not‖ implies that there is a term [entity] 𝐴 
whose being is denied, and hence that 𝐴 is. Thus unless ―𝐴 is not‖ be an empty 
sound, it must be false—whatever 𝐴 may be, it certainly is. (PoM: §427, 449) 
 
For Russell the idea of a bearer-less proper name is incoherent. Thus if definite 
descriptions are singular terms, then insofar as they may be empty, they are singular 
terms of a different kind to proper names. This new kind of singular term would be one 
which tolerates the formation of sentences expressing propositions that do not conform 
to either of (Ab1) or (Ab2)—for there is no entity that ⟨3⟩ is about. Yet (Ab1) and (Ab2) 
are central to Russell‘s framework of propositions in PoM. As such, the proposal that 
‗the present king of France‘ is a singular term designating nothing at all, and yet 
contributing to the formation of significant declarative sentences like (3), is highly 
implausible as an account of Russell position in PoM. Indeed it is difficult to see how it 
could even find an application to Russell‘s position: that all propositions are about some 
entity (or entities) is near axiomatic for Russell in PoM, yet the present proposal 
tolerates exceptions.
21
 
 
(𝑖𝑖). Let us then consider the second alternative, the possibility that there is some 
unique entity satisfying the descriptive condition is presently king of France. There is 
certainly no existing present king of France. But as is well-known, Russell 
countenanced entities which do not exist, but (merely
22
) subsist or have being (PoM: 
§427, 449). Perhaps then, ‗the present king of France‘ designates a non-existent being. 
⟨3⟩ will then be taken as true or false depending upon how we evaluate propositions 
containing non-existent entities (we need not investigate this mode of evaluation: 
suffice it to note that ⟨3⟩ is, presumably, false). This second possibility, unlike the first, 
is in conformity with (Ab1) and (Ab2): ⟨3⟩ is about the non-existent present king of 
France in the (Ab2) sense. 
 
Now I don‘t, for the moment, want to deny that, as an interpretation of Russell, this 
view is an option (though I think it is the wrong one)
23
. For now I simply note that if 
                                                 
21
 A version of this proposal (as an interpretation of Russell) is considered and rejected below (§2.2.2.2). 
22
 The tendency to think of being as a ‗lesser‘ ontological status than existence is not a good one. 
23
 Cf. §2.2.2.1 below. 
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Salmon is attributing to Russell the view that definite descriptions are singular terms 
against this backdrop—and I should add that I do not think he is—so that empty definite 
descriptions are accounted for by positing non-existents, then (ST) does not, after all, 
miss out anything of importance. We were entertaining the possibility that (ST) was 
unfair to Salmon‘s characterisation of singular terms on the grounds that it was too 
narrow, that it said nothing about empty definite descriptions. But now we have come 
full circle and deny that there are empty definite descriptions, by appealing to Russell‘s 
distinction between existence and being. If there are no empty descriptions, (ST) is not 
too narrow after all. I take it then, that (ST) captures enough of what is important about 
Russell‘s general position in PoM to be fruitfully applicable to that position, but is also 
not unfair to the notion of singular term at work in Salmon‘s paper. 
 
2.2.2. Definite descriptions as singular terms in PoM 
We noted in the previous section that, for Russell in PoM, no proper name fails to 
indicate some entity; a proper name which indicates nothing is not, properly speaking, a 
proper name at all, but a meaningless sound. As far as indication goes, the same holds 
for denoting phrases: a denoting phrase that indicates no denoting concept is not, 
properly speaking, a phrase at all, but just another meaningless mark or sound. But 
Russell holds that all denoting phrases have an indication, namely a denoting concept. 
The question is, then, whether there can be denoting concepts that are empty, that 
denote nothing. Russell openly acknowledges this possibility: 
 
It is necessary to realize, in the first place, that a concept may denote although it 
does not denote anything. This occurs when there are propositions in which the 
said concept occurs, and which are not about the said concept, but all such 
propositions are false. (PoM: §73, 73) 
 
As such, there being no unique entity that is 𝐹 is no barrier to there being a proposition 
expressed by a sentence of the form ‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘. But if the proposition is not about the 
denoting concept itself, and is not about the denotation (since, ex hypothesi, there is 
none), what could it be about? 
 
If the Russell of PoM holds that definite descriptions are singular terms, then there 
are two plausible responses to the above question. First, one might renege on the claim 
that there is no denotation, declaring Russell‘s statement to the contrary a slip. When 
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there is no unique 𝐹, ‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ will express a proposition which is about a non-
existent entity. For instance, in §2.2.1 we entertained the suggestion that ‗the present 
king of France‘ designates a non-existent entity: it indicates <the present king of 
France>, which denotes the non-existent present king of France. (3) is then significant 
in virtue of expressing the false proposition ⟨3⟩: 
 
⟨3⟩ ⟨<the present king of France> is wise⟩ 
 
In §2.2.2.1 I indicate how recent developments in Russell scholarship tell against this 
proposal. If the Russell of PoM endorsed the thesis that definite descriptions are 
singular terms, it was certainly not against this backdrop. 
 
The second, more promising, response to the question raised above involves 
maintaining the interpretation according to which Russell is committed to the thesis that 
definite descriptions are singular terms, but acknowledging and accommodating the fact 
that not all denoting phrases have a denotation. This is, no doubt, the position that 
Salmon and Hylton have in mind. In §2.2.2.2 I argue that even against this backdrop, 
proper consideration of the nature of denoting suggests that Russell should not be seen 
as committed to the thesis in question. 
 
2.2.2.1. The ontology of PoM 
Russell scholarship has seen, in recent years, a move away from the Standard View (as 
Griffin (1996) calls it) of the origins of the theory of descriptions, the view ‗that the 
theory of descriptions was intended primarily as a contribution to ontology, a device (as 
Quine [(1966: 5)] put it) for ―dispensing with unwelcome objects‖‘ (Griffin 1996: 24). 
The Standard View has gone hand-in-hand with the claim that the ontology of PoM is 
(in some, most often pejorative, sense) ‗quasi-Meinongian‘—that is ‗unrestrained‘ 
(Quine 1966: 4) or ‗intolerably overcrowded‘ (Ayer 1971: 28). Thus the move away 
from the Standard View has heralded a move away from the quasi-Meinongian reading 
of PoM. 
 
Yet the quasi-Meinongian reading is the only hope for those who would deny the 
possibility of empty denoting concepts. As far as I am aware, no one in the recent 
literature has offered a sustained and serious challenge to the rejection of the quasi-
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Meinongian interpretation, and that being so our defence of the new orthodoxy will be 
brief.
24
 
 
Various arguments have been advanced to challenge the quasi-Meinongian 
interpretation
25
. The most obvious is as follows. As Stevens (forthcoming: §1) notes, an 
ontology does not count as ‗quasi-Meinongian‘ simply in virtue of countenancing an 
ontological realm beyond existence. Even after the theory of descriptions was well-
established in Russell‘s thought—that is, when all sides agree he was not quasi-
Meinongian—he continued to believe in a realm of non-existents (including universals 
for instance). Whether or not an ontology is quasi-Meinongian must therefore ‗be a 
matter of which kinds of objects are taken to have being and on what grounds‘ (Stevens 
forthcoming: §1). Objectionable entities include impossibles, such as round squares, 
happily married bachelors and the like. The theory of descriptions obviously enables 
one to avoid ontological commitment to impossibles, but as the new orthodoxy has 
repeatedly insisted, the theory of denoting concepts does too. 
 
Russell held that every expression indicates something, but as noted above (§2.2.2), 
as far as denoting phrases are concerned, this commits him only to the subsistence of 
the corresponding denoting concepts, not the (putatively) denoted entities. The quasi-
Meinongian interpretation illegitimately moves from Russell‘s commitment to (say) 
<the round square> to his commitment to the being of something both round and square. 
But nothing in PoM suggests that he did posit a round square (as even Quine 
acknowledges
26
). Indeed, in later work, while still committed to the theory of denoting 
concepts, Russell explicitly indicates an awareness of the resources made available by 
empty denoting concepts: 
 
‗The present King of England‘ is a complex concept denoting an individual; ‗the 
present King of France‘ is a similar complex concept denoting nothing. The 
phrase intends to point out an individual, but fails to do so: it does not point out 
an unreal individual, but no individual at all. (EIP: 399) 
 
                                                 
24
 Perkins, Jr. (2007) ‗gently disputes‘ the thesis. Boukema (2007) also offers a careful analysis of certain 
aspects of the Russell-Meinong relation. 
25
 Griffin 1996 contains several. Rebera (2009) suggests that no single argument is individually 
conclusive, but that together they are compelling. 
26
 Quine 1966: 5-6. 
153 
 
Endorsing this interpretation of Russell‘s position requires a slightly careful reading 
of certain passages of PoM, but a slightly careful reading is the least a serious work of 
philosophy might hope for. For example, Russell says ‗Whatever may be an object of 
thought [. . .] I call a term. [E]very term has being, i.e. is in some sense‘ (PoM: §47, 43). 
Is this quasi-Meinongian? Only if impossibles genuinely may be objects of thought: but 
why think that? Similarly: ‗to deny that such and such a thing is a term must always be 
false‘ (PoM: §47, 43). Is this quasi-Meinongian? Only if impossibles may be substituted 
for ‗such and such a thing‘: but why think that?27 Rejecting the quasi-Meinongian 
interpretation also involves contradicting Russell‘s memory of his development. He 
claims, in various places, to have been convinced by Meinongian-style arguments, until 
he discovered the theory of descriptions.
28
 Here however, we must simply accept that 
Russell‘s memory was unreliable. No aspect of the general position outlined in PoM 
excludes the possibility of empty denoting concepts. 
 
2.2.2.2. The nature of denoting 
It may be suggested that Salmon and Hylton can maintain their respective positions if 
we take those positions to acknowledge and accommodate the fact that not all denoting 
phrases have a denotation. Salmon will thus be understood as attributing to Russell the 
thesis that definite descriptions are expressions the semantic function of which is to 
designate the unique entity—if any—satisfying their descriptive condition. On this 
proposal, sentence (1) is about Socrates, but (3) is taken to be a degenerate case, and to 
be about nothing. Similarly, Hylton will be understood to attribute to Russell a version 
of (TV Dep) according to which the truth-value of a proposition 𝑝 (containing a 
denoting concept) is dependent upon the truth-value of the proposition obtained from 𝑝 
by replacing the denoting concept by the denoted entity if there is one, otherwise 𝑝 is 
false. On this proposal the otherwise problematic ⟨3⟩ is declared automatically false. 
 
The difficulty, however, is that whatever the independent merits of these positions, 
they will not do as an interpretation of Russell. For Russell, recall, a denoting phrase 
enables one to express a proposition which is about a given entity (or entities) in a 
peculiar way—as denoted rather than referred to (cf. (Ab1) and (Ab2)). This distinction 
is what, in PoM, secures the distinction between discursive thought and immediate 
                                                 
27
 Perkins Jr. (2007: 25) takes a different view of such passages. 
28
 MMD: 13; MPD: 84; Auto: 455-56. 
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perception (PoM: §56, 53)—between, analogously, general and singular propositions. 
Now Russell of course accepts that propositions ⟨1⟩ and ⟨2⟩ are intimately linked. 
 
⟨1⟩ ⟨<the teacher of Plato> is wise⟩ 
⟨2⟩ ⟨Socrates is wise⟩ 
 
They are linked in virtue of the fact that <the teacher of Plato> denotes Socrates. <The 
teacher of Plato> denote Socrates (rather than anyone else) because (𝑖) Socrates is the 
unique instance of the predicate (class-concept) teacher of Plato, and (𝑖𝑖) <the teacher 
of Plato> is obtained, derived we might say, from the predicate (class-concept) teacher 
of Plato. Associated with every predicate (class-concept) are various denoting concepts 
obtained from it (as described in Chapter One). Ultimately then, that there is such a 
proposition as ⟨1⟩ is dependent upon there being such a predicate (class-concept) as 
teacher of Plato, not upon there being some entity that is the unique instance of it (this 
is no less the case for a proposition such as ⟨3⟩). To be a proposition is to have a truth-
value: all and only propositions have truth-values; so if the existence of the proposition 
⟨1⟩ is not contingent upon the existence of Socrates (but rather upon the existence of the 
predicate teacher of Plato), then neither, ultimately, is its having a truth-value. This is a 
round-about way of saying that the proposition is object-independent; for its truth-value 
is not, ultimately, a matter of how things stand with Socrates, but with the unique 
instance (if any) of the predicate (class-concept) teacher of Plato. And if ⟨1⟩ is object-
independent, then ‗the teacher of Plato‘ is not a singular term. Generalising, definite 
descriptions are not singular terms. 
 
Alternatively, we can argue in the following manner. Russell insists that the logical 
differences pertaining to the different kinds of denoting concepts (<all 𝐹>, <some 𝐹>, 
etc.) are traceable to differences in the kinds of entities denoted, rather than the denoting 
relation itself (PoM: §62, 61–2). Thus all denoting phrases bring it about that the 
sentences in which they occur express propositions that are about whatever it is that 
they are about in the same kind of way. Consider now a predicate (class-concept) having 
only one instance, e.g. author of Waverley. As Russell says, ‗The word the, in the 
singular, is correctly employed only in relation to a class-concept of which there is only 
one instance‘ (PoM: §63, 62). He does not, then, take it that the predicate (class-
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concept) from which <the author of Waverley> is obtained must be unique author of 
Waverley, but just author of Waverley. The denoting concept <the author of Waverley> 
then denotes the unit class, if any, whose member is the entity satisfying the descriptive 
condition. Now whether this entails that the proposition ⟨<the author of Waverley> is 
Scotch⟩ is about a certain unit class, or about Scott, or about both, is a matter of whether 
one identifies a unit class with its member—a matter upon which Russell vacillates, 
eventually coming to distinguish them (PoM: §106, 106; cf. §69, 68).
29
 The crucial 
point is that the account of how ⟨<the author of Waverley> is Scotch⟩ comes to be about 
whatever it is about, is intended by Russell to be the same as the account of how, say, 
⟨<an author of Principia Mathematica> smokes⟩ comes to be about whatever it is about: 
i.e. through the relation of denoting, as given in (Ab2). The relevant logical differences 
between the two propositions pertain to the character of the entities denoted by the 
respective denoting concepts, not the way in which they are denoted. Now ‗an author of 
Principia Mathematica‘ is plainly not a singular term, and since ‗the author of 
Waverley‟ functions in so similar a way, it is not a singular term either. 
 
Russell does not, then, take definite descriptions as singular terms in PoM. But 
what then of the amended version of (TV Dep) that one might offer Hylton? Once we 
no longer understand Russell to have taken definite descriptions for singular terms, part 
of the motivation for (TV Dep) is removed. The principle was proposed as an 
explanation of the fact that a proposition may be about an entity it does not contain as a 
constituent (Hylton 1990: 251). In its amended form, and without definite descriptions 
as singular terms, the principle is now a less than comprehensive explanation, offering 
no real account of the fact that ⟨3⟩ is not about any of its constituents. It is true that 
Russell himself offers no real explanation of this; but in extending his position to 
redress this oversight, the natural move is to make use of his notion of denoting 
concepts as obtained from predicates (class-concepts). We might then take the 
denotation of <the present king of France> to be the class of present kings of France, 
which, taken in extension, is the null class.
30
 This proposal has two advantages over the 
amended version of (TV Dep). First, it is far more in keeping with the spirit of Russell‘s 
                                                 
29
 Any concern that ⟨<the author of Waverley> is Scotch⟩ is about a class rather than a man is misplaced. 
The unit class of authors of Waverley is, taken in extension, identical with Scott. 
30
 This is obviously reminiscent of Frege in the Grundgesetze (Frege 1964). Frege did take definite 
descriptions as singular terms. For the relevant differences between the theory of PoM and Frege‘s 
account in the Grundgesetze, see §2.3 below. 
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position; second, Russell‘s truth-primitivism is left uncompromised. (I am not 
suggesting that Russell implicitly endorsed the modification I have suggested.) 
 
I see, therefore, no reason to suppose that the Russell of PoM was committed to 
either the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms or (TV Dep). If this account 
is correct, then the interpretations of the GEA forwarded by Salmon, Hylton, and any 
other interpreter relying upon these claims, rest on a mischaracterisation of the position 
against which the Russell of OD was arguing. 
 
2.2.3. Consequences for our understanding of the GEA 
In this section I want to re-emphasise the respects in which Russell‘s position in OD 
represents an advance from his position in PoM, and to indicate how the 
acknowledgment of these might influence the way in which we approach the task of 
understanding the GEA. 
 
The great similarity between the theory of denoting concepts and the theory of 
descriptions is that both are theories of generality. As I have argued above, this holds 
true not only for the relatively uncontroversial quantifier phrases—‗all 𝐹‘, ‗any 𝐹‘, 
‗some 𝐹‘, etc.—but also for definite descriptions. In this very limited respect, then, 
there is no real change. Broadening our view however, OD heralds significant advances 
in both ontological and semantic respects. 
 
The ontological advance is not, as was once thought, that a whole realm of non-
existent entities are jettisoned, but, rather, that denoting concepts are abandoned—
though one must remember that, as Hylton (1990: 255-56) notes, the variable, which is 
very arguably a kind of denoting concept, remains in OD, though now taken as 
fundamental (OD, 42).
31
 The main action comes, as we have seen in Chapter Three, on 
the semantic front, where OD sees the abandonment of Russell‘s former naivety 
concerning the relationship between the surface grammatical form of ordinary language 
sentences and the logical form of the propositions they express. That a sentence is of 
subject-predicate form, for example, is no sure indication that the proposition it 
expresses has the analogous logical form. It is the overcoming of this naivety—the 
                                                 
31
 This point is discussed again in Chapter Five. 
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recognition that decompositional analysis must be preceded by a stage of SR-
interpretive analysis—that constitutes the real advance from PoM to OD. This 
development amounts to the recognition of a class of incomplete symbols. In casting 
definite descriptions as incomplete symbols, one denies that they are singular terms. But 
as we have seen, it does not follow from the fact that an expression is not an incomplete 
symbol, that it is a singular term; nor does it follow from the fact that an expression is 
not a singular term that it is an incomplete symbol. We must not lose sight of the fact 
that the really significant development in OD involves the casting of definite 
descriptions as incomplete expressions, not the denying that they are singular terms. 
 
How might these considerations help us in understanding the GEA? In treating 
denoting phrases as incomplete symbols, Russell is able to answer the Central Question 
of OD without recourse to denoting concepts (bearing in mind the aforementioned 
caveat concerning the status of the variable).
32
 My suggestion therefore, is that the GEA 
should be understood as criticising the theory of denoting concepts on just this matter: 
that its answer to the Central Question of OD relies upon denoting concepts (denoting 
complexes, meanings, Sinne). On this suggestion then, the tangle that the GEA uncovers 
concerns the relation between a denoting concept and its denotation. 
 
Now there is nothing very new in this proposal yet. But, the suggestion continues, 
the kind of problem we should expect to find in the GEA is not so much that denoting 
concepts are themselves inherently problematic (though they may be
33
), but that the 
theory that posits them is unable to provide a satisfactory explanation of their relation to 
the entities they denote. The conclusion that any interpretation of the GEA ought to 
identify is that the theory of denoting concepts (or the theory of meaning and 
denotation, or Frege‘s theory of Sinn and Bedeutung) cannot adequately explain why, 
say, ⟨<the author of Waverley> is Scotch⟩ is about Scott. 
 
                                                 
32
 The Central Question of OD being: How is it that a sentence containing a denoting phrase comes to be 
about whatever it is about? 
33
 I have no wish to deny that there may be such issues, or even that, at certain stages of the GEA, they 
come under consideration. But, if my suggestion is along the right lines, we should take very seriously the 
possibility that such issues do not constitute the heart of the matter (for related discussion see Noonan 
1996). The central problem identified in the GEA does not concern the denoting concepts themselves, or 
the possibility of forming propositions directly about them, but rather concerns their relation to their 
denotations. 
158 
 
2.3. The earlier Russell and Frege compared 
In a certain light, Russell‘s treatment of definite descriptions in PoM is superficially 
similar to Frege‘s treatment of them in the Grundgesetze (Frege 1964).34 It is therefore 
worthwhile to briefly indicate the differences between the two views whereby Frege, 
unlike Russell, takes descriptions to be singular terms. This will also serve to emphasise 
the shared assumption in virtue of which both positions, despite their other differences, 
are targeted by the GEA.
35
 
 
Frege introduces the symbol ‗\‘ as a definite description-forming operator (1964: 
§11, 49-51). For any concept Φ(𝜉), he takes the expression ‗ε ̓ Φ(ε)‘ as indicating the 
Werthverlauf—‗course of values‘—of that concept, and then holds that the expression: 
 
(4) \ε ̓ Φ(ε) 
 
refers to the object falling under the concept Φ(𝜉). Taking Φ(𝜉) to be ‗ξ taught Plato‘, 
(4) refers to Socrates. For any concept Ψ(𝜉) having an extension composed of more or 
less than exactly one object, the expression: 
 
(5) \ε ̓ Ψ(ε) 
 
will have the same reference as ‗ε ̓ Ψ(ε)‘, i.e. the course of values of Ψ(𝜉). Taking Ψ(𝜉) 
to be ‗𝜉 is presently king of France‘, (5) refers to the null-class. 
 
This ensures that all definite descriptions refer to something; and this is necessary 
because it is highly implausible that a sentence of the form ‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ fails to be either 
true or false, as it must do if ‗the 𝐹‘ is a singular term to which nothing answers.36 
Given Frege‘s function-argument framework, if ‗the 𝐹‘ fails to designate an object, 
there is nothing to stand as argument to the concept given by the predicate ‗𝜉 is 𝐺‘, and 
hence no possibility of transition from the concept to a truth-value. In order that all 
                                                 
34
 The similarity is particularly obvious if one modifies Russell‘s position in the manner mooted in 
§2.2.2.2. I do not, however, think that Russell himself endorsed any such modification. 
35
 Frege‘s account of descriptions changes throughout his career. The different positions are outlined in 
Pelletier & Linsky 2005, and their development plotted by Makin (2000: 173-78). 
36
 Such, I take it, would have been Frege‘s position in the Grundlagen (Frege 1884: §74n). 
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sentences of the form ‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ be assigned a truth-value37 every definite description 
must be assigned a reference. Just as the complex singular term (as Frege conceives it) 
‗the father of Charles II‘ only refers if ‗Charles II‘ does, so, for Frege, ‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ only 
refers (to a truth-value) if ‗the 𝐹‘ refers. 
 
Russell‘s view in PoM is significantly different. If there is no 𝐹, ‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ 
expresses the false proposition ⟨<the 𝐹> is 𝐺⟩. It suffices for Russell merely that ‗the 𝐹‘ 
have a propositional complement (no denotation is technically required): so long as this 
is so, well-formed sentences containing ‗the 𝐹‘ are assured of expressing a 
proposition—and hence of being true or false. The propositional complement is the 
denoting concept <the 𝐹>, which subsists quite independently of its denoting anything. 
We may, as I suggested above, make the move (Fregean in spirit) of providing a 
denotation for empty denoting concepts (e.g. the class of 𝐹s), but it is important to 
recognise that any such move is optional for Russell. Given his truth-primitivism, there 
is no theoretical objection to the stipulation that any proposition of the form ⟨<the 𝐹> is 
𝐺⟩ is automatically false if <the 𝐹> denotes nothing. Intuitively it is not perhaps an 
attractive move: certainly it appears to be ‗plainly artificial‘ (OD: 47). But artificiality 
aside, the PoM framework does not demand that every denoting concept denote 
something. 
 
The difference between the two positions may be emphasised by comparing the 
levels of analysis to which they appeal (I do not intend ‗analysis‘ in any technical sense 
here). Let us compare the analyses of (6): 
 
(6) The father of Charles II died on the scaffold. 
 
The Fregean analysis appeals to three levels: the linguistic level, the level of Sinn, and 
the level of Bedeutung. For Russell there are only two levels: the linguistic and the 
propositional.
38
 At the linguistic level we have the sentence, (6), composed of two 
                                                 
37
 As opposed to merely expressing a Thought. 
38
 Russell‘s propositional level is most akin to Frege‘s level of Sinn as regards judgement: a proposition is 
the object of judgement for Russell, just as a Thought is for Frege. On the other hand, as regards 
significance, the propositional level is most akin to the level of Bedeutung: propositions are about objects 
(terms, entities). 
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expressions, a definite description and a predicate. At Russell‘s second level (the 
propositional level) we have the proposition expressed, namely ⟨6R⟩: 
 
⟨6R⟩ ⟨<the father of Charles II> died on the scaffold⟩ 
 
For the Russell of PoM the analysis does not go beyond this level.
39
 At Frege‘s second 
level (the level of Sinn), (6) expresses a Thought, namely ⟨6F⟩: 
 
⟨6F⟩ ⟨§the father of Charles II§, §𝜉 died on the scaffold§⟩
40 
 
And for Frege, the truth of ⟨6F⟩ is a matter of its determining
41
 the True at his third level, 
the level of Bedeutung. It will determine the True just in case, if the concept Φ(𝜉) is the 
determinatum of §𝜉 died on the scaffold§ and 𝑎 is the determinatum of §the father of 
Charles II§, the value of the concept Φ(𝜉) for the argument 𝑎 is the True. This is the root 
of the difference between Frege and Russell‘s positions. For Frege, a definite 
description is employable in the construction of true or false sentences in virtue of 
having both a Sinn and a Bedeutung: for Russell, a denoting phrase is employable in the 
construction of true or false sentences solely in virtue of indicating a denoting concept. 
For Frege—but not for Russell—it is a condition of ‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ making a truth-
evaluable claim, that ‗the 𝐹‘ designate something. The truth (falsehood) of the sentence 
‗the 𝐹 is 𝐺‘ depends, for Frege, upon the state of the object designated by ‗the 𝐹‘: so for 
Frege, definite descriptions are singular terms.
42
 
 
If Frege and the earlier Russell do not both endorse the thesis that definite 
descriptions are singular terms, what do they have in common? Simply what we 
identified above: both set about answering the Central Question of OD by appeal to the 
logical relation holding between the propositional complement of a denoting phrase, 
                                                 
39
 Obviously I am not claiming that Russell thinks all analysis stops here! ⟨6R⟩ is presumably amenable to 
further analysis. But in terms of the levels I am discussing here, any further analysis would take place at 
the propositional level. 
40
 I will use subscripted ‗§’s, to distinguish Sinne, analogously to the use of angle-brackets to distinguish 
denoting concepts. 
41
 I will use ‗determining‘ for the relation between Sinn and Bedeutung. It is, for the purposes of this 
thesis, more or less equivalent to PoM‘s technical sense of ‗denoting‘. 
42
 Makin (2000: 173) suggests that, in the Grundgesetze, Frege was close to recognising that definite 
descriptions should not be classified as singular terms. If he was, then so much the better for my 
objections to the Salmon-Hylton position above. 
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and the denotation of that phrase. As I shall set it out, the GEA is intended to show that 
the appeal to this machinery cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the central question 
of OD.
43
 
 
3. The Gray’s Elegy Argument: An Overview 
There are, I think, at least three significant difficulties concerning the GEA. The first is 
that Russell uses unfamiliar terminology. He speaks, for instance, of denoting 
complexes and speaks sometimes of their having a meaning, sometimes of their being 
meanings. Denoting complexes are not mentioned in PoM, and the terminology is 
certainly not Fregean. So what exactly are they? The second difficulty concerns the fact 
that the argument addresses an issue that Russell had not addressed before (except in 
OF, of course). The third difficulty concerns the fact that while the argument Russell 
brings to bear is recoverable from the text, it isn‘t easily recoverable. As a result of the 
second and third difficulties, an interpretation that presents a coherent account of the 
argument and links it to the text will inevitably be somewhat convoluted. In an effort to 
overcome (or at least mitigate) these difficulties, I propose in this section to give an 
overview of the GEA. In §4 I will go through the argument in greater detail, following 
the course set by the text. 
 
The Central Question of OD is: How is it that a sentence containing a denoting 
phrase comes to be about whatever it is about? The GEA concerns the adequacy of the 
answer that the theory of meaning and denotation is able to provide. Let us begin, then, 
with that answer. It will help to have an example in mind. So let us ask what 
explanation the theory of meaning and denotation is able to give of the fact that the 
sentence ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ is about Socrates. 
 
In the most general terms, the explanation is that ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ is 
about Socrates because the propositional complement of its subject term, the definite 
description ‗the teacher of Plato‘, is an entity with the property of denoting Socrates. A 
terminological issue may be resolved here: a ‗denoting complex‘ is simply the 
propositional complement of a denoting phrase. It is more or less equivalent to 
‗denoting concept‘, as used in PoM (one difference being that while it seems quite 
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 Though as I suggest in §5, Frege‘s position can—in a certain sense—be rescued. 
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acceptable to speak of a simple denoting concept, it seems odd to speak of a simple 
denoting complex). Thus ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ is about Socrates because it 
expresses a proposition containing a denoting complex—namely <the teacher of 
Plato>—that denotes him. 
 
In PoM there is really no more explanation of the fact that ‗the teacher of Plato is 
wise‘ is about Socrates than we have just given. Russell does, however, hint that there is 
more to be said. He writes: 
 
In a full discussion, it would be necessary also to discuss the denoting concepts: 
the actual meanings of these concepts, as opposed to the nature of the objects 
they denote, have not been discussed above. (PoM: §65, 65, emphasis added) 
 
The implication here is that denoting concepts (= denoting complexes) have meanings. 
This is surprising since we have been led to believe that a denoting complex is the 
meaning of a denoting phrase. The theory of meaning and denotation is, we supposed, a 
theory premised upon the distinction between the meaning of a denoting phrase—i.e. a 
certain denoting complex—and its denotation. That is, the theory distinguishes between 
what a sentence containing a denoting phrase is about and what occurs in the 
proposition expressed by that sentence—i.e. the meaning of the denoting phrase. 
 
Russell‘s speaking of the meaning of the propositional complement of a denoting 
phrase reflects the recognition that there must be more to the theory of meaning and 
denotation‘s response to the Central Question. The reason why there must be more 
concerns the status of the theory of meaning and denotation as a theory of denoting, i.e. 
as an account of the possibility of propositions of generality. ‗The teacher of Plato is 
wise‘ is about Socrates because the denoting complex <the teacher of Plato> denotes 
him; but in addition to this, the theory of meaning and denotation must provide an 
explanation of why it is that <the teacher of Plato> denotes Socrates rather than anyone 
else. It isn‘t just by accident—it isn‘t, for example, just by luck that ⟨<all men> are 
mortal⟩ is about all men rather than all pencils. Rather, when a denoting complex 
denotes an entity, it does so because that entity has a certain property, namely that 
property which we might characterise as the descriptive content of the corresponding 
denoting phrase. The complex <the teacher of Plato> denotes Socrates because it 
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denotes whatever taught Plato and, as a matter of fact, Socrates taught Plato. If 
Xanthippe had taught Plato, <the teacher of Plato> would denote her; if Plato had never 
received instruction, <the teacher of Plato> would denote nobody. 
 
To accommodate this aspect of the theory of meaning and denotation, Russell 
comes to the view that ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ is about Socrates because <the 
teacher of Plato> denotes him, and because the meaning of the complex is the 
descriptive condition taught Plato. (We may say—and Russell is disposed to put things 
this way—that the denoting phrase ‗the teacher of Plato‘ means <the teacher of Plato>. 
But since we will also need to speak of the meaning of <the teacher of Plato>, it is 
better to say that the phrase indicates <the teacher of Plato>, and to reserve ‗means‘ and 
‗meaning‘ for the meaning of complexes.) So in order to provide an adequate answer to 
the Central Question, we need to take account of the relevance of meaning, as well as 
denotation. In explaining why ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ is about Socrates, we need 
to take account of the meaning of the complex <the teacher of Plato> in order to 
adequately reflect the fact that the sentence is about Socrates in virtue of his having 
taught Plato. 
 
Russell sometimes speaks of denoting complexes as having ‗two sides‘ and being 
‗two-fold‘ (OF: 383). What he means is that denoting complexes are capable of 
occurring in propositions in more than one way. In general a proposition containing a 
denoting complex will be about the denotation of that complex (as in ⟨<the teacher of 
Plato> is wise⟩. But sometimes a proposition containing that same complex will be 
about the complex itself. This latter possibility reflects a fundamental aspect of 
Russell‘s general metaphysical framework: if there were no propositions about 
complexes in virtue of containing them—if denoting complexes were not possible 
logical subjects—the ‗contradiction always to be feared‘ (PoM: §74, 76) would raise its 
ugly head. Propositions about a given denoting complex and about its denotation will, 
then, have a common constituent
44
, namely the denoting complex itself. (Russell is lax, 
it seems to me, in that he sometimes fails to keep the complex suitably distinct from its 
meaning; I take his position to be that if one wishes to speak about the meaning of a 
complex, one formulates a proposition about the complex. If the complex and its 
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 At least when the propositions about the denotation are about it in virtue of containing the complex. 
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meaning are distinct, then this is either a gross mistake, or requires further explanation. 
Either way, it seems to me that Russell goes astray in this respect.) 
 
The version of the theory of meaning and denotation under discussion at present is 
a ‗four-entity‘ version of the theory. Henceforth I shall refer to it as ‗the four-entity 
theory‘, or ‗4E theory‘ for short. It is a four-entity theory because it posits four distinct 
entities: (𝑖) the denoting phrase; (𝑖𝑖) the denoting complex; (𝑖𝑖𝑖) the meaning; and (𝑖𝑣) 
the denotation. The 4E theory and the notation I shall use in association with it is given 
in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3 
The Four-Entity (4E) Theory 
𝑖. Denoting Phrase................................................................... ‗the 𝐹‘ 
𝑖𝑖. Denoting Complex.............................................................. <the 𝐹> 
𝑖𝑖𝑖. Meaning............................................................................. M<the 𝐹>M [= 𝕄] 
𝑖𝑣. Denotation.......................................................................... D<the 𝐹>D [=𝔻] 
 
(I will use ‗𝕄‘ and ‗𝔻‘ as singular terms for the meaning and denotation (respectively) 
of the denoting phrase ‗the 𝐹‘. The possibility of such a use of ‗𝕄‘ will be called into 
question by the GEA, but I employ it independently of those concerns, solely as a useful 
heuristic device.) 
 
As mentioned above, on the 4E theory some propositions containing a denoting 
complex will be about its denotation, but some will be about the complex itself (or 
about its meaning, Russell not adequately distinguishing these two possibilities). This is 
reflected in the notation above by the use of subscripted ‗M‘s and ‗D‘s. In the notation, 
we will say that <the teacher of Plato> is the propositional complement of ‗the teacher 
of Plato‘, but will hold that 
 
⟨7⟩ ⟨<the teacher of Plato> is wise⟩ 
 
is strictly ambiguous. It might be: 
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⟨7a⟩ ⟨D<the teacher of Plato>D is wise⟩ 
 
in which case it is a proposition about Socrates; or it might be: 
 
⟨7b⟩ ⟨M<the teacher of Plato>M is wise⟩ 
 
in which case it is a proposition about <the teacher of Plato>. The crucial point is that 
although ⟨7a⟩ and ⟨7b⟩ are not equivalent, they have a common constituent in entity-
position (i.e. <the teacher of Plato>). 
 
The notation we have introduced provides a convenient way of illustrating the 
claim that denoting complexes are ‗twofold‘. This is welcome because the theory of 
meaning and denotation‘s response to the Central Question relies upon the claim that 
denoting complexes are twofold; for it relies upon the claim that the complex occurring 
in entity-position in ⟨7a⟩ denotes Socrates in virtue of the fact that its meaning embodies 
a descriptive condition that Socrates satisfies.  
 
However, in appealing to the relevance of meaning in this way, one in fact merely 
provides the beginnings of an adequate response to the Central Question. To provide a 
full answer, we would need to say a little more about the 4E theory. How exactly is it 
that the meaning of <the teacher of Plato> comes to be relevant in ⟨7a⟩? What is the 
nature of the connection between the meaning of a complex and that complex itself, i.e. 
between M<the teacher of Plato>M and <the teacher of Plato>? In virtue of what is it 
possible for a complex to occur in such a way that a proposition is about its denotation 
and also occur in such a way that a proposition is about itself or its meaning? Our 
notation provides convenient ways of representing these relations, but what is needed is 
an account of what it is that the notation represents. The validity of the notation is, so to 
speak, underwritten by the nature of the relations that hold at the logical level (the 
propositional level); hence we are only entitled to introduce the notation at all if we 
have a firm grasp of the relations it represents. 
 
Russell will argue in paragraph (D) of the GEA that there is, in fact, no non-circular 
way of explaining what the notational operations that we perform represent. Of course 
the use of subscripted ‗M‘s and ‗D‘s is my proposal. Russell employs, to the same 
166 
 
effect, inverted commas. The use of inverted commas is probably the most notorious 
aspect of the GEA. Its notoriety is certainly merited, but we can, I think, recover the 
points that Russell wishes to make. 
 
The upshot of paragraph (D) will be that the 4E theory fails to adequately explain 
what the use of subscripts (or inverted commas) represents, and hence that it is unable 
to justify its claim that denoting complexes are twofold. In the light of this, Russell 
proposes a different version of the theory of meaning and denotation. This second 
version may be thought of as a ‗three-entity theory‘ (‗3E theory). On this theory—
which is far closer to Frege‘s position than the 4E theory was—the denoting complex 
and meaning are taken to be identical, leaving us only three entities: (𝑖) the denoting 
phrase; (𝑖𝑖) the meaning (= denoting complex); and (𝑖𝑖𝑖) the denotation. 
 
Fig. 4 
The Three-Entity (3E) Theory 
𝑖. Denoting Phrase.............................................................. ‗the 𝐹‘ 
𝑖𝑖. Meaning (=Denoting Complex).................................... M<the 𝐹>M [= 𝕄] 
𝑖𝑖𝑖. Denotation.................................................................... D<the 𝐹>D [= 𝔻] 
 
The transition from the 4E to the 3E theory occurs in paragraphs (E) and (F). At the 
end of paragraph (F) and the beginning of paragraph (G), Russell indicates an initial 
problem facing the 3E theory. If one wishes to formulate a proposition about a meaning, 
one must denote it with a second meaning; but identifying this second meaning turns 
out to be problematic. 
 
This initial problem is not the main objection to the 3E theory, however. The major 
objection—signalled in the second half of (G) and developed in (H)—brings us back to 
the Central Question. Russell now argues that if meaning is not an aspect of a denoting 
complex (as, by intention at least, it was on the 4E theory) there is no explaining how 
meaning can be ‗relevant‘ to the fact that ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ is about Socrates. 
If denoting complexes merely denote (and do not also mean) then although the 
proposition ⟨<the teacher of Plato> is wise⟩ is about Socrates, there is no accounting for 
the fact that it is about him only in virtue of his having taught Plato. But this is a 
fundamental requirement of the theory of meaning and denotation: if it cannot satisfy it, 
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it must give up any pretensions to being an adequate account of propositions of 
generality. Its response to the Central Question will be entirely inadequate, and the 
theory must, on this ground, be abandoned. 
 
4. The Gray’s Elegy Argument: An Interpretation 
Although I have not attempted to provide detailed discussion of rival interpretations of 
the GEA, I have on occasion indicated where my interpretation differs significantly 
from others. These comments are (with regret) relegated to footnotes, for to include 
them in the main text would clog up and complicate a discussion that is already 
complicated enough. The main focus in these footnotes are the interpretations of Makin 
(2000) and Levine (2004), for it is these interpretations which—as far as I can tell—
have influenced mine the most.
45
 
 
4.1. Paragraphs (A) and (B): introduction 
 
The relation of the meaning to the denotation involves certain rather curious 
difficulties, which seem in themselves sufficient to prove that the theory which 
leads to such difficulties must be wrong. (OD: 48 A) 
 
The opening paragraph is perfectly clear. It is the relation of meaning to denotation that 
will come under investigation. We should not therefore, expect the GEA to call into 
question either the ontological status of meanings, the possibility of formulating 
propositions about them, or the possibility of epistemic access to them.
46
 
 
The difficulty begins in (B), which is as confused as (A) is clear. 
 
When we wish to speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase, as opposed to 
its denotation, the natural mode of doing so is by inverted commas. Thus we 
say: 
 
The centre of mass of the solar system is a point, not a denoting complex; 
‗The centre of mass of the solar system‘ is a denoting complex, not a point. 
 
                                                 
45
 I would like to record my debt to many excellent discussions of the GEA, notably: Geach 1959; Cassin 
1970; Dau 1985; Cartwright 1987b; Hylton 1990; Pakaluk 1993; Wahl 1993; Kremer 1994; Noonan 
1996; Landini 1998b; Makin 2000; Levine 2004; and Salmon 2005. 
46
 Contrast, e.g., Levine 2004: 265-66. For interpretations with an epistemological twist see: Kremer 1994 
or Noonan 1996. 
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Or again, 
 
The first line of Gray‘s Elegy states a proposition. 
‗The first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘ does not state a proposition. 
 
Thus taking any denoting phrase, say 𝐶, we wish to consider the relation 
between 𝐶 and ‗𝐶‘, where the difference of the two is of the kind exemplified in 
the above two instances. (OD: 48-9 B) 
 
Alonzo Church famously claims that the objection raised in the GEA is ‗traceable 
merely to confusion between use and mention of expressions, of a sort which Frege is 
careful to avoid by the employment of quotation-marks‘ (Church 1943: 302). Russell‘s 
use of inverted commas is certainly confusing, but Church is simply wrong to think that 
the objections ‗completely vanish‘ (Church 1943: 302) when they are applied 
consistently and correctly. In (B) at least, the main difficulty does not so much concern 
the use of inverted commas, but an equivocation between the 4E and 3E theories. 
 
Russell‘s first example (shortened slightly), may be rendered as follows: 
 
(8) The centre of mass of the solar system is a point. 
⟨8⟩ ⟨D<the centre of mass of the solar system>D is a point⟩ 
 
If 𝑝 is the point which is centre of mass of the solar system, ⟨8⟩ expresses a proposition 
about 𝑝 in virtue of its being denoted by <the centre of mass of the solar system>. (9), 
on the other hand, ought to express a proposition which is not about 𝑝 but rather the 
meaning of the phrase ‗the centre of mass of the solar system‘47. 
 
(9) ‗The centre of mass of the solar system‘ is a denoting complex. 
 
The difficulty is that if we interpret (9) in accordance with the 4E theory, yielding ⟨9⟩, 
 
⟨9⟩ ⟨M<the centre of mass of the solar system>M is a denoting complex⟩ 
 
                                                 
47
 These inverted commas are ‗phrase-mentioners‘: the inverted commas in (9) are Russell‘s ‗meaning-
indicators‘. 
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the proposition is, as was intended, about the meaning in question, but—as was not 
intended—the proposition is false. For M<the centre of mass of the solar system>M is a 
meaning, not a denoting complex (meanings and denoting complexes not being 
identified on the 4E theory). 
 
One option here—which challenges my entire approach—is to suggest that the 
imposition of the 4E theory was in the first place unwarranted, to suggest that it had no 
place in either PoM or Frege‘s theory, and to claim that it has been posited merely in 
order to make sense of an otherwise intractable argument. The less interesting, but more 
accurate, reading, it will be said, is that the GEA is simply confused and incoherent.
48
 
 
However this objection to my general approach can and should be resisted. Three 
points are salient. Firstly, as noted in §3, PoM contains at least a hint that Russell had 
something like the 4E theory in mind, as Russell there distinguishes between a denoting 
concept and the meaning of that concept (PoM: §65, 65). Secondly, the fact that the 4E 
theory is not to be found in Frege is neither here nor there. The GEA will address both 
4E and 3E theories (Frege‘s is a 3E theory). Thirdly, the 4E theory is explicit in OF, 
where we find the origins of the GEA. There are far too many examples to quote them 
all. Here are a few: 
 
When a concept has meaning and denotation, if we wish to.... (OF: 381, 
emphasis added) 
 
The endeavour to speak about the meanings of denoting complexes leads.... (OF: 
382) 
 
...the necessity of distinguishing the two sides in complexes. (OF: 383, emphasis 
added) 
 
One might try to explain away such evidence by claiming that Russell in fact 
intends ‗denoting complex‘ as synonymous with ‗denoting phrase‘. But this is highly 
unlikely. In the first of the above quotations he is distinguishing the concept—not 
complex—from the meaning, and he certainly did not intend ‗denoting concept‘ as 
synonymous with ‗denoting phrase‘ (and a similar claim is made, as we have seen, at 
                                                 
48
 Something like this general approach is found, in spirit at least, in Urquhart 2005. 
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the end of the discussion of denoting in PoM). Moreover, the wording of (B) strongly 
suggests that ‗denoting phrase‘ and ‗denoting complex‘ are to be distinguished. He 
writes: ‗When we wish to speak about the meaning of a denoting phrase‘, and then 
gives an example in which what is spoken of is a denoting complex—suggesting that 
phrase and complex are not to be conflated. Thus I take it that the 4E theory is 
obviously present in OF, implicit in PoM, and at stake in the GEA. 
 
The correct explanation of paragraph (B) is, I suggest, that Russell has simply 
presented the position poorly. (9) is best understood in terms of the 3E theory, 
according to which ⟨9⟩ is true. This reading is supported by OF, in which Russell 
introduces the same examples, commenting that: 
 
In each of these [i.e. (8) and (9)] the subject occurs as entity, not as meaning; in 
[(9)], the subject is ―𝐶‖ [i.e. M<the centre of mass of the solar system>M], in [(8)] 
it is 𝐶 [i.e. D<the centre of mass of the solar system>D]. Thus it would seem that 
―𝐶‖ and 𝐶 are two different entities. In that case, what is the connection between 
them? (OF: 383, emphasis added) 
 
Here Russell uses the same examples as in (B) to illustrate and motivate the 3E theory, 
stressing that ‗𝐶‘ and 𝐶—that is: M<the centre of mass of the solar system>M  and D<the 
centre of mass of the solar system>D—are different entities, rather than the same entity 
under different modes of occurrence. 
 
At the end of (B) Russell attempts to frame his distinctions in general terms, using 
the third letter of the alphabet capitalised as a schematic letter abbreviating any denoting 
phrase. (Henceforth, when I wish to mention one of Russell‘s deployments of the 
schematic letter ‗𝐶‘ I will either use the phrase ‗schematic ―𝐶‖‘ (or some clear variant), 
or indicate (in parentheses or a footnote) whether I am using inverted commas as normal 
‗phrase-mentioners‘ or as Russellian ‗meaning-indicators‘.) He begins badly, 
mentioning a phrase without using any device at all (he can‘t use inverted commas, 
having just proposed to use them as ‗meaning-indicators‘): 
 
Thus taking any denoting phrase, say 𝐶... (OD: 49 B) 
 
 and continues: 
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...we wish to consider the relation between 𝐶 and ‗𝐶‘. (OD: 49 B) 
 
The second schematic ‗𝐶‘ in this last quotation employs inverted commas 
according to Russell‘s stated convention (as meaning-indicators). The first schematic 
‗𝐶‘, given plain (i.e. without inverted commas), could indicate the denoting complex 
itself (i.e. the denoting complex posited on the 4E theory), or the denotation (i.e. 𝔻). On 
the former interpretation, Russell wishes to consider the relation between <the centre of 
mass of the solar system> and M<the centre of mass of the solar system>M, which would 
be in accord with an investigation into the 4E theory. On the latter interpretation, 
Russell wishes to consider the relation between 𝑝 and M<the centre of mass of the solar 
system>M. Both interpretations are independently plausible and so there is no great 
pressure to decide between them. Only one reading should be guarded against: the plain 
instance of the schematic ‗𝐶‘ in the most recently quoted passage is not intended to 
mention the denoting phrase (as is the first plain instance of schematic ‗𝐶‘ in (B)). If it 
were, we could make no sense of the final claim, that ‗the difference of the two is of the 
kind exemplified in the above two instances‘. 
 
4.2. Paragraph (C): statement of the argument 
In paragraph (C) the overall structure of the GEA is presented, albeit not very clearly. 
 
We say, to begin with, that when 𝐶 occurs it is the denotation that we are 
speaking about; but when ‗𝐶‘ occurs, it is the meaning. Now the relation of 
meaning and denotation is not merely linguistic through the phrase: there must 
be a logical relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning 
denotes the denotation. But the difficulty which confronts us is that we cannot 
succeed in both preserving the connexion of meaning and denotation and 
preventing them from being one and the same; also that the meaning cannot be 
got at except by means of denoting phrases. This happens as follows. (OD: 49 
C) 
 
Russell begins by comparing two occurrences of a denoting complex in a 
proposition. In both cases, as urged in OF
49
, the complex occurs in an entity-position in 
the proposition. In one case, ⟨8⟩, the proposition is about the denotation of the complex, 
in the other case, ⟨9⟩, the proposition is about the meaning of the complex. 
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 OF: 383. 
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⟨8⟩ ⟨D<the centre of mass of the solar system>D is a point⟩ 
⟨9⟩ ⟨M<the centre of mass of the solar system>M is a denoting complex⟩ 
 
Russell now says that the relation between M<the centre of mass of the solar 
system>M and D<the centre of mass of the solar system>D—is not ‗merely linguistic 
through the phrase‘. The point here is almost universally held to be that although it is 
possible to draw a relation between meaning and denotation in terms of their respective 
relations to a common denoting phrase, this ‗merely linguistic‘ relation is less 
fundamental than, and derivative upon, the logical relation in which they stand to one 
another. That is, although the logical relation of denoting can be given as the relative 
product of the phrase-meaning and phrase-denotation relations, this relation is indirect, 
when what is required is a characterisation of the direct relation of meaning to 
denotation.
50
 I suspect, however, that a different reading may be more apt.
51
 
 
According to my alternative reading, Russell‘s ‗linguistic through the phrase‘ point 
concerns the relation between the expressions ‗‗𝐶‘‘ and ‗𝐶‘—i.e. schematic ‗𝐶‘ in 
inverted commas and schematic ‗𝐶‘ plain; or in our notation, between the expressions 
‗M<the centre of mass of the solar system>M‘ and ‗D<the centre of mass of the solar 
system>D‘. His point is that the notational convention that we introduce (be it 
subscripted ‗M‘ and ‗D‘, or inverted commas) is a representation of something more 
fundamental at the logical level. We use subscripted ‗M‘ to indicate that the complex 
occurs in such a way that the proposition is about the meaning of the denoting phrase, or 
use subscripted ‗D‘ to indicate that the complex occurs in such a way that the 
proposition is about the denotation of the denoting phrase. That is fine as far as it goes: 
we are quite at liberty to introduce any such notational convention we like. But a 
condition of doing so is that we genuinely understand what it is that our notation 
represents. Thus Russell‘s point might be put like this: that we indicate the relation 
between the meaning and denotation of a denoting complex by using different 
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 This is clearly indicated in diagrammatic form by Demopoulous (1999). Cf. Figure 2 in Chapter Two 
(§4.3). 
51
 As far as I know, no other commentator has offered the following reading of the ‗linguistic through the 
phrase‘ claim. 
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subscripts attached to the expression for the complex is justified only to the extent that 
we are familiar with the logical operations that the linguistic operations track.
52
 
 
The remainder of paragraph (C) (less the final clause, to be discussed below) sets 
out the crux of the argument. The difficulty, apparently, is that we cannot realise—as 
presumably we must—both of the following two aims: 
 
 To preserve the connection of meaning and denotation; 
 To prevent the meaning and denotation from being one and the same. 
 
The difficulty, however, is to discern any part of the GEA in which it seems as if there 
is a danger of the meaning and denotation becoming one and the same. It is clear that 
such an event would be disastrous for any version of the theory of meaning and 
denotation (since the theory is premised upon their distinction); but there is little 
indication from any of the eight paragraphs of the argument that this might be on the 
cards.
53
 What then could Russell have in mind? I suggest that the incompatible aims are 
in fact the following: 
 
 To preserve the connection of meaning and denotation; 
 To prevent the meaning and denotation from being ‗two sides‘ of the one 
complex (alternatively: to prevent the denoting complex from having the ‗two 
sides‘ of meaning and denotation). 
 
This re-description of the second aim may seem a little far removed from the actual 
text of paragraph (C). But that this kind of thought is in the offing is suggested in OF, 
where Russell adverts: 
                                                 
52
 This interpretation of the ‗linguistic through the phrase‘ claim enables a deeper understanding of 
paragraph (D), I will suggest below. 
53
 Salmon describes the central thrust of the argument as follows: 
 
Here is the chestnut in a nutshell: The seemingly innocuous thesis that definite descriptions are 
singular terms is untenable. For the attempt to form a proposition directly about the content of a 
definite description (as by using an appropriate form of quotation) inevitably results in a 
proposition about the thing designated instead of the content expressed. I call this phenomenon 
the Collapse. (Salmon: 2005: 1071) 
 
One might take the Collapse to be an instance of meaning and denotation becoming one and the same; 
but the italicised phrase doesn‘t strike me as a natural way of describing it. (I also dispute Salmon‘s claim 
that there is a Collapse.) 
174 
 
 
the indissolubility of meaning and denotation, and the impossibility of inventing 
a symbolism which will avoid the necessity of distinguishing the two sides in 
complexes. (OF: 383) 
 
On this reading, the second aim now amounts this: that we cannot prevent denoting 
complexes from having the two sides. But one might think: ‗Well what is so wrong with 
that: isn‘t that exactly what the 4E theory claims?‘ And indeed that is exactly what the 
4E theory claims; but Russell‘s contention will be that: 
 
(GEA 1) If the meaning and denotation are two sides of the one denoting complex, 
then we cannot explain (‗preserve‘) the connection between them. 
 
If Russell could establish (GEA 1), we would have to abandon the 4E theory; and 
indeed this is what Russell does in paragraph (E), where he switches from the 4E theory 
to the 3E theory, on the basis of the argument presented in (D). 
 
However, in (F), (G) and—especially—in (H), Russell is going to argue that the 3E 
theory is even worse off. If the meaning and denotation are completely distinct entities, 
there is even less chance of satisfactorily explaining their relation (or so he will argue). 
From this we may understand him as implicitly drawing the moral that only way to 
preserve a satisfactory connection between meaning and denotation is to reinstate the 4E 
view, since: 
 
(GEA 2) If the meaning and denotation are not two sides of the one denoting 
complex, then we cannot explain (‗preserve‘) the connection between 
them. 
 
Together (GEA 1) and (GEA 2) form the premises of an argument whose 
conclusion is: 
 
(GEA 3) We cannot explain (‗preserve‘) the connection of meaning and 
denotation. 
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The Central Question of OD is ‗how is it that sentences containing denoting phrases 
come to be about whatever it is that they are about?‘ The theory of meaning and 
denotation offers an answer based on the connection between meaning and denotation. 
Thus if (GEA 3) could be demonstrated, the theory of meaning and denotation would 
have no response to the Central Question of OD and would therefore have to be 
abandoned. The demonstration of (GEA 3) is, as I read it, the aim of the GEA.
54
 
 
The final clause of paragraph (C), ‗that the meaning cannot be got at except by 
means of denoting phrases‘ (OD: 49 C) does not, I think, introduce any new dimension 
to the argument. The fact that, on the 3E theory, ‗the meaning cannot be got at except by 
means of denoting phrases‘ will be shown to be problematic in (H). But there it will be 
taken as symptomatic of a deeper problem. That Russell tacks the clause onto the end of 
(C) suggests that he has a different objection in mind. Most likely, the objection is that, 
if meanings can only be ‗got at [. . .] by means of denoting phrases‘, then they cannot be 
logical subjects (since no proposition could be about a meaning in virtue of containing 
it). This is almost universally held to be the (or at least a) central issue in the GEA. I 
would suggest, however, that this issue is subordinate to the more fundamental issue, 
which is the problem regarding the relation of meaning and denotation.
55
 
 
4.3. Paragraph (D): against the 4E theory 
We come now to the argument itself. 
 
The one phrase 𝐶 was to have both meaning and denotation. But if we speak of 
‗the meaning of 𝐶‘, that gives us the meaning (if any) of the denotation. ‗The 
meaning of the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘ is the same as ‗The meaning of ―The 
curfew tolls the knell of parting day‖,‘ and is not the same as ‗The meaning of 
―the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‖.‘ Thus in order to get the meaning we want, we 
must speak not of ‗the meaning of 𝐶‘, but of ‗the meaning of ―𝐶‖,‘ which is the 
same as ‗𝐶‘ by itself. Similarly ‗the denotation of 𝐶‘ does not mean the 
denotation we want, but means something which, if it denotes at all, denotes 
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 Pakaluk 1993 also recognises that the argument begins with one view, identifies a problem with it, and 
so moves on to another view which is also rejected. Our interpretations differ greatly in other respects. 
55
 Two considerations ought to give anyone who thinks that the problem of meanings as logical subjects is 
central to the GEA pause. Firstly, if this is the central issue, why does Russell say in (A) that the central 
problem concerns the relation of meaning and denotation? Secondly, given that the problem of meanings 
as logical subjects is just an instance of ‗the contradiction always to be feared‘ (PoM: §74, 76), it is 
extremely surprising that Russell was unable to make his point more clearly than he managed in the GEA: 
he was, by 1905, well-practised in this kind of worry. 
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what is denoted by the denotation we want. For example, let ‗𝐶‘ be ‗the denoting 
complex occurring in the second of the above instances‘. Then 
 
𝐶 = ‗the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘, and 
 
the denotation of 𝐶 = The curfew tolls the knell of parting day. But what we 
meant to have as the denotation was ‗the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘. Thus we 
have failed to get what we wanted. (OD: 49 D) 
 
In explaining how it is that, say, ‗the centre of mass of the solar system is a point‘ 
comes to be about 𝑝, the 4E theory appeals to the following facts. Firstly, ‗The centre of 
mass of the solar system‘ has for its propositional complement the denoting complex 
<the centre of mass of the solar system>. Secondly, this complex denotes 𝑝 in virtue of 
𝑝‘s uniquely satisfying the property embodied by the meaning of the complex, namely 
being a centre of mass of the solar system. Since the 4E theory invokes the twofold 
nature of denoting complexes, it owes an explanation of it. The most obvious 
manifestation of the twofold nature of denoting complexes is that some propositions 
containing a denoting complex are about its denotation, while some are about its 
meaning 
56
. The 4E theory certainly gives the impression of being able to account for 
this. A simple notational device (inverted commas, or subscripts) is used to alert us 
when a complex occurs in a proposition in such a way that the proposition is about the 
meaning of the complex, rather than the denotation. But if this is to be anything more 
than a mere impression, we require an explanation of precisely what it is that the 
notational device represents. As I understand it, paragraph (D) is intended to 
demonstrate that the 4E theory‘s explanation involves a circularity. 
 
We begin by interpreting Russell‘s examples in terms of the 4E theory. As a first 
stab the most plausible interpretation is as follows (I will not ultimately endorse this 
interpretation). The first sentence of (D) indicates that Russell is discussing denoting 
phrases (as opposed to complexes), in particular the denoting phrase which is 
represented by the schematic ‗𝐶‘. When the expression ‗the meaning of 𝐶‘—that is, the 
result of attaching the prefix ‗the meaning of ...‘ to the schematic ‗𝐶‘—occurs as the 
grammatical subject of a sentence, that sentence does not express a proposition about 
the meaning of the expression represented by the schematic ‗𝐶‘, but of the denotation of 
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 Or about the complex itself—Russell does not seem to keep these as clearly separate as he ought to. 
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that expression. On this view, (10) and (11) express equivalent propositions (i.e. 
propositions making the same assertion of the same entity): 
 
(10) The meaning of the first line of Gray‘s Elegy is thus-and-so. 
(11) The meaning of ‗the curfew tolls the knell of parting day‘ is thus-and-
so.
57 
 
But neither of these, Russell maintains, expresses a proposition about the meaning of 
the denoting phrase ‗the first line of Gray‘s Elegy‘. In order to formulate such a 
proposition, the denoting phrase must be prefixed with ‗the meaning of ...‘ and 
mentioned, not used. 
 
Now if one had understood the ‗linguistic through the phrase‘ claim in paragraph 
(C) to mean that the relation between meaning and denotation cannot be explained in 
terms of their respective relations to their common denoting phrase, the above 
interpretation of the first half of (D) would be extremely plausible. The problem 
identified will be that the only way to speak about a meaning is to mention the denoting 
phrase that expresses it; and that plainly invokes a linguistic relation, rather than a 
logical one. But as suggested above (§4.2), I do not think that this is the best 
interpretation of the ‗linguistic through the phrase‘ claim. That claim should rather be 
understood as the demand for an account of what, at the logical level, is represented, at 
the linguistic level, by the enclosing of an expression for a denoting complex in inverted 
commas. Now this may not, in general terms, appear to differ significantly from the 
interpretation I have rejected. Are they not just two ways of expressing the same point? 
 
They are not. On the 4E theory the relation of meaning and denotation is to be 
explained in terms of their relation to a common denoting complex (as opposed to 
phrase). It is the different ways in which this complex can occur in a proposition that 
requires investigation; and it is this difference of mode of occurrence that is represented 
by Russell‘s inverted comma (or our subscript) notation. Hence Russell‘s point in (D) 
concerns the modes of occurrence of denoting complexes in propositions, rather than 
the use and mention of denoting phrases in sentences. These are, to a certain extent, 
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 The inverted commas here are used to mention the line of poetry. 
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analogous; but they are not identical. In particular, Russell is not arguing that there is 
anything inherently problematic about expressing a proposition about the meaning of a 
denoting phrase by mentioning that phrase. This practice is perfectly acceptable as far as 
it goes. But it does not constitute an explanation of what it represents—and why would 
it? It aims only at representing, at labelling, something: not at explaining it. It is the 
explanation that Russell is probing in the GEA, and in (D) in particular. That 
explanation concerns the different modes of occurrence of a complex in a proposition. 
So we should expect (D) to concern these matters, not purely linguistic matters 
concerning use and mention.
58
 
 
In our notation we use subscripted ‗D‘ or ‗M‘ to indicate the mode of occurrence of 
a complex in a proposition. Enclosing a denoting complex in subscript ‗M‘s allows us to 
speak about the meaning of that complex: for example, 
 
 ⟨M<the 𝐹>M = 𝕄⟩ 
 
If this is correct, then Russell‘s inverted comma notation—our subscript ‗M‘ notation—
represents, at the propositional level, a function 𝑓 from complexes to their meanings. 
 
The problem Russell identifies in the first half of (D) stems from the fact that the 
argument-places of functions are entity-positions. That is to say, our function 𝑓 has the 
following structure: 
 
 m[𝑓]m/e[𝑥]e 
 
Presenting the denoting complex <the 𝐹> to this function, we get: 
 
 m[𝑓]m/e[<the 𝐹>]e 
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 Like Levine (2004), I contend that the third word of (D) should be ‗complex‘ rather than ‗phrase‘. 
Levine implies that Russell‘s use of ‗phrase‘ was intentional, and that it meant ‗complex‘ (in accordance 
with the general Russellian tendency to use words for linguistic items for their non-linguistic correlates). 
He takes Russell‘s use of ‗denoting phrase‘ in the OD passages after the GEA to indicate a contrast with 
its earlier employment in the GEA (Levine 2004: 269-70). This strikes me as extremely unlikely; I prefer 
to attribute to Russell a mistake here. 
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But on the 4E theory this formula is ambiguous, since ‗<the 𝐹>‘ could be either of 
‗D<the 𝐹>D‘ or ‗M<the 𝐹>M‘. Denoting phrases are normally used to express 
propositions about their denotations. This gives us: 
 
 m[𝑓]m/e[D<the 𝐹>D]e 
 
which is equivalent to: 
 
 m[𝑓]m/e[𝔻]e 
 
But we seek an explanation of how it is that the subscript notation allows us to 
formulate propositions about meanings; and the above formula will not enable us to 
speak about the meaning we want (i.e. 𝕄), but only about the meaning of 𝔻 (if 𝔻 even 
has one). This is what Russell means by saying: ‗Thus in order to get the meaning we 
want, we must speak not of ‗the meaning of 𝐶‘‘, and is what is shown by the 
equivalence of the propositions expressed by (10) and (11). 
 
One way out of this problem is to fill the entity position in m[𝑓]m/e[𝑥]e with a 
denoting complex that denotes the meaning we want. But on the 4E theory, we don‘t 
want to introduce a wholly separate entity, but rather the original denoting complex, 
under a different mode of occurrence. This, then, is what the subscript ‗M‘ and ‗D‘ 
notation facilitates. A denoting complex has two possible ways of occurring as entity: 
denotatively (i.e. enclosed in subscript ‗D‘s) or non-denotatively (i.e. enclosed in 
subscript ‗M‘s). When a complex occurs denotatively in an entity-position in a 
proposition, the proposition will be about the denotation of the complex; when a 
complex occurs there non-denotatively, the proposition will be about the meaning of the 
complex.
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59
 At this stage I should point out a difference between my interpretation of (D) and another that may 
otherwise appear similar. I have distinguished between denotative and non-denotative occurrences of 
complexes. A similar distinction is made by Levine (2004: 272-73). However, in making the distinction I 
allow that ⟨M<the 𝐹>M is thus-and-so⟩ and ⟨D<the 𝐹>D is thus-and-so⟩ contain the same entity in entity-
position and yet are about different entities, and hold this to be a key commitment of the 4E theory. 
Levine, on the other hand, attributes to Russell the following view as an assumption: 
 
AS* Whenever [a denoting complex] occupies a subject-position [i.e. entity-position] in a 
propositional content, that content is not about that [denoting complex] itself but is 
rather about the entity it denotes (determines). (Levine 2004: 273) 
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This yields a more precise understanding of the subscript ‗M‘ notation: enclosing a 
symbol for a complex in subscript ‗M‘s indicates a non-denotative occurrence, even if 
that occurrence is in an entity-position. Returning to 𝑓, our function from complexes to 
their meanings, what we must present to it is M<the 𝐹>M: 
 
 m[𝑓]m/e[M<the 𝐹>M]e 
 
This yields 𝕄 as value, which is what we wanted. But the problem is that this 
explanation of the subscript ‗M‘ notation is obviously circular. In explaining what 
 
 M<the 𝐹>M 
 
represents, we have appealed to 
 
 m[𝑓]m/e[M<the 𝐹>M]e 
 
which uses the very expression we wanted to explain. 
 
Presenting the problem as one of circularity fits in very closely with what Russell 
writes in OF: 
 
If we say ‗―any man‖ is a denoting complex‘, ―any man‖ stands for ‗the meaning 
of the complex ―any man‖‘, which is a denoting concept. But this is circular; for 
we use ―any man‖ in explaining ―any man‖. And the circle is unavoidable. For if 
we say ―the meaning of any man‖, that will stand for the meaning of the 
denotation of any man, which is not what we want. (OF: 382) 
 
This passage uncovers two circularities, and it is important to identify which Russell is 
pressing. Russell‘s aim in the passage is to explain the functioning of the denoting 
                                                                                                                                               
 
He therefore takes it for granted that M<the 𝐹>M and D<the 𝐹>D are ‗distinct entities, not the same entity 
functioning in different ways‘ (Levine 2004: 274). As I interpret (D), its conclusion is that M<the 𝐹>M and 
D<the 𝐹>D are not two sides of the same complex, i.e. that they are not ‗the same entity functioning in 
different ways‘. Thus what Levine takes as a thesis to be assumed, I take as the thesis to be proved. 
Levine‘s account (cf. especially Levine 2004: 276n.) of the role of AS* in OF is problematic in other 
respects, but we need not go into the details. 
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complex <any man>. The proposition ⟨<any man> is a denoting complex⟩ is about—or 
at any rate is intended to be about—what <any man> means (i.e. M<any man>M). In the 
confused terms in the quotation: ―any man‖ stands for ‗the meaning of the complex 
―any man‖‘; in our terms: M<any man>M stands for—enables one to speak about—the 
meaning of the complex <any man>. This is circular in that it offers an explanation (or 
part of an explanation) of a denoting complex in terms of a further denoting complex. 
Now if the problem were that we did not, in general, have an adequate grasp of denoting 
complexes, this would be problematic. But since that is not our problem, this kind of 
circularity need not concern us unduly.
60
 The problematic circularity—the one to which 
Russell refers—concerns the fact that the denoting complex <any man> is explained in 
terms of itself: in Russell‘s terms, ―any man‖ stands for ‗the meaning of the complex 
―any man‖‘.61 
 
Presenting the problem as one of circularity has the added advantage of affording 
an explanation of an otherwise very strange claim: 
 
Thus in order to get the meaning we want, we must speak not of ‗the meaning of 
𝐶‘, but of ‗the meaning of ―𝐶‖,‘, which is the same as ‗𝐶‘ by itself. (OD: 49 D) 
 
Is Russell suggesting that the following two claims 
 
 ‗The meaning of ―𝐶‖‘ 
 ‗𝐶‘ 
 
are the same, or synonymous? That would make ‗the meaning of ...‘ an insignificant 
expression when prefixed to a denoting phrase—and that is surely not the case.62 
 
                                                 
60
 It would beg the question against the proponent of the theory of meaning and denotation to assume that 
we have no grasp of, or are not acquainted with, any denoting complexes. 
61
 Recognising and distinguishing these two respects in which the explanation is circular is important for 
the understanding of the GEA. It is also important in a scholarly respect, since it distinguishes my account 
of paragraph (D)—and of the entire GEA, in effect—from that of Makin (2000: esp. 34-7). Makin also 
recognises that the argument in (D) concerns symbolism, and that a circularity is involved. We disagree 
as to the nature of the circularity. 
62
 Levine (2004: 275) identifies an analogous circularity to that which I have identified, i.e. that M<the 
𝐹>M is characterised in terms of m[𝑓]m/e[M<the 𝐹>M]e. He fails, however, to provide any explanation of 
how it could even be possible that an instance of the function expressed by ‗the meaning of ...‘ could 
yield its own argument as value. 
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My interpretation, however, yields the result that the two expressions 
 
 M<the 𝐹>M 
 m[𝑓]m/e[M<the 𝐹>M]e 
 
are equivalent: for the latter involves the complication of a non-denotative occurrence. 
With the distinction between denotative and non-denotative modes of occurrence in 
mind, we see that expressions which look as if they could not possibly be equivalent—
since one is a function of the other—can be equivalent. The problem is that if they are 
equivalent, then the second expression cannot yield a non-circular explanation of the 
first. 
 
The first half of paragraph (D) argues that there is no non-circular account of the 
subscript ‗M‘ notation. The second half reinforces the point by showing that without an 
explanation of the subscript ‗M‘ notation—and so of non-denotative occurrences—the 
4E theory can give no adequate account of the role it assigns to meanings. We cannot 
even make sense of a meaning being denoted by another complex without employing 
the notion of a non-denotative occurrence (a notion which Russell takes himself to have 
shown that we do not really understand). 
 
Russell makes the point in general terms: 
 
‗the denotation of 𝐶‘ does not mean the denotation we want, but means 
something which, if it denotes at all, denotes what is denoted by the denotation 
we want. (OD: 49 D)
63
 
 
To render this in our terminology let Russell‘s denoting complex 𝐶 be <the 𝐹>. We 
have stipulated that <the 𝐹> denotes 𝔻. But, in asking after the denotation of <the 𝐹>, 
we are, in effect, asking after the denotation of 𝔻. Why? Because the argument position 
in the function represented by ‗the denotation of ...‘ is an entity-position. Denoting 
complexes standardly occur denotatively; and moreover we have been unable to provide 
                                                 
63
 Russell‘s potentially confusing uses of the verb ‗to mean‘ should not be taken as having a technical 
sense; rather they are used colloquially, as loosely equivalent to ‗to refer to‘ or ‗to be about‘, or 
something along those lines. 
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an explanation of non-denotative occurrence. Hence, taking 𝑓* as a function from 
complexes to their denotations, ‗the denotation of <the 𝐹>‘64 is equivalent to: 
 
 m[𝑓*]m/e[D<the 𝐹>D]e 
 
which is equivalent to: 
 
 m[𝑓*]m/e[𝔻]e 
 
But this is a function of the denotation of <the 𝐹> (i.e. 𝔻), rather than a function of <the 
𝐹> itself, as was intended.65 The solution, of course, is to employ the notion of a non-
denotative occurrence. But the first half of (D) has argued that we cannot make sense of 
this notion. 
 
Russell‘s illustrative example is liable to cause confusion largely, I think, because 
of the way it is set out on the page. The use of indentation leads one to suppose that the 
complex upon which the example focuses is <the first line of Gray‘s Elegy>. In fact the 
relevant complex is, in Russell‘s terms, ‗the denoting complex occurring in the second 
of the above examples‘, i.e. <the denoting complex occurring in the second example in 
(B)>. The indented clause simply points out that the complex in question has, for its 
denotation, the complex <the first line of Gray‘s Elegy>. Thus, presenting the relevant 
complex to the function expressed by ‗the denotation of ...‘ yields (in effect): 
 
 m[𝑓*]m/e[D<the denoting complex occurring in the second example in (B)>D]e 
 
Which, given Russell‘s indented clause, is equivalent to: 
 
 m[𝑓*]m/e[<the first line of Gray‘s Elegy>]e 
 
And then the problem is clear. The presentation of a complex to 𝑓* only yields the 
denotation of that very complex if that complex occurs non-denotatively. If it occurs 
                                                 
64
 These are standard phrase-mentioning inverted commas. 
65
 Cf. OF: 382-83. 
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denotatively the value will be the denotation of the denotation of the complex in 
question. Thus in Russell‘s example, the value of: 
 
 m[𝑓*]m/e[D<the denoting complex occurring in the second example in (B)>D]e 
 
turns out to be a line of poetry, rather than—as was intended—<the first line of Gray‘s 
Elegy>. 
 
 The upshot, then, is that there is no non-circular account of the notation employed 
by the 4E theory. The 4E theory relies upon the notion of a non-denotative occurrence 
of a complex in a proposition, but we have no real understanding of such occurrences. 
In their absence—as shown by the second half of (D)—we really have no grip on the 
interaction of meanings, complexes, and denotations. On my reading, this constitutes 
Russell‘s argument in defence of (GEA 1). 
 
4.4. Paragraph (E): retreat from the 4E to the 3E theory 
Paragraph (E) sees Russell summarising the findings of paragraph (D), and offering the 
proponent of the theory of meaning and denotation the opportunity to retreat to the 3E 
theory. 
 
The difficulty in speaking of the meaning of a denoting complex may be stated 
thus: The moment we put the complex in a proposition, the proposition is about 
the denotation; and if we make a proposition in which the subject is ‗the 
meaning of 𝐶‘, then the subject is the meaning (if any) of the denotation, which 
was not intended. This leads us to say that, when we distinguish meaning and 
denotation, we must be dealing with the meaning: the meaning has denotation 
and is a complex, and there is not something other than the meaning, which can 
be called the complex, and be said to have both meaning and denotation. The 
right phrase, on the view in question, is that some meanings have denotations. 
(OD: 49-50 E) 
 
The summary at the beginning of (E) focuses upon the difficulty in formulating a 
proposition about the meaning of a complex. In the terms I have employed, this 
amounts to the difficulty in explaining the possibility of a complex occurring in a 
proposition in such a way that the proposition is about the complex‘s meaning, rather 
than its denotation. In the light of this, Russell now offers his opponent an alternative 
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view: that the complex just is the meaning. On this new view—the 3E theory—a 
denoting phrase expresses a meaning (= denoting complex) which denotes the 
denotation (unless the denoting phrase is empty). Hence: ‗The right phrase [way to put 
it], on the view in question, is that some meanings [i.e. non-empty ones] have 
denotations‘ (OD: 49-50 E). 
 
4.5. Paragraphs (F) and (G): initial objection to the 3E theory 
Here are paragraphs (F) and (G). 
 
But this only makes our difficulty in speaking of meanings more evident. For 
suppose 𝐶 is our complex; then we are to say that 𝐶 is the meaning of the 
complex. Nevertheless, whenever 𝐶 occurs without inverted commas, what is 
said is not true of the meaning, but only of the denotation, as when we say: The 
centre of mass of the solar system is a point. Thus to speak of 𝐶 itself, i.e., to 
make a proposition about the meaning, our subject must not be 𝐶, but something 
which denotes 𝐶. Thus ‗𝐶‘, which is what we use when we want to speak of the 
meaning, must be not the meaning, but something which denotes the meaning. 
And 𝐶 must not be a constituent of this complex (as it is of ‗the meaning of 𝐶‘); 
for if 𝐶 occurs in the complex, it will be its denotation, not its meaning, that will 
occur, and there is no backward road from denotations to meanings, because 
every object can be denoted by an infinite number of different denoting phrases. 
(OD: 50 F) 
 
Thus it would seem that ‗𝐶‘ and 𝐶 are different entities, such that ‗𝐶‘ denotes 𝐶; 
but this cannot be an explanation, because the relation of ‗𝐶‘ to 𝐶 remains 
wholly mysterious; and where are we to find the denoting complex ‗𝐶‘ which is 
to denote 𝐶? Moreover, when 𝐶 occurs in a proposition, it is not only the 
denotation that occurs (as we shall see in the next paragraph); yet, on the view in 
question, 𝐶 is only the denotation, the meaning being wholly relegated to ‗𝐶‘. 
This is an inextricable tangle, and seems to prove that the whole distinction of 
meaning and denotation has been wrongly conceived. (OD: 50, G) 
 
On the 4E theory, the meaning and denotation were two sides of the one complex. 
Having now adopted the 3E theory ‗we are to say that 𝐶 is the meaning of the complex‘ 
(OD: 50 F). Russell now reminds us that a ‗plain‘ occurrence of the complex in a 
proposition entails that the proposition is about whatever the complex denotes, as in (8): 
 
(8) The centre of mass of the solar system is a point. 
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(8) expresses a proposition about 𝑝. In order to form a proposition about the meaning, 
then, we have to employ inverted commas, as in (9): 
 
(9) ‗The centre of mass of the solar system‘ is a denoting complex [= 
meaning]. 
 
What occurs in the entity-position of ⟨9⟩ is not—as on the 4E theory—the same entity 
as occurs in entity-position in ⟨8⟩: 
 
‗𝐶‘, which is what we use when we want to speak of the meaning, must be not 
the meaning, but something which denotes the meaning. (OD: 50 F) 
 
Thus far, then, Russell is simply describing the 3E theory, pointing out its difference 
from the 4E theory. 
 
Suppose we wish to formulate a proposition about a certain meaning (call it ‗𝕄1‘). 
We need, on the 3E theory, a second meaning—call it ‗𝕄2‘—to denote 𝕄1. So for 
instance, 
 
 ⟨𝕄2 is thus-and-so⟩ 
 
is a proposition asserting that 𝕄1 is thus-and-so. 
 
But what can we say about the relation of 𝕄2 to 𝕄1? If 𝕄1 were a constituent of 
the complex 𝕄2, it would occur there in an entity-position. But if 𝕄1 occurs as entity, it 
denotes its denotation. So, for instance, the complex 
 
 m[𝑓]m/e[𝕄1]e 
 
is a function not of 𝕄1, but of whatever 𝕄1 denotes. As Russell puts it: ‗if 𝐶 [i.e. 𝕄1] 
occurs in the complex, it will be its denotation, not its meaning, that will occur‘ (OD: 50 
F). Thus if 𝕄2 did contain 𝕄1, 𝕄2 would amount to a function from the denotation of 
𝕄1 back to 𝕄1 itself. Now if the entity denoted by 𝕄1 was only denoted by 𝕄1, we 
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would have an adequate specification of 𝕄2. But every entity is denoted by an infinite 
number of meanings and, as such, there is no ‗backward road‘, in Russell‘s memorable 
phrase, from a denotation to a particular meaning that denotes it. 
 
The relation between 𝕄2 and 𝕄1—between ‗𝐶‘ and 𝐶—is now starting to look 
precarious. All we know about 𝕄2 is that: 
 
 it denotes 𝕄1; 
 it is not identical with 𝕄1; 
 it is not expressible as a unique function of 𝕄1.66 
 
Russell writes: 
 
Thus it would seem that ‗𝐶‘ and 𝐶 are different entities, such that ‗𝐶‘ denotes 𝐶; 
but this cannot be an explanation, because the relation of ‗𝐶‘ to 𝐶 remains 
wholly mysterious; and where are we to find the denoting complex ‗𝐶‘ which is 
to denote 𝐶? (OD: 50 G) 
 
Two claims require explanation here: the ‗wholly mysterious claim‘ and the ‗where are 
we to find ‗𝐶‘?‘ claim. 
 
When Russell complains that ‗the relation of ‗𝐶‘ to 𝐶 remains wholly mysterious‘, 
one might wonder whether he is not demanding too much. Going back to PoM, the 
denoting relation—i.e. the relation of ‗𝐶‘ to 𝐶—is taken to be fundamental, a primitive 
logical relation. As such, there is not, one might reasonably assume, a great deal more to 
be said about it: primitive logical relations are inevitably somewhat mysterious. 
 
Russell would, I think, grant this point. But, in line with the general thrust of OD, 
he is going to push the question: how does the 3E theory explain the fact that (say) ‗the 
teacher of Plato is wise‘ expresses a proposition about Socrates? Now the theory of 
meaning and denotation is a theory of denoting and so constitutes an account of 
generality—an account of those propositions that are about an entity (or entities) in 
                                                 
66
 I owe this way of thinking about (F) to Makin, who brings these three points out extremely clearly 
(Makin 2000: 25-32). 
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virtue of its (their) having a certain property. Hence the answer we want is that ‗the 
teacher of Plato is wise‘ expresses a proposition containing <the teacher of Plato>, and 
that this denotes Socrates in virtue of his having a certain property, namely having 
taught Plato. The kind of answer we want will explain why, had it been not Socrates but 
Xanthippe who had taught Plato, ‗the teacher of Plato is wise‘ would have expressed a 
proposition about her. What ‗remains wholly mysterious‘—or so Russell is urging—is 
the relation between the property of having taught Plato as it relates to the denoting 
complex <the teacher of Plato> and that property as it relates to the denotation, i.e. 
Socrates. We might put the point as follows. Russell is not questioning the claim that 
⟨<the teacher of Plato> is wise⟩ is about Socrates; he is asking why this is so, and is 
asking in expectation of answer that appeals to the fact that Socrates has a certain 
property. (Notice that, this being so, it is imperative for a correct interpretation of the 
GEA that we deny Salmon‘s claim that the aim of the GEA is ‗to supplant the view that 
a definite description is a singular term‘ (Salmon 2005: 1076).) 
 
Russell‘s ‗where are we to find ‗𝐶‘?‘ claim is generally thought to raise a 
specifically epistemological point: that we do not know which of the infinitely many 
complexes ‗𝐶‘ (i.e. 𝕄2) is. This, I think, is correct. Russell is echoing the ‗no backward 
road‘ point from (F).67 The epistemological point is not, however, the central objection 
to the 3E theory. Rather, the decisive blow comes immediately afterwards, and relates to 
the ‗wholly mysterious‘ claim: 
 
Moreover, when 𝐶 occurs in a proposition, it is not only the denotation that 
occurs [. . .]; yet, on the view in question [i.e. the 3E theory], 𝐶 is only the 
denotation, the meaning being wholly relegated to ‗𝐶‘. (OD: 50 G) 
 
Russell takes himself to have shown that on the 3E theory, all that the complex does is 
denote its denotation. There is no nuance, no twofold character, just a brute act of 
denotation; for the meaning has been ‗wholly relegated‘ to an entirely separate entity. 
But, he will now claim, meaning is always relevant to a proposition—even if the 
proposition is (by intention) about the denotation—in a way that the 3E theory cannot 
account for. 
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 Salmon brings this point out very clearly (2005: 1106). 
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Russell‘s manner of expression is particularly unhelpful at this point. What he 
means by ‗when 𝐶 occurs in a proposition, it is not only the denotation that occurs‘ is 
that when a complex occurs in a proposition, it does not just denote its denotation, but 
denotes it in virtue of the denotation‘s satisfying a certain descriptive condition. This, as 
I have repeatedly urged, is a fundamental requirement of a theory of denoting. It is not 
simply a brute fact that <the teacher of Plato> denotes Socrates. It denotes him because 
he alone has a certain property. In entertaining a proposition containing <the teacher of 
Plato>, one ought to be able to recognise that it is about whoever taught Plato. Russell‘s 
claim will be that the 3E theory is unable to meet this demand. This is the ‗inextricable 
tangle‘ of which he speaks. His attempt to demonstrate it is, unfortunately, no clearer 
than any other stage of the argument. 
 
4.6. Paragraph (H): meaning and truth-conditional relevance 
Here is paragraph (H), the final phase of the GEA: 
 
That the meaning is relevant when a denoting phrase occurs in a proposition is 
formally proved by the puzzle about the author of Waverley. The proposition 
‗Scott was the author of Waverley‘ has a property not possessed by ‗Scott was 
Scott‘, namely the property that George IV wished to know whether it was true. 
Thus the two are not identical propositions; hence the meaning of ‗the author of 
Waverley‘ must be relevant as well as the denotation, if we adhere to the point of 
view to which this distinction belongs. Yet, as we have just seen, so long as we 
adhere to this point of view, we are compelled to hold that only the denotation 
can be relevant. Thus the point of view in question must be abandoned. (OD: 50-
51 H) 
 
The aim of (H) is to bring out the inextricable tangle promised in (G). 
 
The propositions expressed by sentences (12) and (13) are clearly not identical: one 
has a property the other lacks, namely that George IV wished to know whether it was 
true. 
 
(12) Scott was the author of Waverley. 
⟨12⟩ ⟨Scott = <the author of Waverley>⟩ 
 
(13) Scott was Scott. 
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⟨13⟩ ⟨Scott = Scott⟩ 
 
Russell claims that this shows that ‗the meaning of ―the author of Waverley‖ must be 
relevant as well as the denotation‘ (OD: 50 H). His point is that meanings are intimately 
linked to truth-conditions. 
 
If in ⟨12⟩ we substitute a co-denoting meaning, say <the author of Marmion>, we 
get: 
 
(14) Scott was the author of Marmion. 
⟨14⟩ ⟨Scott = <the author of Marmion>⟩ 
 
The substitution makes no difference as regards truth-value, but it makes a huge 
difference as regards truth-conditions. Compare Evans‘ Intuitive Criterion of 
Difference: 
 
the thought associated with one sentence 𝑆 as its sense must be different from 
the thought associated with another sentence 𝑆′ as its sense, if it is possible for 
someone to understand both sentences at a given time while coherently taking 
different attitudes to them, i.e. accepting (rejecting) one while rejecting 
(accepting), or being agnostic about, the other. (Evans 1982: 18-19) 
 
In more Russellian terminology, and adapting to the case in hand: if one can understand 
both (12) and (14), and accept (reject) one while rejecting (accepting) or being agnostic 
about the other, then (12) and (14) express distinct propositions. We can demonstrate—
and such a demonstration is what I take Russell to be groping (somewhat inadequately) 
towards in (H)—that the Intuitive Criterion of Difference is met by constructing the 
following example, in which substitution brings about a change in truth-value (and if 
the truth-value has changed the truth-condition must have changed also). So consider: 
 
(15) George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. 
(16) George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Marmion. 
 
Suppose that George IV already knew that Scott was the author of Marmion. Then 
while (15) would express a true proposition, (16) would express a false proposition. 
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Russell makes this point in (H) by contrasting George IV‘s attitudes towards ⟨12⟩ 
and ⟨13⟩ rather than, as I have done, ⟨12⟩ and ⟨14⟩. His examples are apt to induce two 
misunderstandings. Firstly one might be led to suppose that (H) in particular, and the 
GEA in general, have something to do with the status of definite descriptions as 
compared to singular terms. But the argument has, pace Salmon, nothing to do with 
singular terms. Secondly, one might be led to suppose that the argument of (H) concerns 
intensional contexts. However, as I see it, intensional contexts merely provide a 
convenient way of demonstrating Russell‘s real point. That point concerns truth-
conditions. ⟨12⟩ and ⟨14⟩ have different truth-conditions; and this demonstrates the 
respect in which meanings are ‗relevant‘ to propositions containing denoting 
complexes. The complexes <the author of Waverley> and <the author of Marmion> 
have the same denotation but are, qua meanings, distinct. It is their distinctness that 
grounds the truth-conditional distinctness of ⟨12⟩ and ⟨14⟩. 
 
This point may seem somewhat far removed from the text of (H); but I maintain 
that it is what Russell has in mind. This is supported by textual evidence from later 
work. As many commentators acknowledge, an argument that appears to be related to 
the GEA occurs in KAKD. In that discussion Russell writes as follows. 
 
[W]hen we say ‗Scott is the author of Waverley‘, the meaning of ‗the author of 
Waverley‘ is relevant to our assertion. For if the denotation alone were relevant, 
any other phrase with the same denotation would give the same proposition. 
Thus ‗Scott is the author of Marmion‘ would be the same proposition as ‗Scott is 
the author of Waverley‘. But this is plainly not the case, since from the first we 
learn that Scott wrote Marmion and from the second we learn that he wrote 
Waverley, but the first tells us nothing about Waverley and the second nothing 
about Marmion. Hence the meaning of ‗the author of Waverley‘ as opposed to 
the denotation, is certainly relevant to ‗Scott is the author of Waverley‘. (KAKD: 
216) 
 
This is, in essentials, the same point that Russell makes in (H), or so I claim. 
 
To reinforce the objection, it may be brought out in a slightly different way. In 
entertaining proposition ⟨17⟩, a subject entertains a proposition about the denotation of 
the denoting complex <the author of Waverley>. 
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⟨17⟩ ⟨<the author of Waverley> is wise⟩ 
 
But obviously the subject might entertain ⟨17⟩ without recognising that the proposition 
is about Scott, even though Scott is the denotation of the denoting complex <the author 
of Waverley>. Thus the subject entertains a thought which she is capable of recognising 
as being about whoever is the author of Waverley. It must also be possible for a subject 
entertaining ⟨17⟩ and proposition ⟨18⟩ to recognise them as distinct. 
 
⟨18⟩ ⟨<the author of Marmion> is wise⟩ 
 
This ability is premised on the subject‘s ability to distinguish <the author of Waverley> 
and <the author of Marmion>. These two denoting complexes are structurally similar, 
but differ in terms of constituency: one has Waverley in the position where the other has 
Marmion. Thus the subject, in judging that ⟨17⟩ and that ⟨18⟩, must have some insight 
into the internal structure and constituency of the denoting complexes. The internal 
structure and constituency of the complexes must therefore be available to the subject in 
entertaining the propositions. For the subject must be able to recognise that the 
propositions are about whoever they are about in virtue of those person‘s having written 
Waverley and having written Marmion respectively. This is what marks out a theory of 
denoting out as an account of generality. 
 
The decisive objection to the 3E theory is, then, that it renders impossible this kind 
of recognition. The meaning must be relevant in the sense just explained, for this is a 
central task of any theory of denoting. The 4E theory explains—or at least gestures 
towards an explanation of—this by appealing to the twofold nature of denoting 
complexes: complexes have two sides, one of which (i.e. the meaning) embodies the 
descriptive condition mentioned in the corresponding denoting phrase and satisfied by 
the denotation. On the 3E theory however, the complex is the meaning; and while its 
occurrence in a proposition signals that the proposition is about something else (i.e. the 
denotation), it does not explain a subject‘s ability to (say) recognise that ⟨17⟩ and ⟨18⟩ 
are about the same man in virtue of his satisfying two distinct descriptive conditions. 
The explanation we want is that the complex in ⟨17⟩ is such that it denotes whoever 
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wrote Waverley and that it, so to speak, wears this fact on its sleeve in virtue of having 
an additional aspect—the aspect of meaning (and similarly mutatis mutandis for the 
complex in ⟨18⟩). The explanation we get—if one may call it an ‗explanation‘ at all—is 
simply that the complex in ⟨17⟩ denotes Scott (and similarly for ⟨18⟩). But if that is all 
the explanation the 3E theory offers, then one cannot say why (or even if) the truth-
conditions of ⟨17⟩ and ⟨18⟩ differ.68 
 
This stage of the argument demonstrates that, on the 3E theory, the explanation of 
the connection between <the author of Waverley> and Scott amounts to no more than 
that the former denotes the latter. This is too brute a relation to have any real 
explanatory value: too brute a relation to stand alone as an account of denoting. It fails 
to account for the fact that one judging both that the author of Waverley is wise and that 
the author of Marmion is wise is able to recognise these propositions as having very 
different truth-conditions. Moreover the diagnosis of the problem is clear: the 3E theory 
goes astray in identifying the complex with the meaning. These ought to be held 
distinct, as on the 4E theory. This leads us to conclude that: 
 
(GEA 2) If the meaning and denotation are not two sides of the one denoting 
complex, then we cannot explain (‗preserve‘) the connection between 
them. 
 
And if (GEA 2) holds, then Russell has defended both premises of his argument: 
 
(GEA 1) If the meaning and denotation are two sides of the one denoting complex, 
then we cannot explain (‗preserve‘) the connection between them. 
(GEA 2) If the meaning and denotation are not two sides of the one denoting 
complex, then we cannot explain (‗preserve‘) the connection between 
them. 
 (GEA 3) We cannot explain (‗preserve‘) the connection of meaning and 
denotation. 
 
                                                 
68
 Thus on the 3E theory one can recognise that ⟨12⟩ and ⟨13⟩ are truth-conditionally distinct, but cannot 
tell whether ⟨12⟩ and ⟨14⟩ are truth-conditionally distinct. For this reason, Russell‘s exposition in KAKD 
is superior to his exposition in (H). 
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5. The GEA versus Frege 
The Central Question of OD is: How is it that sentences containing denoting phrases 
come to be about whatever it is that they are about? The conclusion of the GEA—that 
we cannot explain (‗preserve‘) the connection of meaning and denotation—should be 
understood as the claim that the theory of meaning and denotation‘s answer to the 
Central Question is inadequate. 
 
Russell took his earlier position to be ‗very nearly the same‘ (OD: 41n.) as that of 
Frege; and I have argued above that the sense in which they are in fact similar is that 
both appeal to a certain logical relation—denoting or determining—holding between the 
propositional complement of a denoting phrase and its denotation. Thus to the extent 
that this relation grounds Frege‘s response to the Central Question, he owes a response 
to the GEA. 
 
The charge, as it relates to Frege, is this. The description ‗the author of Waverley‘ 
has, for its propositional complement, the Sinn §the author of Waverley§ which 
determines Scott. As such, the sentence ‗the author of Waverley is wise‘ is taken by 
Frege to express a Thought which is about Scott in virtue of the occurrence therein of 
§the author of Waverley§. Russell‘s claim in the GEA (especially in (G) and (H)) was 
that a 3E theory like Frege‘s fails to explain the fact that this Thought is about Scott in 
virtue of his satisfying the descriptive condition wrote Waverley. 
 
It certainly seems that there is a difficulty for Frege here. But it is important to 
recognise that differences between the overall views of Russell and Frege suggest that 
the theory of Sinn and Bedeutung—as opposed to Frege‘s account of definite 
descriptions—can be maintained, if one is that way inclined. 
 
For the pre-OD Russell, denoting complexes are the entities through which 
quantification occurs. Frege‘s account of quantification is, on the other hand, 
independent of his theory of Sinn and Bedeutung. Now in an account of quantification, 
the connection between the properties which guide the quantification and the properties 
of the entities gathered by the quantification must be absolutely apparent. This is, in 
effect, the principle behind the GEA‘s objection to the 3E theory in (G) and (H). 
Russell, who is interested in the 3E theory as, in effect, an account of quantification, is 
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therefore beholden to a more stringent requirement than Frege, for whom the notion of 
Sinn is cognitive. For Frege, the theory of Sinn is designed to resolve the kinds of issues 
arising in Frege‘s Puzzle (Frege 1892a): it must explain how it is possible for someone 
to believe that (say) Hesperus is 𝐺 while disbelieving that Phosphorus is 𝐺. Thus while 
the theory of Sinn is constrained by Evans‘s Intuitive Criterion of Difference, it is not 
constrained by Russell‘s more stringent demands. 
 
The danger—which the Russell of OD fails to avoid—is that in drawing too close a 
parallel between the earlier Russell and Frege, one arrives at the view that their two 
theories share a common purpose. Makin makes the same mistake when he claims that 
the two theories involve ‗essentially the same kind of theoretical device to resolve 
essentially the same kind of problem‘ (Makin 2000: 169). We should concur rather with 
Levine (2004), that the two theories are differently motivated.
69
 The theory of Sinn is 
intended to resolve Frege‘s Puzzle: the theory of meaning and denotation is intended as 
an account of propositions of generality. For Frege then, the theory of Sinn must predict 
that ‗the author of Waverley is wise‘ and ‗the author of Marmion is wise‘ express 
distinct Thoughts (propositions) about Scott; but it need not offer the strong account of 
the relations between §the author of Waverley§ and Scott, §the author of Marmion§ and 
Scott, that Russell demands. 
 
Nonetheless a worry remains. It is familiar to distinguish two kinds of Sinne. 
Levine puts it this way: 
 
we might distinguish ―presentive‖ senses, which we grasp as a consequence of 
being acquainted with a certain entity in a certain way, and ―descriptive‖ senses, 
which prescribe conditions which an object must fulfil in order to be determined 
by that sense. Whereas we cannot grasp a ―presentive‖ sense without a prior 
acquaintance with the object it determines, we can grasp a ―descriptive‖ sense 
without having been acquainted with the object (if any) fulfilling the condition it 
prescribes. (Levine 2004: 264) 
 
A descriptive Sinn is like a denoting complex in that it sets up a descriptive condition 
that an entity must satisfy in order to be denoted (determined) by it. Insofar as Frege is 
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 Levine attributes these differences to the underlying epistemologies of Russell and Frege. While his 
claims regarding the epistemologies are convincing, I hold that there is a more fundamental difference in 
the motivations for the two theories, as discussed in the main text. 
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committed to an account of Sinne as descriptive Sinne he opens himself to the more 
stringent demand that the GEA relies upon. Grasping a proposition containing a 
descriptive Sinn would (or at least could) require recognising it to be about an entity 
picked out in virtue of its satisfying a certain descriptive condition. 
 
Yet since Frege was committed to the view that definite descriptions are singular 
terms, he is not obliged to treat them as expressing descriptive Sinne—indeed the GEA 
suggests he would be well-advised not to. Presentive Sinne are a better option for the 
Sinne of singular terms, as they are not so much akin to embodied descriptive 
conditions, but are rather ways of being acquainted with an entity. Sinne thus conceived 
circumvent the objection to 3E theories raised in the GEA, for there is no need to appeal 
to a descriptive condition as something distinct from the propositional complement of 
the expression. The relation between the Sinn and the Bedeutung is, on this view, clear: 
to grasp a proposition containing the Sinn just is to grasp a proposition directly about 
the Bedeutung (in the only sense of ‗direct‘ that a Fregean will accept as coherent70). 
 
The difficulty for Frege is that, to the extent that the GEA forces him to treat 
definite descriptions as expressing presentive Sinne, his conception of definite 
descriptions as singular terms becomes less and less plausible. If definite descriptions 
express presentive Sinne, definite descriptions will turn out to be—in Evans‘s 
terminology—Russellian: their significance will depend upon their having a referent.71 
But the supposition that a description‘s significance depends upon its having a referent 
is implausible in the extreme. Thus Frege can escape the GEA, but only by giving up 
his claim that definite descriptions are singular terms.
72
 This is not, perhaps, so high a 
price to pay; and having paid it, Frege is left with an account of singular terms as 
expressing object-dependent Sinne. The GEA does not touch this view for it is, at heart, 
an argument about the nature of propositions of generality, not of singular terms. 
 
 
                                                 
70
 I assume that Fregeans deny the possibility of ‗bare‘ acquaintance with entities (in obvious distinction 
to Russell). 
71
 Cf. Evans 1982: 12. 
72
 This is too quick. There are options for Frege here. He might, for instance, embrace truth-value gaps for 
sentences containing empty descriptions. I will not investigate the options here. 
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5. Toward a Solution to the Paradoxes 
 
1. Introduction 
At the end of Chapter Two, and again in passing at the beginning of Chapter Four, I 
gave a brief indication of the nature of Russell‘s attempt to use the theory of meaning 
and denotation to resolve the paradoxes. In this final chapter I attempt to embellish the 
account of the connection between the Gray‘s Elegy Argument (GEA), the theory of 
denoting, and the paradoxes. 
 
In §1 I will set out certain structural similarities between Russell‘s thinking about 
classes and denoting, and draw some connections between the interplay of the notions 
of extension and intension in relation to the theory of classes and the theory of denoting. 
My comments will be somewhat speculative and are only tentatively asserted. They are 
intended not so much as an accurate descriptive account of Russell‘s thought, but as a 
way of making sense of its evolution. 
 
In §2 I relate the insights garnered by Russell in OF and OD to the development of 
his response to the paradoxes. Here, I suggest, we see why it is important to 
distinguish—as I did in Chapter Three—between the theory of descriptions as presented 
by Russell, and the modified theory endorsed by contemporary philosophers of 
language. For it is the element of structurally-radical interpretive analysis—i.e. that 
which, I claimed, contemporary philosophers of language fail to carry over from 
Russell—that is the key to understanding Russell‘s use of the theory of descriptions 
(rather than the theory of meaning and denotation) in his substitutional response to the 
paradoxes. 
 
2. Classes and Denoting: Structural Similarities, Extension and Intension 
I suggested in §2 of Chapter Two that Russell‘s thinking about classes harbours a 
tension which manifests itself in a complex interplay of the notions of intension and 
extension. Russell (PoM: §101, 102) had tried to state a ‗mixed‘ paradox in terms of his 
distinction between classes-as-many and classes-as-one, but his attempt foundered 
somewhat, or so I argued, as a result of his failure to get clear as to the relation between 
the two kinds of class. The attempt to specify the relation between a given class-as-
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many and its associated class-as-one leads inevitably to the conclusion that the mixed 
paradox is neither wholly extensional nor wholly intensional; for there is no 
specification of the relation between a class-as-many and its associated class-as-one that 
does not import some intensional notion or other. 
 
In Chapter Two I diagrammed the relations in question as follows. 
 
Fig. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I offered a characterisation of the relation 𝐶, the direct relation holding between 𝛼1 and 
𝛼M (i.e. a class-as-one and its related class-as-many). Similarly, I offered the following 
diagram of the relations involved in the theory of meaning and denotation.
1
 
 
Fig. 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here relation 𝑋 is the indication relation, holding between the phrase ‗the 𝐹‘ and its 
propositional complement, the denoting complex <the 𝐹>. Relation 𝑌 is the denoting (in 
                                                 
1
 The style of diagram is owed to Demopoulos (1999). 
𝐶 
𝐵 
𝐴 
𝛼M  
𝛼1 𝜙𝑥  
‗The 𝐹‘ <The 𝐹> 
𝑍 
𝑌 
𝑋 
The 𝐹 
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the linguistic sense) relation between the phrase and its denotation. The GEA 
investigates relation 𝑍, holding between the complex and its denotation. Superficially 
the similarities between Figures 1 and 2 are obvious; but we need a more detailed 
account of the relation of the notions of intension and extension to the theory of 
meaning and denotation. 
 
It is natural to think of a denoting phrase as having an intension, namely the 
meaning it expresses, and an extension, namely its denotation. The GEA, however, fixes 
upon not the denoting phrase, but its propositional complement, the denoting complex. 
What is the relation between a denoting complex and its denotation, and more 
pertinently for present purposes, is there a purely intensional or purely extensional 
account of it to be had? 
 
To hold that the relation between the complex and the denotation is purely 
extensional is to endorse the 3E theory. But we have seen that that theory, as an account 
of denoting, is insupportable. Moreover, it is insupportable precisely because it is 
wholly extensional, and so pays insufficient heed to the relations between the 
descriptive condition embodied by the complex and the satisfaction of that descriptive 
condition by the denotation. The upshot is that an adequate theory of the relation 
between the complex and its denotation must include both extensional and intensional 
aspects. It must take from the standpoint of extension the lesson that when the complex 
occurs denotatively in a proposition the proposition is about the denotation. While from 
the standpoint of intension must be taken the lesson that if a complex 𝐶 denotes 
denotation 𝐷, then 𝐶 embodies a descriptive condition satisfied by 𝐷. Putting these two 
aspects together, a correct theory of the denoting relation must hold that: 
 
 If 𝐶 denotes 𝐷, then 𝐶 denotes 𝐷 in virtue of the satisfaction of the descriptive 
condition embodied in 𝐶 by 𝐷. 
 
Accordingly, the most appropriate way of stating the relation between a complex and its 
denotation—between <the author of Waverley> and Scott, say—is not simply: 
 
(1) <the author of Waverley> denotes Scott; 
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but something along the following lines: 
 
(2) (∃𝑥)(𝑊𝑥 & (𝑦)(𝑊𝑦  𝑦 = 𝑥) & (<the author of Waverley> denotes 𝑥)) 
 
That is to say: there is some unique entity satisfying the descriptive condition wrote 
Waverley, and <the author of Waverley> denotes that one. This satisfies the demand 
imposed from the extensional standpoint, as it tells us that <the author of Waverley> 
denotes a certain entity; and it also satisfies the demand imposed from the intensional 
standpoint, as it tells us that <the author of Waverley> denotes an entity satisfying the 
appropriate descriptive condition. But although (2) constitutes a response to the 
problems posed for the 3E theory in the GEA, it does so only by backtracking to a 
position in which the problems posed by the GEA for the 4E theory reappear. For (2) 
includes the complex <the author of Waverley>; but as that complex occurs in (2) (or, 
better, in the proposition it expresses) it is not intended to denote its denotation, but to 
occur in such a way that it stands for itself.
2
 This wants explaining, but as Russell had 
argued in paragraph (D) of the GEA, no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming. 
 
The beginning of a solution to the whole problem comes in recognising that the 
issues raised in the GEA are to be avoided, not by striving to account for the role of any 
individual complex via a clause such as (2), but by providing a general method for 
handling any complete proposition in which such a complex occurs. This is the first step 
in the discovery of the theory of descriptions. Russell takes it in OF immediately after 
stumbling through the prototype GEA. The second step, the abandoning of complexes 
altogether, follows swiftly after. This is one of the key moments in the history of 
philosophy, so I quote at length. 
 
It might be supposed that the whole matter could be simplified by introducing a 
relation of denoting: instead of all the complications about ‗𝐶‘ and 𝐶, we might 
try to put ‗𝑥 denotes 𝑦‘. But we want to be able to speak of what 𝑥 denotes, and 
unfortunately ‗what 𝑥 denotes‘ is a denoting complex. We might avoid this as 
follows: Let 𝐶 be an unambiguously denoting complex (we may now drop the 
inverted commas); then we have 
 
                                                 
2
 That is to say: the second conjunct in (2)—<the author of Waverley> denotes 𝑥—is about the complex 
<the author of Waverley> rather than Scott. 
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(∃𝑦) : 𝐶 denotes 𝑦 : 𝐶 denotes 𝑧 . ⊃𝑧 . 𝑧 = 𝑦. 
 
Then what is commonly expressed by 𝜙‗𝐶 will be replaced by 
 
(∃𝑦) : 𝐶 denotes 𝑦 : 𝐶 denotes 𝑧 . ⊃𝑧 . 𝑧 = 𝑦 : 𝜙‗𝑦. 
 
Thus e.g. 𝜙‗(the author of Waverley) becomes 
 
(∃𝑦) : ‗the author of Waverley‘ denotes 𝑦 : ‗the author of Waverley‘ 
denotes 𝑧 . ⊃𝑧 . 𝑧 = 𝑦 : 𝜙‗𝑦. 
 
Thus ‗Scott is the author of Waverley‘ becomes 
 
(∃𝑦) : ‗the author of Waverley‘ denotes 𝑦 : ‗the author of Waverley‘ 
denotes 𝑧 . ⊃𝑧 . 𝑧 = 𝑦 : Scott = 𝑦. 
 
This, then, was what surprised people, as well it might. On this view, we shall 
not introduce ℩‗𝑢 at all, but put 
 
𝜙‗℩‗𝑢 . = : (∃𝑦) : 𝑦 ε 𝑢 : 𝑧 ε 𝑢 . ⊃𝑧 . 𝑧 = 𝑦 : 𝜙‗𝑦. 
 
This defines all propositions about ℩‗𝑢, which is all we need. (OF: 383-84)3 
 
Thus Russell comes to see that he can avoid the problems concerning the vexed relation 
between denoting complexes and their denotations by refusing to admit denoting 
complexes (‗we shall not introduce ℩‗𝑢 at all‘), and instead defining the contexts in 
which they were previously held to occur: 
 
On this view, ‗the author of Waverley‘ has no significance at all by itself, but 
propositions in which it occurs have significance. Thus in regard to denoting 
phrases of this sort, the question of meaning and denotation ceases to exist. (OF: 
384) 
 
An adequate theory of the relation between a denoting complex and its denotation must 
include both extensional and intensional aspects. The GEA shows that the theory of 
meaning and denotation is unable to accommodate this. In the passage quoted 
                                                 
3
 Dots and double-dots are used, like brackets, to indicate scope, but also for conjunction; an expression 
such as ‗𝐹𝑧 ⊃𝑧 𝐺𝑧‘ is the universal quantification ‗(𝑧)(𝐹𝑧 ⊃ 𝐺𝑧)‘; the reversed apostrophe is read ‗of‘, 
hence ‗𝜙‗𝑦‘ is read ‗𝜙 of 𝑦‘. 
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immediately above, Russell has, effectively, come to recognise that for phrases such as 
‗the author of Waverley‘ the problem need not arise. 
 
OF continues with Russell extending the theory to other kinds of denoting phrases, 
though he fails to find a satisfactory account of ‗anything‘: 
 
The interesting and curious point is that, by driving denoting back and back as 
we have been doing, we get it all reduced to the one notion of any, from which I 
started at first.
4
 This one notion seems to be presupposed always, and to involve 
in itself all the difficulties on account of which we have rejected other denoting 
concepts. Thus we are left with the task of concocting de novo a tenable theory 
of any, in which denoting is not used. The interesting point which we have 
elicited above is that any is genuinely more fundamental than other denoting 
concepts; they can be explained by it, but not it by them. (OF: 387) 
 
A concern remains, then, as to the nature of any, and as to the problems of meaning and 
denotation as they relate to the variable (Russell having taken the variable as the most 
general denoting concept in PoM): 
 
We should, of course, simply say that ―anything‖ is a primitive idea, if it were 
not for the fact that we cannot get clear as to the relation of its meaning to its 
denotation. (OF: 387-88) 
 
As we know, shortly afterwards in OD Russell had come to treat the variable as 
fundamental. This does not, of course, constitute a ‗tenable theory of any, in which 
denoting is not used‘—and this tension is never very far from the surface. G. E. Moore 
struck upon the issue in correspondence with Russell: 
 
What I should chiefly like explained is this. You say ‗all the constituents of 
propositions we apprehend are entities with which we have immediate 
acquaintance.‘ Have we, then, immediate acquaintance with the variable? And 
what sort of entity is it? (Moore to Russell, 23 October 1905, quoted in Hylton 
1990: 256) 
 
Russell‘s response is typically modest: 
                                                 
4
 It is not clear what Russell means here, but perhaps the following passage, concerning the origins of 
PoM, gives a clue: ‗I was led to a re-examination of the principles of Geometry, thence to the philosophy 
of continuity and infinity, and thence, with a view to discovering the meaning of the word any, to 
Symbolic Logic‘ (PoM: xxii). 
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I admit that the question you raise about the variable is puzzling, as are all 
questions about it. The view I usually incline to is that we have immediate 
acquaintance with the variable, but it is not an entity. Then at other times I think 
it is an entity, but an indeterminate one. In the former view there is still a 
problem of meaning and denotation as regards the variable itself. I only profess 
to reduce the problem of denoting to the problem of the variable. This latter is 
horribly difficult, and there seem equally strong objections to all the views I 
have been able to think of. (Russell to Moore, 25 October 1905, quoted in 
Hylton 1990: 256) 
 
The variable is a denoting concept of sorts. Thus the question arises as to the relation of 
its meaning to its denotation. To treat the variable as fundamental, as in OD, is not to 
answer this question but to duck it; and as the correspondence attests, Russell was quite 
aware of this. 
 
With this in mind it may appear difficult to see how the theory of descriptions 
constitutes a decisive step away from the earlier theory. In response to this puzzle, 
Hylton argues that the theory of descriptions constituted progress because it allowed 
Russell to abandon his commitment to ‗non-propositional complexity‘ (Hylton 1990: 
256-263), i.e. to complex entities that neither are, nor are derived from, propositions. 
(The variable may remain, for it is simple rather than complex. Denoting complexes, of 
the kind discussed in the GEA, are eliminated.) According to Hylton, the elimination of 
non-propositional complexity—and especially of denoting complexes—is desirable on 
two counts. Firstly, denoting complexes have a certain kind of unity. This kind of unity 
is distinct from, but certainly no clearer than, propositional unity. Russell had no real 
answer to the problem of the unity of the proposition (cf. Chapter One, §2, esp. §2.4), 
and has no answer to the problem of the unity of non-propositional complexes either. 
Secondly, the inference from (to use Hylton‘s example) ‗Rover is a black dog‘ to 
‗Rover is a dog‘ is grounded in the structure of the denoting complexes <a black dog> 
and <a dog>. But, Hylton claims, ‗this kind of structure is not one into which we have 
any insight, except that it must give certain results‘ (Hylton 1990: 259). So if non-
propositional complexity can be eliminated in favour of propositional complexity, this 
is to be welcomed, for we do have insight into propositional structure. 
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One might challenge Hylton‘s account in various ways. In the first place, the 
account is misdescribed. It is not non-propositional complexity in general that is the 
problem, but simply one kind of complexity. For example, nothing in the theory of 
descriptions rules out realism about classes, and classes have a kind of non-
propositional complexity. A more substantive criticism, however, concerns Hylton‘s 
grounding the inference from ‗Rover is a black dog‘ to ‗Rover is a dog‘ in the structure 
of denoting complexes. This might be resisted. Michael Kremer (1994: 269-272), for 
instance, argues that in PoM all denoting concepts were simple, and that inferential 
relations of the kind in question were grounded in the relations between denoting 
concepts and the class-concepts from which they are derived. 
 
However the most telling objection to Hylton‘s story is that although he may have 
hit upon a respect in which the theory of descriptions is to be preferred to the earlier 
theory, there is still no explanation of the vehemence with which Russell rejects his 
earlier view, and no real account of the relevance of the GEA to the change in view. 
Russell takes the GEA to have shown the theory of meaning and denotation to involve 
an ‗inextricable tangle‘ (OD: 50 G), that the ‗whole distinction [. . .] has been wrongly 
conceived‘ (OD: 50 G), and that the theory ‗must be abandoned‘ (OD: 51 H). It is not as 
if he has selected the theory of descriptions from among competing rivals: he takes the 
GEA to have shown that the theory of meaning and denotation is near-enough 
incoherent. All of this suggests that, even though it took the variable as fundamental, the 
theory of descriptions still somehow avoids the ‗inextricable tangle‘ raised in the GEA. 
The correct account of Russell‘s preference for the new theory ought to reflect this fact; 
Hylton‘s, it seems to me, does not. 
 
The correct explanation is, I think, as follows. The GEA shows that the theory of 
meaning and denotation has no satisfactory explanation of a certain relation: namely, 
that relation in virtue of which one who judges that the author of Waverley is wise 
makes a judgment about Scott only insofar as Scott (uniquely) satisfies the descriptive 
condition embodied by the denoting complex <the author of Waverley>. However, 
when discussion is restricted to variables, since the descriptive condition is, in effect, 
wholly absent—this being what it means to say that ‗𝑥, the variable, is essentially and 
wholly undetermined‘ (OD: 42)—the difficulty does not arise. It suffices that where 
different variables occur, one is able to distinguish them and, so to speak, keep track of 
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them as they occur (often multiply) in judgements and propositions. Now it may well be 
that Russell has no real explanation of our ability to distinguish variables one from 
another; but this is not the problem adduced in the GEA. It is the entirely unrestricted 
nature of the variable, the fact that it does not denote whatever it denotes in virtue of 
any property of that thing, that excuses it from the demands that lead to the ‗inextricable 
tangle‘. I take it that this is the thought lying behind Russell‘s claim, in his 
correspondence with Moore (quoted above), that he professes only ‗to reduce the 
problem of denoting to the problem of the variable‘. My claim then, is that the GEA 
may be seen as bringing Russell to the realisation that the theory of meaning and 
denotation is unable to account for the demands imposed upon it from the standpoints of 
intension and extension. A denoting complex must denote its denotation in virtue of the 
denotation‘s satisfying some descriptive condition, embodied by the complex. And it is 
this that the theory fails to account for. 
 
The solution, the heart of the theory of descriptions, is to do without the denoting 
complex altogether, to deny that the denoting phrase has a propositional complement. 
That is to say, the best answer to the Central Question of OD—how is it that sentences 
containing denoting phrases come to be about whatever it is that they are about?—lies 
in recognising that the entire sentence should be reformulated as a complex existential 
claim. The kind of decompositional analysis so prominent in PoM must be preceded by 
an initial stage of structurally-radical interpretive analysis (‗SR-interpretive analysis‘). 
 
This initial stage of SR-interpretive analysis will eliminate any incomplete symbols, 
revealing the true logical form of the proposition expressed by the sentence at hand to 
be a complex existential generalisation. The structure that is revealed contains only a 
propositional function, containing variables, and a quantifier. The only entities for 
which the question of meaning and denotation—the demands of the standpoints of 
extension and intension—could arise, namely the variables, make no descriptive 
demands upon their denotations. They do not denote or range over whatever they denote 
or range over in virtue of its satisfying some descriptive condition. Being ‗wholly 
undetermined‘ (OD: 42), they range over absolutely everything whatsoever. Hence the 
difficulties imposed from the standpoints of intension and extension simply fall away. 
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We saw in Chapter Two that for Russell classes are, most fundamentally, classes-
as-many, but that he also admits classes-as-one. Classes-as-one are taken as offering an 
account of the possibility of one class being a member of another. But as the argument 
of Chapter Two went, the status of the class-as-one is somewhat mysterious: it isn‘t a 
class in the primary sense (this status being reserved for classes-as-many), yet it allows 
one to speak about classes in the primary sense. Or again, it isn‘t a denoting concept, 
but it plays a similar role, inasmuch as its occurrence in a proposition signals that the 
proposition is, in some sense, about the class-as-many to which the given class-as-one 
stands in relation 𝐶 (from Fig. 1). Russell‘s discussion of classes-as-one was deeply 
confused, so I claimed. 
 
Having developed the GEA, it may
5
 have begun to slowly dawn on Russell that, 
just as denoted entities can be spoken of without positing strange entities occupying a 
precarious no-man‘s-land between the standpoints of extension and intension (i.e. 
denoting complexes), so too classes (in the primary sense) can be spoken of without 
recourse to entities of such dubious status as classes-as-one. Russell was not, I think, 
aware of the tension in his view on classes identified in Chapter Two. But that 
something was amiss must have been clear to him. Indeed in 1905 the American 
mathematician Maxime Bôcher had written to Russell on this subject: 
 
The central point at issue is your ‗class as one‘. Your attitude towards this term 
is that of the realist, if I understand you correctly; mine is that of the nominalist. 
I cannot admit that a class is in itself an entity; it is for me always many entities 
(your ‗class as many‘). When we speak of it as a single entity, we are 
considering a new object which we associate with the class, but not the class 
itself. That is, the ‗class as one‘ is merely a symbol or name which we may 
choose at pleasure. (Bôcher to Russell, 25 April 1905, quoted in Russell 1973: 
130-31) 
 
In December 1905 (so after the publication of OD) Russell read his paper Difficulties to 
the London Mathematical Society. He suggested there, in setting out a version of the 
substitutional theory, that classes-as-one be eliminated: 
 
                                                 
5
 I put it no more strongly than this. 
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Instead of saying ‗The class 𝑢 is a class which has only one member‘, we shall 
say [. . .] ‗There is an entity 𝑏 such that 𝑝(𝑥/𝑎) is true when, and only when, 𝑥 is 
identical with 𝑏‘.6 Here the values of 𝑥 for which 𝑝(𝑥/𝑎) is true replace the class 
𝑢; but we do not assume that these values collectively form a single entity which 
is the class composed of them. (Difficulties: 155) 
 
Notice that this does not yet compromise the status of the class-as-many: what is 
eliminated is the class-as-one (‗a single entity‘). The class-as-many is only officially 
jettisoned months later, in April 1906 in STCR, where Russell writes: 
 
The theory which I wish to advocate is that classes [footnote: I use the word 
class as synonymous with aggregate or manifold.], relations, numbers, and 
indeed almost all the things that mathematics deals with, are ‗false abstractions‘, 
in the sense in which ‗the present King of England‘, or ‗the present King of 
France‘ is a false abstraction. (STCR: 166) 
 
(Russell‘s use of ‗aggregate‘ and ‗manifold‘ suggests that he intends classes-as-many, 
as indicated by his use of these terms in that way at PoM: §68, 67.) 
 
If we pursue the line of thought I am adumbrating, it will strike us as interesting 
that classes-as-one should be given up before classes-as-many. The uneasy status of the 
class-as-one, sandwiched between, on one side, the propositional function that gives rise 
to it, and on the other its associated class-as-many—as well as its part-extensional/part-
intensional relation (as described by 𝐶 in Fig. 1) to that class-as-many—makes its 
position analogous to that of the denoting complex. The denoting complex is 
sandwiched between a denoting phrase and its denotation, and its relation to that 
denotation incurs demands from the standpoints of extension and intension that it 
cannot meet. No great surprise then, if the abandoning of denoting complexes is 
followed by the abandoning of classes-as-one. But let me emphasise once more: I do not 
claim that this line of thought actually occurred to Russell; my claim is that the 
similarities are there to be observed and can aid our understanding of the development 
of Russell thought, not that they played any motivating role. 
 
                                                 
6
 The expression 𝑝(𝑥/𝑎) is read ‗the result of substituting 𝑥 for 𝑎 in 𝑝‘. 
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3. The GEA, the Theory of Denoting, and Russell’s Progress with the Paradoxes 
In the previous section I sketched some structural similarities between Russell‘s 
thinking about classes-as-one and denoting complexes. In this section I want to suggest 
a more concrete connection between the theory of denoting and the paradoxes. 
 
The extension of the theory of descriptions to class-abstracts, and the possibility of 
dispensing with classes altogether, was clearly an important feature of Russell‘s 
eventual solution to the paradoxes. In OF Russell asks how, on his new theory, class 
abstracts such as ‗𝑧 (𝜙‗𝑧)‘ are to be handled (OF: 384). According to the view of PoM, 
this class abstract can be treated as equivalent to the denoting phrase ‗the class of 𝑧 such 
that 𝜙𝑧‘. But the attempt to state what this denoting phrase denotes raises the following 
problem.
7
 What it denotes is a class-as-many; but a class-as-many, given its essentially 
plural nature, cannot stand as the (single) logical subject of a proposition and so, in 
particular, cannot be substituted for ‗𝑌‘ in a proposition of the form ⟨𝑋 denotes 𝑌⟩. For 
example, if (3) is well-formed, ‗𝛼M‘ cannot genuinely be the class-as-many: 
 
(3) ‗𝑧 (𝜙‗𝑧)‘ denotes 𝛼M. 
 
However, handling class abstracts in line with the theory of descriptions allows Russell 
to take: 
 
 𝑢 Kl 𝜙 
 
as equivalent to: 
 
 𝑢 is a class determined by 𝜙 
 
and then to treat the occurrence of class abstracts in propositional contexts as follows: 
 
 𝑓‗(𝑧 (𝜙‗𝑧)) . = . (∃𝑢) . 𝑢 Kl 𝜙 . 𝑓‗𝑢 Df.8 
 
                                                 
7
 In addition to the problems of meaning and denotation discussed at length in Chapter Four. 
8
 See OF: 384. 
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In this way we explain formulae involving class abstracts by way of formulae in which 
no such expressions occur. To be sure, Russell has not by this stage arrived at a way of 
dispensing with classes altogether (there must be classes in some sense, else there will 
no value of ‗𝑢‘ for which ‗𝑢 is a class determined by 𝜙‘ comes out true). But it is not 
difficult to see him as on the way to ∗20∙01 of PM: 
 
∗20∙01. 𝑓{𝑧 (𝜓𝑧)} . = : (∃𝜙) : 𝜙!𝑥 . ≡𝑥 . 𝜓𝑥 : 𝑓{𝜙!𝑧 } Df. 
 
The Russell of OF has recognised that ‗class abstract talk‘ can be reformulated. He has 
not yet managed to reformulate it in such a way that all ontological commitment to 
classes lapses, but he is on the way. 
 
However, it is not the potential for the elimination of classes upon which I wish to 
focus. Rather, let us focus upon the relation of the insights won by the theory of 
denoting phrases as incomplete symbols to Russell‘s attempts to develop a 
substitutional theory of classes in response to the paradoxes. 
 
In OF, prior to discovering the theory of descriptions, Russell had used the theory 
of meaning and denotation to motivate the claim that in an expression such as (4): 
 
(4) (𝐶)(𝑥 )
(𝐶)(𝑥 )
𝑥 
 
 
(i.e. ‗the result of substituting (𝐶)(𝑥 ) for 𝑥  in (𝐶)(𝑥 )‘), ‗(𝐶)(𝑥 )‘ occurs as meaning in 
its leftmost occurrence, but as entity in its rightmost occurrence, and hence that if (4) 
does represent the application of (𝐶)(𝑥 ) to itself, this can only be ‗by accident‘ (OF: 
360). This strategy was attractive in that it opened up the possibility of a principled 
denial that the paradoxes are well-formed.
9
 But, as we are now in a position to 
recognise, (having investigated the GEA, especially paragraph (D)), the combination of 
the grammar of substitution with the theory of meaning and denotation was bound to 
fail, due to the impossibility of getting straight as to the connection of meaning and 
denotation. 
 
                                                 
9
 Cf. Chapter Two, §4.2. 
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Russell was later to claim that his pre-OD attempts to implement a substitutional 
theory had ‗failed for want of the theory of denoting‘ (Grattan-Guinness 1977: 79-80), 
but that subsequently, ‗as a consequence of the new theory of denoting‘, he ‗found at 
last that substitution would work, and all went swimmingly‘ (Grattan-Guinness 1977: 
80).
10
 This development concerns the treatment of denoting phrases as incomplete 
symbols. An expression of the form ‗𝐺(det 𝐹)‘11 appears to represent a proposition 
attributing 𝐺-ness to whatever is (are) denoted by ‗det 𝐹‘. But the fact that ‗det 𝐹‘ is an 
incomplete symbol means that ‗𝐺(det 𝐹)‘ in fact expresses a proposition of a radically 
different form to that suggested by its surface linguistic structure. No constituent of the 
proposition corresponds to the expression ‗det 𝐹‘, and no constituent corresponds to 
‗𝐺(__)‘. (For recall that ‗𝐺(some 𝐹)‘ is not the assertion that 𝐺𝑥  is true for some given 
value of 𝑥, but rather the assertion that 𝐹𝑥  & 𝐺𝑥  is true for at least one value of 𝑥.) It 
follows that—appearances to the contrary notwithstanding—the proposition expressed 
by ‗𝐺(det 𝐹)‘ cannot be represented as the following substitution: 
 
(5) 𝐺𝑥 
det 𝐹
𝑥 
 
 
What is wrong with (5) as a representation of ‗𝐺(det 𝐹)‘ is not only that it falsely 
represents ‗det 𝐹‘ as having a propositional complement, but also that the proposition 
expressed by ‗𝐺(det 𝐹)‘ does not directly involve 𝐺𝑥 , as does (5). (If ‗det 𝐹‘ is ‗some 𝐹‘, 
‗𝐺(det 𝐹)‘ directly involves not 𝐺𝑥  but 𝐹𝑥  & 𝐺𝑥 .) As I put it in Chapter Three (§4), the 
predicate expression in ‗𝐺(det 𝐹)‘ is a quasi-incomplete symbol. 
 
If Russell‘s view entails that predicate expressions are quasi-incomplete symbols, 
the theory of descriptions is extremely ill-suited to the project of constructing a 
compositional semantics of natural language. But what is a weakness in the field of 
natural language semantics is a strength in Russell‘s domain. For one of the merits of 
the theory of descriptions is that it yields a principled revision of the account of the 
logical form of a certain class of propositions. Certain substitutions at the level of 
symbolism will fail to be legitimate—fail to accurately represent substitutions at the 
propositional level—on the basis that the positions to which the substitutions are 
                                                 
10
 I ignore the fact that the substitutional theory was ultimately unsuccessful. See Stevens 2005: ch. 3. 
11
 Here ‗det‘ stands for any determiner phrase. 
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applied are not, at the propositional level, really there. For example, to say that the class 
of 𝐹s has the property 𝐺, requires that we predicate 𝐺-ness of the class of 𝐹s. But the 
combination of the predicate 𝐺 with a denoting phrase does not yield a proposition of 
the form ‗𝐺(𝑎)‘, with ‗𝐺‘ representing the contribution of the predicate expression and 
‗𝑎‘ representing the contribution of the denoting phrase; rather, it yields an existential 
claim: that a certain complex propositional function is true for at least one value (and, to 
reiterate, that complex propositional function is not 𝐺𝑥 ). 
 
The above is, albeit in different terms, the basis of Russell‘s substitutional approach 
to the paradoxes in STCR. In the substitutional theory, Russell does without 
propositional functions. Functions, he claims, are ‗nothing at all without some 
argument‘ (STCR: 171). This, it seems to me, bears favourable comparison with the 
claim that predicate expressions are quasi-incomplete symbols. He continues: 
 
Hence, we can never say, of any formula containing a variable function, that it 
holds ‗for some value of 𝜙‘ or ‗for all values of 𝜙‘, because there is no such 
thing as 𝜙 and therefore there are no values of 𝜙. (STCR: 171) 
 
What was previously given in terms of functions will, on the substitutional theory, be 
given in terms of matrices and substitutions. Thus instead of ‗𝜙𝑥‘ (i.e. ‗𝑥 has the 
property 𝜙‘), we put ‗𝑝/𝑎;𝑥‘ (i.e. ‗the result of replacing 𝑎 in 𝑝 by 𝑥‘). (Strictly these 
cannot be equivalent, since the former is a sentence and the latter a definite description. 
To preserve equivalence, the latter should strictly be ‗𝑝/𝑎;𝑥!𝑞‘, i.e. ‗𝑞 results from 𝑝 by 
substituting 𝑥 for 𝑎 in all those places where 𝑎 occurs in 𝑝‘. Henceforth I follow 
Russell‘s lead (STCR: 170n.) in ignoring this point.) The variable function 𝜙 is replaced 
by the variable entities 𝑝 and 𝑎 (STCR: 172). The two entities 𝑝 and 𝑎 are now held to 
define a class, 𝑝/𝑎, and 𝑥 will be a member of 𝑝/𝑎 if 𝑝/𝑎;𝑥 is true.12 Now comes the key 
passage: 
 
To say that 𝑥 is a member of the class 𝛼 is now to say that for some values of 𝑝 
and 𝑎, 𝛼 is the matrix 𝑝/𝑎 and 𝑝/𝑎;𝑥 is true. Here, instead of the variable function 
𝜙, which could not be detached from its argument, we have the two variables 𝑝 
and 𝑎, which are entities, and may be varied. But now ‗𝑥 is an 𝑥‘ becomes 
                                                 
12
 To recapitulate the point made in parentheses above: strictly it is not 𝑝/𝑎;𝑥 that is true, but 𝑝/𝑎;𝑥!𝑞. Note 
also that 𝑝/𝑎 is not a class but a matrix. Matrices do duty for classes in the substitutional theory. 
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meaningless, because ‘𝑥 is an 𝛼‘ requires that 𝛼 should be of the form 𝑝/𝑎, and 
thus not an entity at all. In this way membership of a class can be defined, and at 
the same time the contradiction is avoided. (STCR: 172) 
 
This one passage draws together at least two strands of argument that Russell had 
previously tried, and which we have encountered in this essay. 
 
(𝑖) In Russell‘s reference to ‗the variable function 𝜙, which could not be detached 
from its argument‘ we catch an echo of the identification in PoM (§103, 104) of 
quadratic forms, and of the claim that: 
 
the 𝜙 in 𝜙𝑥 is not a separate and distinguishable entity: it lives in the 
propositions of the form 𝜙𝑥, and cannot survive analysis. (PoM: §85, 88) 
 
This view had come with a disclaimer: ‗I am highly doubtful whether such a view does 
not lead to a contradiction‘ (PoM: §85, 88); but it emerges in the present light as a 
foreshadowing of later developments. Compare: 
 
The fundamental logical principle from which the [substitutional] theory starts is 
one which few people would deny. It is that, in any sentence, a single word, or a 
single component phrase, may often be quite devoid of meaning when separated 
from its context. In such a case, if the word or phrase is wrongly assumed to 
have an independent meaning, we get what may be called a ‗false abstraction‘, 
and paradoxes and contradictions are apt to result. (STCR: 165) 
 
The 𝜙 in 𝜙𝑥 does not survive analysis: it is a ‗false abstraction‘ (it is a quasi-incomplete 
symbol) in much the same way as is ‗the present king of France‘ in ‗the present king of 
France is bald‘, or as is ‗{𝑧 (𝜓𝑧)}‘ in ‗𝑓{𝑧 (𝜓𝑧)}‘. 
 
(𝑖𝑖) The claim that ‗we have the two variables 𝑝 and 𝑎, which are entities, and may 
be varied‘ harks back to all of the problems concerning the relation between meaning- 
and entity-occurrence which had surfaced in the 1903-05 papers, and come to a head 
with the problems of meaning and denotation in the GEA. Recall Russell‘s claim in OF: 
 
It seems likely that meaning-variation must be distinguished from entity-
variation, and that two variables of which one means [i.e. occurs in meaning-
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position] and the other is [i.e. occurs in entity position] can only be equal by 
accident, and can‘t be kept equal throughout variation. (OF: 360) 
 
That 𝑝 and 𝑎 are both entities indicates that they are subject to precisely the same kind 
of variation—there is, without equivocation, only one kind of variation now. The 
difficulties of occurrence-as-meaning and occurrence-as-entity, and of entity- and 
meaning-variation, are left behind.
13
 
 
The abovementioned points go some way, I hope, towards providing a fuller 
understanding of the relation between the rejection of the theory of meaning and 
denotation, the development of the theory of descriptions, and the consequences of 
developments in the theory of denoting for the attempt to solve the paradoxes. 
 
Russell wrote of the recognition that class-symbols could be treated as incomplete 
symbols that it ‗made it possible to see, in a general way, how a solution of the 
contradictions might be possible‘ (MMD: 14). Now as Graham Stevens (2005: 49) 
notes, it is not acceptable to simply assume that Russell is referring in the quotation to 
the elimination of classes: we must understand the role of the theory of descriptions in 
the substitutional theory. But more than this, it is not really acceptable for those us who 
wish to understand the development of Russell‘s theories of denoting in the first half of 
the first decade of the twentieth century to simply note the relation of the theory of 
descriptions to the substitutional theory. What is wanting in addition is some 
understanding of the reasons why the substitutional approach failed to get off the 
ground prior to the discovery of the theory of descriptions—in virtue of what is the 
theory of descriptions so much better suited to Russell‘s purposes than his earlier 
theory? 
 
The answer is not—or is not simply—that the recognition of a class of incomplete 
symbols allows for the ontological elimination of classes. For as Russell pointed out 
 
                                                 
13
 Cf. Graham Stevens: ‗The most important consequence of the substitutional theory is that it disposes of 
the paradoxes without recourse to artificial restrictions on variation‘ (2005: 50). 
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All that is obtained by the substitutional method would still be true if there were 
after all such entities as classes and relations; we do not deny that there are such 
entities, we merely abstain from affirming that there are. (STCR: 188)
14
 
 
Rather, the most salient point is that the theory of descriptions, and the notion of an 
incomplete symbol, bring with them a commitment to the idea that analysis must be, in 
the first instance, SR-interpretive. Entire contexts must be analysed all at once, rather 
than piecemeal, word-by-word, phrase-by-phrase. This, it will be recalled, is what 
marks out Russell‟s theory as distinct from its more contemporary cousin at work in the 
philosophy of language. It also marks out the theory of descriptions as a radically new 
direction in Russell‘s thought. For it is, most fundamentally, the commitment to the 
primacy of SR-interpretive analysis that distinguishes the theory of descriptions from 
the theory of meaning and denotation. 
 
Wittgenstein declared that ‗Russell‘s merit is to have shown that the apparent 
logical form of the proposition need not be its real form‘ (1922: 4.0031). A satisfactory 
understanding of how Russell arrived at, and subsequently implemented, this great 
insight demands an account of the relation of the theory of denoting to the paradoxes. 
This essay, I hope, goes some way toward providing just such an account. 
 
The End. 
  
                                                 
14
 Cf. PM: 72, and also the earlier claim in STCR that ‗there really are no such things as classes‘ (STCR: 
166). 
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